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Information Strategies for Malaysia: Geographical, Organisational, Political 
and Technological Implications for Development 
Malaysia has undergone radical social, economic and political development over the 
last four decades. The information systems put in place to provide informational 
support for managing development projects have also changed from manual systems 
in the 1960s and 1970s, to computerised systems based on batch and on-line 
processing and networking in the 1980s, and multimedia in the 1990s. Two large 
scale information system programmes were studied in detail. The National Project 
Monitoring System (SETIA) and the National Land Information System (NALIS) 
involved co-ordination of individualised information systems and sharing of 
information by agencies at Federal, State (including District) and local authorities. 
Collection of information and the subsequent analysis of that information was guided 
by two theoretical frameworks: first the organisational perspectives framed by Web 
models which help in understanding the dynamics of computing in development; and 
second the subjective epistemological stance framed by structuration theory which 
helps to frame an understanding of the complexities of social relations surrounding 
information systems development. This research demonstrates how organisational 
behaviour, and a socio-political culture influenced by economic interests and personal 
ambition, can complicate large scale information systems development. Reluctance to 
share information; differences of appreciation and awareness and varying levels of 
understanding of the technology in use; inadequate and incompatible information; 
inadequate working strategies and standards; and imbalanced infrastructural support 
are among the major reasons for lack of success. However, in the implementation of 
information systems, problems related to human factors are not unique to Malaysia; 
rather they are common even among 'advanced' countries. But developing countries 
like Malaysia are often more sensitive to changes in economic and political 
environments. The concluding chapter of this thesis places the information strategy 
issues in the context of Malaysian and Southeast Asian political and economic events 
of 1998. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
"Governments will achieve better results by being realistic in what they set out to 
accomplish. They must strive to match what they do - and how they do it - to 
their institutional capabilities, not to some idealised model" (World Bank, 1997b, 
p. 39). 
This research is the product of a combination of several years of interest in Malaysian 
IT developments. The broad goal is to explore the irony of development - why stated 
development objectives can have little resemblance to development results. 
Governments rightly are concerned with setting a strategy and creating the conditions 
for implementing a strategy. Much further down the line are the individuals, groups, 
organisations and disciplinary cultures for whom strategy often means change and 
sometimes a threat to the 'status quo'. In the early 1990s in Malaysia information and 
technology seemed to be a major government agenda. We are almost coming to the 
end of the decade, yet the results of these programmes are still unclear, and it is still 
not apparent which of the large scale information technology undertakings are 
becoming a reality. 
An underlying theme of this study is to explore the meaning of 'development' as used 
by government in the context of Malaysia. For example, the government argues that 
Malaysia is considered much more well-off than other developing countries, but, what 
does this really mean? The thesis explores one significant aspect of development, 
programmes of establishing computerised information systems as enabling tools for 
development. The aim is to explore how these programmes are implemented and why 
they developed in the ways they did. As Osborne and Gaebler point out: 
"[People] simply want their governments to be more effective. It is for those 
who know something is wrong, but are not sure just how to bring it to life; for 
those who have launched successful experiments, but have watched those in 
power ignore them; for those who have a sense of where government needs to 
go, but are not quite sure how to get there" (1992, p. xv). 
This chapter begins by discussing selective areas of government development and 
growth policies and initiatives. The importance of a rich understanding of this issue in 
order to make implementable IT management and policy prescriptions is emphasised. 
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This is followed by presenting the aims of this thesis. Finally, the structure of the 
thesis is summarised 
1.2 Growth and Development 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Malaysian economy was one of the developing 
world's best performers (UNDP, 1996). It grew at 6.7% per annum from 1971 to 
1990. This growth was led by the manufacturing sector, which grew by 10.3% per 
year (GOM, 1991a). Performance was even stronger between 1994 and 1995, when 
the economy grew at 8.1% and the manufacturing sector at 12.3% per annum 
(GOM, 1993; 1996). There has been impressive structural transformation of the 
economy, with the manufacturing share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rising 
from 14% in 1971 to 31.5% in 1994 (GOM, 1993; 1996). 
But development in pursuit of economic growth is not always an 'appropriate' goal 
since the benefits of growth have different impacts on different groups. One 
Malaysian example is the highway upgrading project, where an objective of central 
government was to improve communication for the public. The work, however, was 
privatised. The result is high fees being charged to users of new or upgraded 
highways to recover directly the development costs. Although people can now travel 
more conveniently and quickly they must pay directly for 'enjoying' the extra service. 
Developments that are initially set up for all the people can end up primarily 
benefiting a minority. However, this dilemma is not unique to Malaysia. Many 
governments are considering the 'user pays' approach as a means of overcoming 
taxation and budget problems. This even extends to the provision and use of 
government information which, in the USA is deemed to be a freely available public 
good, but which elsewhere sometimes is regarded as a commodity that can generate 
income. 
The structure of Malaysian development can be assessed by looking at the evolution 
of manufacturing activities from light to heavy activities. In the 1970s, Malaysia 
started with a fairly light industrial structure, dominated by food processing, wood 
and textiles. By 1980 there had been a gradual change to manufacturing industries. 
Subsequent to that the rate of upgrading of Malaysian industry was very rapid, and 
2 
by 1990 Malaysia had a relatively advanced industrial structure, with the share of 
heavy industry only marginally lower than that of Korea and Taiwan (World Bank 
and UNDP, 1995). But according to the World Bank and the UNDP, Malaysian 
manufacturing sector achievements are not supported by local skills and local market 
productivity (Jomo, 1994; World Bank and UNDP, 1995; MASTIC, 1996). The 
World Bank report argued that Malaysia, though leading in high skill technology 
exports, is weak in terms of a well-educated and technically trained workforce, and in 
significant areas of research and development. Malaysia's industrial performance 
owes relatively little to Malaysia's own labour market, but is dependent considerably 
on an inflow of Foreign Direct Investments into sophisticated industrial and export 
activities. The report suggests that to achieve an 'advanced' industrial status Malaysia 
could not continue to depend on Foreign Direct Investment. Rather to continue its 
competitiveness Malaysia has a requirement to develop its own skills and knowledge 
through strong research and development programmes. 
1.3 I T and Development 
Current Malaysian initiatives for IT development, like manufacturing industrial 
projects, are encouraged through private investments; in particular foreign 
multinationals. As with industrial development programmes the introduction of large 
scale information system programmes was formulated in line with the government's 
vision to give Malaysia advanced country status. With regard to choice of IT, 
government believed that the use of the latest systems would ensure the support they 
needed in improving the efficiency of administrative systems and at the same time 
help to accelerate programmes for infrastructure development (MAMPU, 1993; 
Abdul Hamid, 1994). An awareness campaign regarding IT was actively enforced in 
early 1993 by the Malaysian Administrative and Modernisation and Manpower 
Planning Unit (MAMPU), the Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics Systems 
(MIMOS) and the National Institute of Public Administration (INTAN) in 
collaboration with various international agencies, for example, the Central Computer 
and Telecommunications Agency in the United Kingdom. MAMPU, as a government 
advisor in organisational management, formulated guidelines to be used by all public 
agencies in purchasing, upgrading and installing new computerised systems. A body 
responsible for the development and publication of standards, the Standards and 
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Industrial Research Institute Malaysia (SIRIM) organised thirteen committees to 
draw up IT standards. Working group 2 committee, for example, is responsible for 
devising standards in areas of telecommunication, information interchange and IT 
equipment interconnections; and working group 12 committee is responsible for 
standards in areas of Geographic Information Systems (GIS). In 1994 further 
development was made in areas of IT management when the National Information 
Technology Council (NITC) was established to act as a think-tank focusing on the 
development of IT in a nationwide context. However, IT management institutions like 
the NITC and MAMPU have succeeded only in drawing up the objectives for IT 
development, and the standards working group committees were not able to bring 
together relevant agencies to identify IT requirements. In establishing a national 
GIS/LIS standards, for example, there is continued disagreement over various issues 
(for example, issues on geospatial data and metadata requirements; pricing and 
control on information) among institutions such as the National Mapping Committee 
(NMC), National Remote Sensing Committee (NRSC), and Military Mapping 
Council (MMC) (Mohamed, 1994; Mohd Zin, 1994). The lack of infrastructural 
standards allowing for data and information access and sharing has forced many 
organisations to continue embarking on individual information system programmes. 
Among land-related organisations, for example, there are currently various types of 
Geographic and Land Information Systems (GIS/LIS) implemented independently. 
The problem of developing appropriate data/information sharing and exchange 
infrastructures is not unique to Malaysia; although to some extent the nature of the 
problem varies between countries. For example, in Britain there has been a diversity 
of interests involved in geographic information ranging from computer (hardware and 
software) vendors to information providers, public pressure groups and the academic 
community; and there is no single body responsible for various types of geographic 
information (Chorley and Buxton, 1991; Masser, 1996). In the absence of such a 
body the Ordnance Survey has played a role in the development of national 
geographic information strategies (Masser, 1996). Through the work of the Ordnance 
Survey Britain has been able to have a national series of digital maps based on a 
country-wide National Grid. In building a national information infrastructure Britain's 
main issues are to link other data sets to the core database (Masser, 1996). Some 
4 
areas that need to be addressed include that of pricing policy, in particular for 
Ordnance Survey data and methods of accessing data (Masser, 1996). The pricing 
and access issues faced by Britain, however, are different to those of the United 
States. The United States federal government places most of its data in the public 
domain; in other words there are no copyright restrictions (Nanson et al., 1996; 
Chrisman, 1997). However, this is a rare case for many countries around the world 
have maintained copyright laws and cost recovery programmes of some form (Rhind, 
1992). In the case of developing countries issues of access to information are still 
only vaguely understood. As Fox (1991) explained few Asian countries, for example, 
have "policies for establishing co-operation between different agencies, let alone 
policies for co-ordinating data collection efforts or for sharing information" (p. 63). 
An indication of the Malaysian government's views on research and development in 
IT, and related skills provision, is contained in the Prime Minister's 'Way Forward', 
popularly known as 'Vision 2020'. The Vision proposes nine challenges, one of 
which is to build a strong development foundation based on information technology. 
The Prime Minister argues that information technology is one of the most potent 
means of realising the goal of becoming a 'developed' country. Information 
technology is seen as the means of establishing an economy driven by intelligence, 
skills and diligence, and whose participants are in possession of a wealth of 
information, with the knowledge of what to do and how to do it. Information 
technology is said to "nurture the positive environment for the establishment of a 
scientific and progressive society and will enable the nation to secure a diversified 
and balanced economy" (NST, 1 August 1997). Vision 2020 sets clear goals for IT 
development and for achieving advanced country status. But how the Vision is to be 
implemented is not clearly stated. Implementation takes place in the context of 
existing structures and activities, and the goals can be interpreted differently by those 
responsible for implementation. 
The pace of development in Malaysia is strongly guided by the vision of one person, 
the Prime Minster. Mahathir has made this clear since his first position as a Cabinet 
minister. As Minister of Trade and Industry from 1978 to 19811, Mahathir marketed 
1 Mahathir was elected Prime Minister of Malaysia on My 16, 1981. 
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Malaysia as a centre for direct investment by American, European and Japanese 
manufacturing concerns. He argued: 
"What are we after when we welcome the multinationals? [He asked]. The first 
benefit, is an inflow of capital. Next is the creating of job opportunities - the 
single most important raiser of living standards. Then there must be some form of 
technology and skill transfer..." (Mohamad, 2 October 1979). 
Mahathir never lost sight of the interests of the multinational companies. However, he 
had a bolder and more ambitious vision which neither the older import substitution 
industries, nor the multinational based export oriented industrialisation, could realise. 
Mahathir did not intend development activities to be confined to a dependence on 
external multinational operations. He explained as follows: 
"We do not want to be grounded in the mediocrity of mere assembly operations 
[because] our future lies in the greater value-added secondary and tertiary 
processing of our raw materials and the higher technology industries" 
(Mohamad, 30 September 1986). 
He meant Malaysia to achieve the classical 'take-off on to a higher stage of 
industrialisation by way of a 'heavy industrialisation' drive, arguing that: 
"The push towards the development of heavy industries represents another new 
dimension of national development. I believe heavy industries will bring 
substantial benefits to the economy in terms of technology, skills and the 
numerous spin-offs, and will lay the foundation for Malaysia to become an 
industrialised society. We will not give up being producers of various agricultural 
commodities but we should overcome the mental block which condemns us to 
being the producers of primary commodities to find the growth of the 
industrialised countries. We must raise our sights and have the dynamic 
comparative advantage to sustain the development of heavy industries" 
(Mohamad, June 1984). 
However, Mahathir's development ideology was not without challenge from among 
local intellectuals and Cabinet members, but he was able to overcome his critics. For 
example, Mahathir's heavy industrialised drive was argued against by some on the 
grounds that the domestic market was too small and that the products had a low 
export potential given existing gluts for automobiles and steel (Chee, 1989; Jomo, 
1989; 1994). The absence of economies of scale made it likely that the projects would 
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require considerable levels of subsidy and protectionism which in turn would burden 
the local consumers; the projects would be highly dependent on foreign technology 
with a comparatively low degree of local participation in terms of content, expertise 
and management (Chee, 1989). Others (see, for example, Machado, 1987) argue that 
the projects needed massive capital investment and foreign borrowings over long 
gestation periods which would divert funds from other projects and render 
profitability uncertain. 
Despite criticism, the Prime Minister carried out what he believed to be a necessary 
economic shift. He realised that in order for Malaysia to become a developed country 
it could not continue with conventional manufacturing industries. The Multimedia 
Super Corridor (MSC) project was launched to move the country from a 
manufacturing base to an information based or multimedia based economy. As with 
the heavy industrial shift, many people, including members of Cabinet, had their 
reservations. The critical factor in developing the MSC is technology that allows 
composition and delivery of the content. Malaysia does not own that technology. 
Research and Development and skills are still at the planning stage. In other words, 
the Multimedia Super Corridor lacks the right supporting structure to spawn off 
technology start-ups (Bullis, 1997). 
It is impossible for skills and knowledge to be generated within a short-term period. 
For example, ISEAS (1986) and the World Bank and UNDP (1995) found Malaysia's 
skills training sector and educational programmes to be in need of major changes. 
They suggested that the private sector should be given more opportunity to 
participate in training programmes; that the Education Department should make 
changes in the school curriculum, for example, emphasising in areas related to 
national development policy such as in areas of IT; that improvements should be 
made to decrease the high drop-out rate among secondary level students; and that the 
enrolment of university students in science subjects should be increased. Further they 
stressed that the results of the improvements could not be expected in the short-term, 
for training and education takes time to mature. These suggestions have been taken 
up in general terms by related educational and training departments. But policy-
makers, in particular the Prime Minister, believe that current IT skills and knowledge 
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shortages should not become obstacles to government development plans; rather 
Malaysia should use its other assets such as material resources and political will to 
embark on development undertakings. In 1996 the Prime Minister said: 
'First, Malaysia's physical location at the centre of ASEAN and its multicultural 
links with the biggest Asian markets is unique...With new airport and 
communications infrastructure being built, Malaysia will be a highly efficient and 
effective hub for the region; second, [Malaysia has the cost advantage as 
compared to other newly industrialised economies in the region] my translation, 
we have no inherited systems or entrenched interests determined to defend their 
current positions. We have the political will and power to rapidly change any 
existing laws or policies that impede the ability of companies to capitalise on the 
benefits afforded by the information age. We will not be bogged down by 
excessive politicking; finally, we... have a track record of meeting our 
commitments. We are a pragmatic government which has consistently proven our 
critics wrong even when we adopt unconventional policies and strategies" (NST, 
1 August 1996). 
The Prime Minister's personal vision is clearly communicated to all layers of society. 
SETIA and NALIS, information system programmes which form a focus of this 
research, are among the two IT programmes that could be considered as initiatives 
that follow the strategy set by the Prime Minister. But how far could government 
programmes follow the track record set by industrial implementation programmes 
which are highly dependent on multinationals and Foreign Direct Investments? Or 
could government agencies operate as private corporations? The Prime Minister 
believes that it is feasible: 
"We have introduced many changes to the administrative system. I f previously 
we co-operated less with the private sector, today we consider the public and 
private sectors as a team that works together to develop the country" 
(Mohamad, 30 April 1993). 
Currently (late 1998) in almost every significant line of industry, advisory committees 
staffed by representatives of leading firms work closely with government agencies, 
making the most of important recommendations. For example, Daim Zainnuddin, a 
businessman, is the government's main financial advisor. The division between 
businessmen and public officials is becoming so thin that sometimes public servants 
find it rather difficult to make distinction between 'professional' business advice and 
public policy. The transfer of public authority to private hands frequently comes at the 
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initiative of large companies. But sometimes the government itself will make the first 
overtures, organising private associations, and then handing them the powers of the 
state, thereby supposedly moving toward decentralised forms of policy-making. In 
fact, these measures can merely transfer public power to favoured producers who can 
readily control markets without being held democratically accountable by the public 
for the sovereign authority they exercise. The Multimedia Development Corporation 
(MDC), for example, an agency that manages MSC, acts with public authorities on 
most matters, but it is an authority answerable only to the Prime Minister. 
Sometimes administrative personnel are drawn from the very industry that they are 
charged with regulating, their business background being taken as proof of their 
'expertise'; they return to higher positions in the same industry after serving their 
terms in office. For example, the secretary general from the Ministry of Industry and 
International Trade joined the administrative position of Heavy Industries Corpora-
tion of Malaysia; senior engineers from the Department of Works have joined 
highway project firms; senior officers from the Defence and Police Departments have 
joined Malaysian airlines and shipping corporations. Likewise, many accept higher 
paying jobs in companies whose interests they favoured whilst in office. This promise 
of a lucrative post with a private firm can exercise a considerable influence on the 
judgements of the ambitious public administrator. There exists, then, a large number 
of decision-makers who are with the government but not quite within it, who exercise 
public authority without having to answer to the public and who determine official 
policy while considering their first interests and obligations to be their private 
businesses. Again, it must be stressed that these tensions are not unique to Malaysia. 
In the United Kingdom the Nolan Committee reported in 1995 on 'Standards in 
Public Life', in particular addressing possible conflicts of interest (The Nolan 
Committee, May 1995). 
There is then the issue of whether Malaysia has enough organisational leaders capable 
of manoeuvring their agencies along the route of private development. As Cleary, 
Henry and Associates (1989) argue, sometimes public programmes are far more 
difficult to plan coherently than are private ones. They argued that problems faced by 
public programmes go beyond the boundaries of the programme that they are charged 
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with managing. Planning and setting priorities can be substantially more difficult 
because of less focused organisational goals. In addition, public administrators have 
to balance a range of other variables, including constituency pressures, the wishes of 
selected interest groups, the interaction of legislative committees, and a plethora of 
prospective social and economic changes that virtually no-one can predict. 
Programme planning in the public sector therefore bears little, i f any, relationship to 
what planning means in the private sector. Consequently, programme objectives in the 
public sector are characterised not by their definition, but by their lack of it. 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992), however, argue government involvement in the market 
is not new. They argued that: 
"Governments have done [setting rules of the marketplace] since the day 
government was invented. Zoning laws set the rules for real estate development. 
Securities laws set the rules for stock markets. . . Government constantly change 
rules of the marketplace to solve problems" (p. 280). 
They argued though that many governments in the developed countries (the argument 
is applicable for developing countries as well) have not realised that market 
mechanisms have always been used to achieve government goals. One should not 
look, they argued, at what a government does, but rather at how the government 
operates. They stressed that: 
"the shift is under way all around us, but because we are not looking for it-
because we assume that all governments have to be big, centralised, and 
bureaucratic-we seldom see it. We are blind to the new realities, because they do 
not fit our preconceptions" (p. 321). 
Nonetheless, there are some (Kettl, 1995; Fox, 1996; Frederickson, 1996) who argue 
that one should also look to quality of change made by government. As Kettl (1995) 
argues, some of the common changes suggested, such as downsizing, has "largely 
become a symbolic tactic, a way for elected officials to resonate with the concerns of 
the voters without directly attacking the problem of making government work better " 
(p 38). 
Similarly Frederickson (1996) argues that: 
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"The reinventing government. . . turns the old policy-administration dichotomy on 
its head. In the traditional dichotomy, Congress (city council, state legislature) 
makes laws, and the civil service, under the oversight of the president (mayor, 
governor), carries it out. In reinvention, the elected executive and the 
empowered public service engage in 'steering,' 'missions,' and in getting 
'results ' These are all metaphors of political power that speak to the realignment 
of that power in the direction of elected executives" (p. 269) 
The differences of opinions among these authors suggest that sometimes it is difficult 
to justify government action or in-action. But for Malaysia, government practice, in 
particular its emphasis on large scale development projects and dependence on the 
finance and skills of multinationals, confronted government in mid-1997 when the 
Asian economic crisis hit the region. The government could not come up with bold 
measures to stop out-flow of foreign businesses, closing down of local businesses and 
the increase in job losses. Government staff themselves had their contracts cut which 
meant postponing programmes of various types. One such programme is that for 
training and education; cuts were made at school and university levels on facilities like 
computers and advanced training in IT (NST, 20 September 1997; 30 July 1998; 3 
September 1998). The prospects for improvement in Malaysia's economic environ-
ment have remained uncertain. Since September 3 r d 1998 when the Deputy Prime 
Minister was dismissed Malaysia's long-term political stability and possible economic 
recovery has been a subject of international debate. 
1.4 Study Aims and Objectives 
The present research used two national scale public computerised information 
systems as vehicles through which to explore experiences of information systems 
development in Malaysia: the Integrated Project Monitoring System (SETIAJ^ an 
established information system programme and the National Land Information System 
(NALIS) a newly organised compulsed information system programme. The two 
programmes are different in nature but have similar general objectives - to manage 
information efficiently a.nd effectively for use in planning and decision-making 
processes, as well as the sharing of information by users (public agencies) at different 
geographical locations. A total of 91 agencies2 from Federal, State (including 
2 In the present study generally the term agency is used to describe a broad range of offices such as 
in ministries, departments, units, divisions, etc. In case where specific reference is required the exact 
name of the office is used. 
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District) and local authority levels were investigated to provide the necessary 
information in understanding the government and public servants in the undertaking 
of information systems development for Malaysia. Using these two case studies the 
main aims of this thesis are: 
• to evaluate the process of information technology adoption in the 
organisational context and to explore the strategy (if any) of making 
information technology choices. 
• to identify in detail where significant IT adoption has taken place. 
• to assess adaptation issues, that is, how much the adopted information 
technology has been adapted by the organisations. 
• to explore the broader contextual factors, external and internal to agencies, 
that may have affected IT programme development. 
• to assess how IT has improved communications within and between 
organisations; and within areas in Peninsular Malaysia and between the 
regions of Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia. 
With these aims in mind this study explores the following, more specific issues, 
involved in the implementation of information systems in Malaysia: 
• The role of government has been considered as critical for influencing the 
diffusion of IT in organisations and societies, and in the development of 
supportive IT infrastructures and capabilities (Kraemer et al, 1992; 1994). In this 
thesis it is argued that government development policy has a significant influence 
on the computerisation activities of programme agencies. Similarly, computerisa-
tion activities in strategic government departments such as MAMPU, ICU and 
EPU collectively exert an influence on government IT policy. This thesis 
therefore finds it necessary to explore issues at national policy level as well as 
issues at the levels of individual programmes and organisations. Information from 
these levels provides a picture of the elements that created Malaysia's IT 
environment. 
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» Many authors (Cartwright, 1991; Masser and Campbell, 1991; Taylor, 1991b) 
have argued that developing countries often have a tendency to embark on 
ambitious IT planning rather than adopting a small-scale and gradual approach. 
But because of the cost and complexity of advanced systems many IT 
programmes have been abandoned or have failed to meet their desired objectives. 
This thesis seeks to evaluate how far this assertion is true in the case of 
Malaysia's IT programmes initiatives. In addition, some (Bawden, 1989; Masser 
and Campbell, 1991; Goodman, 1993; Campbell and Masser, 1995) have argued 
that in the implementation of IT programme many organisations have failed to 
draw management information strategies to identify, for example, user 
requirements, the types of information available and ways of sharing data. This 
has often resulted in a mismatch between user needs and what they receive. This 
problem is viewed as the reason for agencies' reluctance in co-operating with an 
IT programme. This thesis evaluates how far this issue is relevant to Malaysian 
organisations. 
• Malaysia has implemented several large-scale computerised information 
system programmes but very few have managed to survive beyond their pilot 
study stage (Chee, 1989; Han, 1991). Similarly, many individual information 
systems have been implemented but few have managed to achieve their planned 
objectives. Some authors for example, Campbell (1991), Hastings and Clark 
(1991), Hutchinson and Toledano (1993) and Sahay and Walsham (1996) argue 
that sometimes organisations are more interested in demonstrating the techno-
logy than in solving real problems. This thesis assesses how far this problem 
extends to the Malaysian IT development context. 
• The government claimed (Mampu, 1993; Abdul Hamid, 1994) that the reach 
of computer system implementation has expanded to cover not only units of 
particular agencies through the use of local area networks (LANs) but also to 
every State and District through the use of wide area networks (WANs). 
Through nationwide investigation this thesis assesses to what extent LANs and 
WANs are used by Malaysian public agencies. The level of LAN and WAN use 
will help to illustrate the extent to which electronic information exchange and 
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sharing activities occurs between and among agencies. In addition, the 
availability of LANs or WANs will help to explain the design adopted for NALIS 
which is highly dependent on LAN and WAN linkages for successful information 
sharing and exchange. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter two describes Malaysia's 
geographical and economic position with respect to other countries in the Asian 
region. A discussion of the region is then related to the general socio-economic 
profile in Malaysia, in particular its development and political preferences. The second 
part of chapter two describes the case studies. 
Chapter three provides the conceptual background to the research. It aims to explore 
wider problems and issues of information technology and development experience in 
other countries, both developed and developing. The chapter explores the relationship 
of 'development' to the implementation of new information technology, such as 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS). The development path chose by government, 
the type of technology preferred by government and generally types of technology are 
considered 'appropriate' for most developing countries are emphasis in this 
discussion. Implementation experiences of various countries are used to outline the 
factors which are necessary for successful implementation of Geographic Information 
Systems in developing countries. 
Chapter four provides a theoretical foundation for the research. Two theoretical 
perspectives, Kling's Web model and Giddens' Theory of Structuration, which are 
used to guide the empirical and analytical aspects of the research are discussed in 
further detail. The Web model is used to explore the dynamics of computing use and 
development in organisations. Structuration theory takes on the discussion of human 
actors in organisations, and helps to form an understanding the meaning of an 
organisation from the subjective point of view; that is, treating organisations as 
subjects whose meanings are to be appreciated and understood rather than as objects 
that could be taken-for-granted. 
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The theoretical constructs lead to the information collection methodology in Chapter 
five. This chapter consists of three major discussion areas: research focus and 
strategy; the information collection approach; and techniques of information analysis. 
The first part describes the research focus and strategy. The former includes a brief 
explanation of the researcher's background in relation to the study area. The research 
strategy then follows, explaining how previous experience helped to develop initial 
research questions and the identification of initial groups of agencies for the purposes 
of pilot a study. The latter part of this chapter discusses the techniques used to 
evaluate the information collected during fieldwork. 
Chapters six and seven discuss the results of this evaluation. Chapter six is divided 
into three parts; the first discusses issues related to the SETIA programme, the 
second discusses the findings related to NALIS and the final section summarises 
issues arising from both programmes. Historical accounts of the programmes are 
related to the present context by drawing on the results of primary data collection 
from fieldwork. 
In Chapter seven two approaches are used to develop further the issues discussed in 
Chapter six. In the first approach structuration theory is used to reconstruct the social 
reality outlined in Chapter six. Here through action or inaction organisational actors 
are explained as a product of their behaviour - how they act and interpret their action 
to fit the environment in which they live. Part two of the chapter explains how the 
actions of these organisational actors and political leaders produce and reproduce 
Malaysia's development pattern and how these actors and leaders consciously and 
unconsciously help to generate problems in relation to programme implementation. 
Chapter eight concludes the research. Discussion in this chapter focuses on 
knowledge and experience gathered from the case studies, and explores the ways in 
which geographical, organisational, political and technological issues were selected 
for action. Here, the research highlights both areas where Malaysian government has 
achieved its desired development objectives and areas where improvements are still 
needed. Suggested recommendations take account, not only of the findings of the 
present research, but also of views that are adopted by other researchers. These 
15 
suggestions are drawn in the form of guidelines that could be relevant not only for 
Malaysia but also for other developing countries. 
Many of the issues contained in this thesis highlight government performances in 
meeting public needs. In the case of Malaysia many of these issues are considered 
sensitive for various reasons including restriction of legal and moral laws. With few 
exceptions, for example, Jomo (1989; 1994) and Chee (1986) academic writings have 
avoided discussion of the 'real' government problems and issues. Through the course 
of the present research various formerly hidden issues were brought to light 
following, first, the Asian economic crises in mid-1997 and then the dismissal of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, in September 1998 which resulted in political 
unrest. These happenings open-up many of the 'hidden' government agendas once 
considered sensitive for public knowledge. However, the Internal Security Act was 
enforced to control the spread of the unwanted news or behaviour and for many local 
researchers the dilemma of explaining and publishing the truth continues. 
The present research is able to link on-going political and social debates with 
evidence from the field and to compare it with the grand policies of Vision 2020. The 
inclusion of these factors differentiates this thesis from previous academic research 
which is able to evaluate only cautiously the mismanagement of development by 
government leaders and servants. Notwithstanding the findings of this research and 
that of other researchers, the openness in confronting development problems in a 
country with a dominant leader may be understood as criticism rather than taken as a 
public view on government 'problems'. It remains to be seen whether the post-1980s 
development ideology which incorporates the concepts of participation and 
empowerment will help to break down such political barriers to effective 
implementation of IT in poorer countries. 
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Chapter 2 Study Area and Case Identification: the context 
2.1 Introduction and Study Area 
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, the basis fGr selecting the study area will be 
outlined. Discussion at this level includes understanding Malaysia's geographical, socio-
cultural and administrative background, and relationships within the Asian region in 
general and ASEAN countries in particular. Second, the chapter will explain the basis for 
selecting specific case studies. This includes placing the case studies within the context of 
broader national IT development initiatives. 
The geographical focus for this research is Malaysia (Map 2.1). One important 
underlying reason for choosing this as a study area is the researcher's familiarity with and 
background knowledge of the country. A second reason is grounded in the country's 
current development strategy which promotes IT-related ventures as a means to enhance 
development. The third reason relates to the Southeast Asian regional context, which is 
considered in the following section. 
2.1.1 Regional Perspectives 
In 1995, when the research for this thesis began, Southeast Asia in particular and Asia in 
general, formed a strong part of the world economy. For example, the four Asian Tigers, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan were exemplary countries in 
competitive trade. Malaysia was not far behind, and in fact, was on the verge of joining 
the four Tigers (IMF, 1997). Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines were praised on 
certain aspects of their economic development (U.S. DOC, 1995). Two years later, in 
1997, the economy of the whole region collapsed. Thailand suffered from plunging stock 
and real-estate markets, and a banking system in shambles. South Korea experienced 
high-profile bankruptcies, highlighting the runaway debts of many corporate empires 
which exposed the banks that owned those debts. By 1998 all countries in the region 
were experiencing deep financial troubles. Interestingly, international capital markets 
suddenly noticed that countries throughout this region had been running large trade 
deficits and economists (see, for example Greenspan, 1997; Krugman, 1997; Noland, 
1997) are now re-evaluating the region's economic position. These authors have prop-
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osed that the root of Asia's troubles lies not with economics but in poor government 
policy that has misguided investments and has encouraged lending to weak financial 
sectors of the market. They argue that financial problems in the region have been 
apparent for a long time, but that government officials have ignored the situation. These 
authors argue that Asian economies, to varying degrees over the last half century, have 
tried to combine rapid growth with a much higher mix of government-directed 
production than has been evident in the essentially market-driven economies of the West. 
Through government inducements, a number of sophisticated manufacturing technologies 
borrowed from the advanced market economies were applied to the generally low 
productivity and, hence, low-wage economies. Thus for selected products, exports 
became competitive with those of the market economies, engendering rapid overall 
economic growth. As a consequence of the slackening of export expansion, caused in 
part by losses in competitiveness and the dollar appreciating against the Yen1 aggregate 
economic growth slowed somewhat, even before the mid-1997 financial crises. The 
situation was exacerbated by a variety of policy errors. For example, in countries such as 
Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, authorities permitted the development of serious 
asset-liability mismatches; banks financed long-term domestic lending through short-run 
foreign borrowing; the financial system was politicised; capital was channelled to 
politically preferred borrowers; and financial decisions were strongly influenced by non-
economic considerations, including outright corruption (The Economist, 2 - 8 August 
1997; 9-15 August 1997; 4 -10 October 1997; Wehrfritz, 1997). Such practices may be 
sustainable as long as the rate of economic growth remains high, as financial institutions 
compensate for the low effective rate of return on loss to these preferred borrowers with 
high rates of return on other loans. However, as growth slackens, adverse consequences 
' Noland (1997, p. 2) explains the Asian exchange rate misalignment as such: "Beginning in 1985, the 
Japanese yen began a rapid appreciation against other currencies, particularly the US dollar. As the 
relative cost of production in Japan rose, Japanese firms reacted by moving production offshore, mainly 
to South Korea and Taiwan. To counteract this shock to the domestic economy, Japanese authorities 
pursued an aggressive policy of monetary expansion. The result was an asset price bubble in Japan and 
massive capital inflows into South Korea and Taiwan. By the late 1980s, these two economies came 
under similar pressure to appreciate their currencies, with similar results: aggressive monetary 
expansion, asset price bubbles at home and large capital outflows - this time principally to Southeast 
Asia". 
With the case of Malaysia, for example, Yen loans had grown with the 'Look East' policy from the early 
1980s. At the time the Yen provided lower interest Japanese credit compared to other credit options 
(Jomo, 1989). 
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emerge. Bad loan begins to inhibit the ability of banks and non-bank lending institutions 
to supply credit to the economy (Greenspan, 1998). 
These economic crises highlight weaknesses of the Asian region, and of developing 
countries in general, at two levels. First, among countries in the region approaches to 
development need to be re-considered, for investors are now more cautious when dealing 
with Asian countries. Second, unequal distribution of wealth becomes more revealing in 
the global context. Countries like Indonesia, the Philippines and Bangladesh, for 
example, remain what they have always been; exporters of raw materials and importers of 
manufactured goods. Income in Thailand and even Malaysia, despite high-scale economic 
activities, is not related to local skills and local industries. The basis of productivity is 
profit provided through dependency upon Foreign Direct Investment, multinational 
corporations and foreign aid (United Nations, 1987; World Bank and UNDP, 1995). 
Governments, investors and developers of this region are now fighting to rebuild their 
status. For Malaysia, the financial catastrophe hit when government promises to the 
people were at their highest. The following section describes Malaysia's government, 
society and its development planning. 
2.1.2 Study Area Profile 
Malaysia is a federation, consisting of thirteen States and two Federal Territories. Eleven 
of the States are in Peninsular Malaysia and the remaining two States, separated from 
Peninsular Malaysia by about 800 kilometres of sea, are Sabah and Sarawak. The 
country's total land area is 329,758 km 2. Peninsular Malaysia makes up about 40%, 37% 
covers Sarawak and the remaining 23% covers Sabah. About sixteen million people live 
in Peninsular Malaysia and almost two million live in each of Sabah (1.8 million) and 
Sarawak (1.9 million) (Table 2.1). The social and cultural complexity of Malaysia lies 
with its population which consists of three major communities in Peninsular Malaysia 
(Malays, Chinese and Indians) and several minor groups includings Thais, Vietnamese, 
Eurasian and European; eight communities in Sabah (including Murut, Bajau and Malay); 
and seven in Sarawak (including for example, Malay, Melanau, Sea Dayak, Land Dayak). 
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Table 2.1: Estimated State Population Distribution (1997)* 
State % of Land Area % of total 
Population 
Population Density 
(no. of people per 
km 2) 
Peninsular 
Malaysia: 
Federal 0.1 6.9 5,897.1 
Territory of 
Kuala Lumpur 
Kedah 2.9 7.9 172.1 
Kelantan 4.5 6.9 99.9 
Melaka 0.5 3.3 408.5 
Negeri 
Sembilan 
2.0 4.1 126.0 
Pahang 10.9 6.0 35.1 
Perak 6.4 12.4 119.0 
Perlis 0.2 1.0 264.1 
Pulau Pinang 0.3 6.4 1,236.7 
Selangor 2.4 11.2 290.0 
Terengganu 3.9 4.3 72.0 
East 
Malaysia: 
Sabah 
22.4 8.4 26.0 
Sarawak 37.7 9.4 15.7 
Federal 00.02 included under included under Sabah 
Territory of 
Labuan 
Sabah 
Malaysia 100.0 100.0 63.6 
(total land area 
329,758 km 2) 
(20,961,000) (average no. of people 
per km 2) 
*Note: Based on Department of Statistics 1991 annual population growth rate. 
Source: Department of Statistics, 1991. 
These major communities could be subdivided further into approximately ten sub-
communities in Peninsular Malaysia and thirty-two sub-communities in Sabah and 
Sarawak (DOS, 1991). The bumiputeras2 make up the dominant population. In terms 
of employment, people from the bumiputeras group hold largely government and agricu-
2 Bumiputeras are native to the land. In Peninsular Malaysia they include the Malay, who make up eight 
of its sub-communities (the Indonesian, Negrito, Jakun, Semai, Semelai, Temiar, and other Malay 
races). For Sabah there are the Kadazan, Murut, Bajau, Indonesia, and seventeen other indigenous 
groups. In Sarawak there are the Malays, Melanau, Sea Dayak, Land Dayak and eight other indigenous 
groups. 
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ltural jobs. The bumiputeras are concentrated in rural areas, and form a direct link to 
agricultural activities. The Chinese dominate the commercial sector and are directly 
associated with urban living and higher incomes (Table 2.2). Indians and other ethnic 
groups make up smaller percentages in the workplace. 
Table 2.2: Percentage of Workers in Professional Occupations 
Ethnic group Chinese Malays Indians Others 
% in professional 
occupations 
55.9 28.9 13.3 1.9 
*Note: High income jobs - architects, accountants, engineers, doctors, 
lawyers and surveyors. 
Source: Second Outline Perspective Plan, 1991-2000. 
Ethnicity of employment patterns changed to some extent after 1980 when the 
government began rigorously to invest in favour of the bumiputeras. The latter were 
provided with various types of business opportunities and saving schemes, for example, 
the National Secured Share Scheme, and investment in government business ventures 
with guaranteed yearly interest. Nonetheless, since the Chinese have dominated 
commercial and urban-related businesses for many generations, government efforts to 
penetrate the commercial sector in this way proved to be difficult (except, for a few 
selected politically well-connected bumiputeras). In thriving major cities like the Federal 
Territory of Kuala Lumpur and Pulau Pinang, Chinese dominance remains. However, 
with continued government assistance in pulling more bumiputeras to urbanised living, 
dominantly Malay States such as Kedah, Perlis and Terengganu, have become 
increasingly urbanised. By 1990, the government's national development strategy took a 
more ambitious turn. Investment planning was directed towards attracting high-quality 
input ('high-tech' and service industries) from international markets. During this time the 
economy was at its peak, with growth of domestic economy (GDP) standing at an 
average rate of 8.2% in comparison to 5.9% in the previous planning period (1985-1990) 
(GOM, 1991a). 
2.1.3 Development Policies and Major Projects 
In late 1990, the government introduced a new set of development guidelines for 
Malaysia, and two major policies were introduced; first, the New Development Plan 
22 
(taking the place of the New Economic Policy which began in 1970) and second, Vision 
2020. The New Development Plan promised to meet four basic objectives: 
9 to reduce poverty and relative income inequalities; 
© to address employment and the rapid development of the bumiputeras' 
commercial and industrial community; 
• to increase growth in the private sector to achieve restructuring (i.e. balancing 
ethnic and poverty disparity); and 
• to address human resource development to achieve growth and distributional 
objectives (i.e. expand training in major sectors, in particular IT). 
Vision 2020 follows on from the New Development policy emphasising ten major 
factors, the most important of which is the creation of 'balanced development' to ensure 
stable growth, to minimise social conflict, to promote racial harmony and to enhance 
national unity. 
Several grandiose projects have arisen from the these main development policies. These 
projects have included: the TELEKOM building, the tallest building in Asia when it was 
built; the PETRONAS twin towers, the world's tallest building; Kuala Lumpur 
International Airport, the biggest international airport in the region; the Multimedia 
Super Corridor (MSC), a test-bed for IT innovation and duplicating California's Silicon 
Valley; Putrajaya, a new, administrative capital of Malaysia expected to be a mega-city 
comparable to Tokyo and Yokahama; and Cyberjaya an intelligent city, to be a learning 
zone for local people and a living environment for investors working in the MSC. These 
developments are intended to help make Malaysia an 'advanced' country by the year 
2020. State-of-the-art communications and telecommunication technologies are 
emphasised as major tools in this development, as are perceived as a means of bridging 
distances between regions, areas and cultures. 
The MSC project has been devised as a catalyst to draw investors to Malaysia. The 
seriousness of this IT venture is apparent since Prime Minister himself has played the 
lead role in promoting plans for the MSC world-wide. Ten commitments (or the 
Multimedia Bill of Guarantee) are made to investors. These are: 
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• to provide a world class physical information infrastructure; 
• to allow unrestricted movement of knowledge workers in and out of the 
country with no employment restrictions; 
• to ensure freedom of ownership of companies; 
• to allow freedom of sourcing capital globally for MSC infrastructure and 
freedom of borrowing funds; 
• to provide competitive financial incentives including tax allowance for up to 10 
years and no duties on the import of multimedia equipment; 
• to develop intellectual property protection and cyberlaws; 
• no censorship of the Internet; 
• to provide globally competitive telecommunications tariffs; 
• to tender-out infrastructure contracts, (i.e. to not be restricted by normal 
tender guidelines which require preference to be given to locals); and 
• provide a high-powered agency to assist implementation (i.e. a separate body 
established especially to manage MSC, with the objective of reducing 
bureaucracy). 
On the supply side, in preparation for the machinery and facilities to support the MSC, 
seven flagship projects were introduced. First, the establishment of 'smart schools' or 
schools utilising computers and advanced software for education and administration. 
Second, the introduction of multi-media smart-cards, to enable MSC residents and 
eventually all citizens to have a single card that will function as their identity cards, (an 
electronic purse for making purchases, a driving license and personal storage device). 
Third, creating R&D clusters to enable companies to share infrastructure, resources and 
expertise in research and development. Fourth, building an electronic government which 
involves intra-government, business-to-government and citizen-to-government interac-
tions. The aim is to enable on-line registration, licensing payments and enquiries (this is 
to allow government to monitor the effectiveness of policies among various agencies and, 
at the same time, to reduce costs by streamlining internal processes). Fifth, strengthening 
of industrial strategy by sharing design and expertise through the use of web mechanisms, 
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that is, reducing the distance problems between industries. Sixth, creating on-line 
information marketing. Seventh, developing tele-medicine applications, for medical 
records management, remote diagnosis and optimisation of specialist resources and 
distributor medical databases. 
2.2 A Development Paradox 
The paradox of planning for development in Malaysia (and which is common among 
other developing countries) revolves around the conflict between demand and supply. In 
most cases demand for development is set before the supply of resources is made ready. 
One critical supply factor in Malaysia's current development is that of skilled labour. The 
labour problem, however, is not new, having existed since the first economic shift (from 
agriculture to heavy manufacturing) in the 1970s, and continuing through the second 
shift (from light manufacturing to high-technology industries) in the 1980s. Over recent 
years a training focus on IT has not been neglected but has been slow in comparison to 
project investments. Malaysia has been able to cope with shortages in skilled labour 
because Foreign Direct Investment and foreign multinationals have always supplied 
experts (United Nations, 1987; World Bank and UNDP, 1995). This ability to maintain a 
close relationship with foreign multinationals has made Malaysia, after Singapore, the 
second most important industrial centre for the ASEAN region. 
The development of MSC has followed the same strategy. Due to shortages of trained 
personnel in IT, experts have been called from various international markets. The 
government used a similar argument to rationalise MSC's development, expecting that 
there would be an exchange of knowledge between foreign investors and local companies 
and in the long-term hoping that the spill-over from the MSC area would cover the 
whole country. Some analysts (World Bank and UNDP, 1995; Bullis, 1997; The 
Economist, 29 March 1997) have raised concerns about Malaysia's continued 
dependence on Foreign Direct Investment and foreign multinational corporations 
especially in relation to Singapore as the strong 'high-tech' competitor (Bullis, 1997) and 
the emergence of India as a new and cost efficient 'high-tech' centre in Asia (The 
Economist, 30 September 1995; 29 March 1997) and this issue will be explored as part 
of the current research. The same concern has also been highlighted by local companies 
and public organisations (NST, 1 August 1997). 
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2.2.1 Skilled Support 
Some studies (World Bank and UNDP, 1995; MASTIC, 1996) report that the supply of 
skilled labour to industry in Malaysia lags behind the development programme created. 
Two of the reasons highlighted by such studies are: first, the level of student enrolment in 
schools and universities has remained below the national target at all times; and second, 
an educational imbalance, with students not favouring technological subjects (all science 
and technology areas as well as engineering), means that skills are not keeping pace with 
industrial structural changes in the country compared to other countries in the region. 
(Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3: Educational Enrolments in Selected Countries 
Tertiary Level Enrolment % 
Country Total % 
of age 
group 
All Science 
and 
Technology 
Subjects 
Engineering 
Only 
Vocational 
Training 
Enrolment 
Malaysia 7.0 0.15 0.07 0.17 
Thailand 16.0 0.16 0.09 0.80 
Taiwan 37.0 0.92 0.60 2.12 
South 
Korea 
40.0 0.96 0.58 1.93 
Source: Wor d Bank anc UNDP, 1995. 
2.2.2 Research and Development 
The national R&D expenditure for Malaysia has been estimated as 0.8% Gross National 
Product (GNP), with more than 80% being provided by the public sector (MOSTE, 
1996). The share from the private sector is minimal. From the total allocation of R&D, 
about half is allocated to agriculturally-related research, 34% to industry and 17% to 
other sectors (MOSTE, 1996). Agriculture takes a significant share because the sector 
has had a strong institutional framework. In 1997 there were thirteen public research 
institutions catering for the agricultural sector whereas in the technology-related sector 
there were only two; namely, the Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia 
(SIRTM) and the Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics Systems (MIMOS). The low 
uptake of research and development in technology relates directly to skills and training, 
there being very limited numbers of competent R&D personnel within the industry 
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(MASTIC, 1996). Government, nonetheless, has a recent history of persisting with 
policies to accelerate R&D. In 1986, for example, about US$40 million were allocated 
to universities for R&D. However, the link between academic R&D and industrial 
product innovation has not been strong (World Bank and UNDP, 1995; MASTIC 1996). 
This is because academic science, until very recently, has invariably been pursued as an 
independent research function and has been isolated from relatively low technology 
domestic industries. The tendency for sectors such as education and R&D to act 
independently could be explained by the structure and culture of administration, and by 
the organisations in which sectors are embedded. 
2.3 Administration and Organisational Structure 
Malaysia administrative structure comprises three levels: Federal, State (including 
District) and local authority (Figure 2.1). Each level is differentiated in many ways. 
Figure 2.1: Existing Government Hierarchy (1998) 
Level 
Federal 
Links between 
Federal & State *~ 
State <-
Links between 
Linkages 
State Secretariat Conference 
Secretary Generals 
Heads of Services and State Secretariat 
State Executive Council 
State & Local Authorities State Development Council 
1 
Local District Development Committee 
At the Federal level, the Ministry is the highest level agency. The primary role of a 
Ministry is to formulate policies, and to plan and monitor programmes under the 
portfolio of a Minister. The implementation of Ministry programmes is the responsibility 
of departments which, in general, operate at State and local authority levels. 
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Administration at the State level is commonly divided into three levels: District, 'Mukim' 
(or Sub-District) and Village. The District Officer, who is the local executive in the 
District, is responsible for administration and development and reports directly to a State 
Secretariat. The State Secretariat is the most important department at State level. The 
State Secretary is the chief executive administrator in the State and acts as advisor to the 
Menteri Besar or Chief Minister, and to the Executive Council. The State Secretariat's 
function is to plan and co-ordinate all State policies and to ensure their implementation 
by all departments, including District offices. 
Local authority outside the Federal Territory comes under the control of the State 
Government. This is an independent level of government and is provided with powers 
and autonomy in many areas. At the local authority level, the bodies that hold executive 
power are referred to as municipalities or district councils. 
Because of the differentiated power between the Federal and State governments there are 
several council bodies and various committees established for co-ordinating purposes. 
The highest co-ordinating level involves Secretary Generals, heads of services and State 
Secretaries. To guard the specific interests of States there is a council of Chief Ministers 
and Menteri Besar (in the Federated Malay States). 
2.4 Organisational and Administrative Culture 
A total of 27 Federal ministries and a combination of 338 departments, units, divisions, 
etc. from Federal, State, District and local authorities make up the administrative 
structure described above. Every agency has a history of its own and has an individual 
culture to uphold. The strongest is the bureaucratic culture of public administrators. The 
latter play a dominant role in most agencies, by holding high level positions. In recent 
years, more professionals have been selected to head departments of a technical nature 
but the domination of public administrators over other professionals has not changed. 
Key agencies such the Prime Minister's Department, the Finance Ministry, and the 
Ministry of Industry and International Trade (MITI), for example, are run exclusively by 
administrators. This lack of recognition of professionals is one reason why many 
technical professionals are leaving public service. 
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2.4.1 Organisational Culture 
Hierarchy is of central importance amongst Malaysian organisations. Because of status, 
those at higher levels have a stronger voice in decision-making even though lower level 
official may have more substantive expertise. Government (represented by the Chief 
Secretary to the Government) has argued that this approach to decision-making has 
changed. According to the Chief Secretary current management approaches are based on 
decentralisation, flat organisation, empowerment and team work (Abdul Hamid, 1994). 
In practice, however, this approach is rarely encountered, due to barriers grounded in 
seniority, corporate leadership, and political influence. [See for example, arguments by 
the chairpersons of the Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics Systems (MIMOS) and 
the Multimedia Development Corporation (MDC) who maintain that this issue is a 
problem in enhancing MSC's development to national level, (NST, 1 August 1997)]. 
2.4.2 Administrative Culture 
Malaysian administrative culture has been to have remained unchanged since 
independence from Great Britain in 1957 (Kessler, 1992). Within the overall 
organisational system decisions always rest with the Prime Minister's office. The present 
Prime Minister's administration is even more highly regarded because of his assertive 
actions towards change for the country. In his early days as Cabinet minister (in the 
1970s) the present Prime Minister introduced the idea of change for Malaysian society, 
especially among the bumiputeras. His ideas were implemented soon after he became 
Prime Minister in 1981. His first initiative for change was adopting a 'Look East' policy 
through emulating Japanese and South Korean work style ethics. This policy was 
followed by the 'Malaysia Incorporated Concept', where Malaysia's workers were urged 
to 'serve their offices' as i f they were serving the country. In 1983, the Prime Minister 
announced the Malaysian government's commitment to privatisation (to changing of the 
status of business, service or industry from State, government or public ownership to 
private ownership. The term sometimes is linked to 'contracting out' or 'compulsory 
competitive tendering'). The privatisation concept was given special focus with the 
appointment of a businessman as finance minister. Government also legislated a number 
of changes to existing laws to facilitate privatisation. 
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2.5 Case Identification 
The selection of specific case studies for this thesis is influenced by the present 
government's motivation to use IT as a means of reaching advanced development status. 
Government made two levels of emphasis: first, public agencies are entrusted to initiate 
maximise use of IT, that is, to be used not only by officers but also supporting staff, to 
avoid duplication of information collection efforts by various government agencies and to 
encourage extensive sharing and exchange of information both within and among 
agencies. Second, information systems are to be the means to overcome the friction of 
distance between geographical areas. Better communications are being sought to 
minimise the present disparity between East and West Malaysia, and between the east 
coast (dominantly poor States and Malay ethnic groups) and west coast (dominated by 
rich urban States and non-Malay ethnic groups) of West Malaysia. One major initiative 
which has been proposed as part of the goal in this context is the National Land 
Development System (NALIS). The main purpose of NALIS is to provide the 
government with an information and technology infrastructure to support interrelated 
aspects of strategic planning, land and landuse management, resource management, 
environmental management, and physical infrastructure planning and development. 
NALIS also aims to provide the necessary organisational and management infrastructure 
to support the development, maintenance and dissemination of land-related data and 
information. This organisational infrastructure aims to cover and involve all levels of 
government in the country, that is, the Federal, State (including District) and local 
governments. 
Before NALIS was initiated there were several similar, less ambitious initiatives, all of 
which failed, for reasons mostly related to weak co-ordination and data incompatibility. 
The first idea for inter-departmental land-related information sharing was the National 
Land Data Bank (NLDB) introduced in 1974. The NLDB was to be an inter-
departmental project with a task force made up of representatives from various 
government departments and agencies such as the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), the 
Statistics Department, the Treasury, the Town and Country Planning Department, the 
Sabah Land and Survey Department and the Federal Commissioner of Land Offices. Two 
years after initiation the programme stopped making any significant progress due to lack 
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of support from participating agencies. During the same period (the mid-1970s) a similar 
proposal, independent of the NLDB, was put forward by a group of academics from 
Science University Malaysia. A pilot project involving three northern States (Pulau 
Pinang, Kedah and Perak) was carried out during the period 1977 to 1980. Detailed 
socio-economic data on population and housing, commercial and industrial properties, 
and land tenure and ownership, were collected and stored in digital format. The 
programme came to an end because of problems with data sharing and data 
incompatibilities. 
The main underlying difficulties with these two initiatives relate to issues of 
organisational behaviour. The present study therefore sets out to explore the following 
basic questions in this context: have there been changes in public organisations since 
implementation of previous programmes? Has NALIS learnt from past problems and 
how is the design of NALIS set to minimise organisational weaknesses? One key focus of 
this research is therefore on organisational behaviour, and it seeks to understand how and 
why individuals in organisations behave the way they do. 
In order to evaluate organisational behaviour in programme management, however, an 
assessment of NALIS and its predecessor programmes alone is not sufficient. This is 
because, firstly, direct comparison with predecessor programmes is not possible because 
their coverage is different and their development is incomplete. Secondly, because 
NALIS is a relatively new programme, studying NALIS alone will not provide a 
complete picture of inter and intra-organisational behavioural relationships. The 
Integrated Project Monitoring System (SETIA), a thirty year old computerised 
information system programme has, therefore, also been selected as a case study. The 
SETIA and NALIS programmes are different in terms of the types of data they collect 
but are otherwise similar in three main aspects. First, both are national scale 
computerised management information systems; second, the objective of both 
programmes is to satisfy data/information needs for central national planning and to 
provide exchange of information services between different levels of government; third, 
both are central government initiated programmes with the distribution of tasks cutting 
through levels of government and hierarchy. 
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As a programme that has been fully developed, SETIA will be used to provide 
understanding of the processes of change involved in implementing a large scale 
information system. NALIS, as a new programme, is used here to provide an 
understanding of programme initiation and design action. This combination of case 
studies is expected to provide an understanding of approaches used in planning, 
administering, and design and implementation of large scale information systems. 
Ultimately, it is intended that an examination of these programmes will illuminate the 
ways in which public organisations, through the use of IT, can help to minimise cultural, 
social and economic gaps that currently exist between different areas and regions of the 
country. 
The IT-related initiatives selected for this study are evaluated in the context of a study 
area which is not only administratively and socially complex but also economically 
volatile. Since the programmes selected for study are related to national level 
development these factors need to be given important recognition. 
The next chapter discusses information system development through the processes of 
adoption and adaptation in developing countries, with special reference to Malaysia. The 
discussion draws comparisons with organisational and technical issues in developed 
countries. 
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Chapter 3 Information Technology for Development 
3.1 Introduction 
The Prime Minister of Malaysia stated '7/ can be no accident that there is today no 
wealthy developed country that is information-poor, and no information-rich country 
that is poor and undeveloped" (NST, 1 August 1996). The speech was made to 
create awareness among Malaysians of a new and dangerous form of information 
poverty that could further widen the gap in economic status and competitiveness of a 
developing country. Should Malaysia be left behind, the Prime Minister argues it will 
risk a shrinking market share. To remain competitive in a global market, it would be 
necessary for Malaysia to have a strong information infrastructure so that it can 
maintain effective communications and develop alliances with industries around the 
world. The World Bank, likewise, argues that developing countries must adjust to 
information technology challenges or '''suffer exclusion from the global economy and 
severe disadvantage in competitiveness of their goods and services" (World Bank, 
1997a, p. 12). Bangemann (1994) similarly argues that: 
"The first countries to enter the information society will reap the greatest 
rewards. They will set the agenda for all who must follow. By contrast, countries 
which temporise, or favour half-hearted solutions, could, in less than a decade, 
face disastrous declines in investment and a squeeze on jobs" (p. 1). 
Malaysia, along with certain other developing countries, has responded strongly to 
such challenges. For example, Malaysia is constructing a 'high-tech' development 
area called the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC). The site covers an area of about 
750 km2, lined by optical fibres. Singapore is carrying out a similar undertaking called 
Singapore One, a project which envisions the networking of the entire island. 
Budgeted at US$27.6 million work on the high bandwidth T3 Internet links to the 
United States has recently begun. This connection will make Singapore the only Asian 
country besides Japan to have high speed connections to the global Internet backbone 
(SNCB, 1997). Thailand is developing a similar project, and is planning to install six 
million telephone lines (GOT, 1997). Indonesia has a built a microwave transmission 
network to bridge communication between its 13,000 islands (which stretch 3,300 
miles east to west and 1,300 miles north to south). The Indonesian government's 
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future plan is to increase installation of at least five million lines, which will triple the 
number of existing lines (ASEAN, 1995). The Philippines are upgrading their 
telephone backlog of 800,000 applications, by privatising their long-distance 
telephone company (GOP, 1997). 
However, infrastructure developments such as these in developing countries have 
been criticised by some (for example Bullis, 1997; Krugman, 1997) as inappropriate. 
They argue that due to high levels of poverty, disease, and illiteracy, the immediate 
concern should be towards upgrading basic infrastructure, amenities (such as 
electricity, telephone, water suppliers) and social services (such as education and 
health). On the other hand, leaders of developing countries and international 
institutions, such as the World Bank (1997a) and proponents of IT argue that it is just 
because these problems exist (poverty, disease, illiteracy) that investment in advanced 
information infrastructure is appropriate (see, for example, Kraemer, et al., 1992; 
Pitroda, 1993; Smith, 1995; Broadbent, 1997). 
The present study explores these perspectives further and seeks to understand why 
development choices for developing countries are difficult, especially when relating to 
the choice of new information technologies such as Geographical Information 
Systems. The discussion begins by exploring the debate over the term 'development'. 
3.2 Development Debates 
'Development' is defined and informed by different intellectual traditions. At its most 
basic level the term 'development' may be used to refer to the level of per capita 
income, and its growth over time. National income estimates are readily available for 
a large number of countries and are widely understood by many (ILO, 1972; Chenery, 
et al., 1974; Sundram, 1983). But, for many GNP is too simple a formulation to 
describe development (Rostow, 1960; Kindleberger, 1965; Maddison, 1970; Singer 
and Ansari, 1977). Kindleberger (1965) for example argues: 
"economic growth means more output and changes in the technical and 
institutional arrangements by which it is produced...Development goes beyond 
these to imply changes in structure of outputs and in the allocation of inputs by 
sectors... development draws attention to the change in functional capacity-in 
physical co-ordination, for example, or learning capacity" (p. 3). 
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Singer and Ansari (1977) argue similarly that: 
"The developing countries are not all poor countries, though the overwhelming 
majority of them certainly are. We must carefully avoid, therefore, using the 
increase in per capita income as an identification of development.. This would be 
an extremely narrow view. Development consists of much more than an increase 
in per capita income; it is desired for many and complex reasons of which the 
increase in per capita income is merely one" (p. 40). 
During the 1980s and 1990s understanding of the development process was given 
closer analysis (Bryant and White, 1982; Menou, 1993; Escobar, 1995). It was 
realised that focus ought to be given to the complexity of specific circumstances 
encompassing the socio-economic, cultural and ecological conditions, as well as the 
prevailing institutional framework and the relevant external and international 
contexts. The relationship between the complexity of the development context, and 
failure of known development solutions, came to be well illustrated in the sustainable 
development debate that had begun to overshadow the development debate since the 
second half of the 1980s (World Commission on Environment and Development, 
1987). The emphasis in development in the 1980s was shifting to questions of 
inequality and equity in development, and the role of a variety of actors and actions in 
development, especially those relating to local and environmental matters. The intense 
interest in the concept of sustainable development since then is perhaps ascribed to a 
general realisation that it has become imperative to redefine development. Earlier 
conceptions that equated development with growth and accumulation have been seen 
as resulting in extensive damage to the environment. 
At a different level during the debate the academic community worked to give shape 
to other important concepts in the field of development, namely the integrated nature 
of development problems and a holistic approach to development action. The 
significance of 'context' began to receive more attention again (emphasised by Riggs 
in 1970). Approaches to the 'Third World' development were criticised as having 
been exclusively shaped by Western views that gave a central place to progress by 
means of technological domination over nature (Norgaard, 1988). Western beliefs 
and patterns of thinking were argued as instigating cultural imperialism and the 
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downgrading of various non-Western cultures (Norgaard, 1988; Escobar, 1995). As 
Escobar (1995) puts it, the function of Western is to normalise non-Western 
populations, or make the non-Western more like them. The state in the 'Third 
World', according to Escobar is usually an instrument of neo-colonialism which 
arrogates to itself the ability to speak and write with authority about the problems of 
developing societies. Mohanty (1991), for example, refers to the images of 'Third 
World' women as represented in most feminist literature as: 
"essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually 
constrained) and her being 'third world' (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, 
tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimised, etc.). This, I suggest, is in 
contrast to the (implicit) self-representation of Western women as educated, as 
modern, as having control over their own bodies and sexualities, and the freedom 
to make their own decisions" (1991, p. 56). 
This image, Mohanty believes is a paternalistic attitude on the part of Western women 
toward their 'Third World' counterpart and, more generally, the perpetuation of the 
hegemonic idea of Western's superiority. Mohanty's critique was supported by 
Escobar (1995) who states that Mohanty's views applies also to mainstream 
development literature, "/'« which there exists a veritable underdeveloped subjectivity 
endowed with features such as powerlessness, passivity, poverty, and ignorance, 
usually dark and lacking in historical agency" (p. 8). Both authors suggest a move 
to explore and define the colonial discourse in ways that allow the exercise of power 
over it. 
A new conception of development therefore emerged, not only set against Western 
epistemology, but also against Western conceptions of development, of development 
process, and of the desired action. In this context the felt needs and self-
understanding of people affected in development are brought to the front and issues 
of'empowerment' and 'participation' become key. 
3.3 Development Choices 
Despite the shifting emphases and changes in ways of thinking about development, in 
certain quarters, especially among international organisations, bureaucratic and 
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management solutions to development have not shifted away from technical economic 
sentiments and technical approaches. Escobar (1995) made the following observation: 
"Indeed, it seemed impossible to conceptualise social reality in other terms. 
Wherever one looked, one found the repetitive and omnipresent reality of 
development: governments designing and implementing ambitious development 
plans, institutions carrying out development programmes in city and countryside 
alike, experts of all kinds studying underdevelopment and producing theories ad 
nauseam...Reality, in sum had been colonised by the development discourse, and 
those who were dissatisfied with this state of affairs had to struggle for bits and 
pieces of freedom within it, in the hope that in the process a different reality 
could be constructed" (p. 5). 
Development decisions in reality then are motivated by a variety of aims, and are 
guided by different interest groups that are influenced by factors such as social 
customs, political systems, religion and colonial history. All these factors directly or 
indirectly enter into the determination of development choice. For former colonised 
countries like Singapore, Malaysia, India and parts of Africa the shift away from 
Western ideology takes time. Administrators and decision-makers are still dominated 
by a Western educated group. Large areas of development-related laws are still based 
on those of the colonial period. For example, the Local Government Act (Act 172) 
and Town and Country Planning Act (Act 173) in Malaysia practically duplicate the 
those Acts in Britain. Similar examples are found in other institutional systems such as 
schools and universities. Sometimes embedded ideology stems from a historical 
discourse that causes major conflict, not only between developing countries but also 
within groups of various generations and classes within a country. Esman (1980) for 
example indicated the difficulty for certain African countries to accept administrative 
reform merely because public administrators were unwilling to break the centralised 
power of an elite and bureaucratic group. The assertion made by Escobar (1995) is 
true that colonial influences "just do not seem to go away" (p. 12). A top-down 
approach characterised policy formulation, planning, decision-making and 
implementation used in the colonial era, for example, has remained popular among 
many 'Third World' countries. Hutchinson and Toledano (1993) cited a case in India 
of how a group of government IT experts did not understand the importance of IT 
dissemination to rural areas. The Comilla programme in Bangladesh provides a similar 
example of pervading influence of elite groups (Blair, 1978): 
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"Clearly, the class structure of the Third World states has a great deal to do with 
this melancholy truth, and class analysis goes a long way toward explaining why 
rural development programmes serve a relative few at the top of the economic 
structure" (p. 65). 
Confronting the hard-core bureaucratic elite and the politicians were approaches 
emphasising power at the grass-roots level. One such effort was the 'appropriate 
technology' movement first synthesised from Schumacher (1973). This was an 
intermediate technology concept based on the foundations laid by Ghandhi ideology 
(for example, see Hoda, 1976). The concept emphasised on the idea that technology 
should fit into the context of particular location and period. The following section 
explores development of the appropriate technology movement. 
3.4 The Relationship of Appropriate Technology to Development 
The appropriate technology movement has grown in importance since the second 
development decade (1970s) when there was increasing uncertainty over the 
optimism of earlier development strategies (Corbridge, 1995; Stewart, 1997). Direct 
application of Western technology, it was argued, failed to produce the desired 
economic growth, and had contributed directly to employment problems, rapid rural 
migration and the explosive expansion of urban areas (for example, see Evans, 1984; 
James and Watanabe, 1985). Western technologies were developed in response to 
entirely different conditions in term of labour, raw materials, skills, and market 
responses (Long and Oleson, 1980; Yapa, 1991). Technologies appropriate for 
developing countries should as suggested by Clark (1988) have: 
"emphasised the importance of improving the productive capacities of people in 
their existing workplaces wherever these might be, taking the jobs to the people 
rather than the people to the jobs, of incremental technical improvements across-
the-board rather than big-bang quantum leaps and, most important of all, it 
showed how there was a central role for small scale, labour intensive 
technologies in economic development" (p. 1). 
Appropriate technology views, however, were not readily accepted by some 
developing countries, especially those with strong 'modernising' market economies 
like Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore (United Nations, 1987) Malaysia (ISEAS, 
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1986; World Bank and UNDP, 1995), and China (Ho, 1997). Opponents of 
appropriate technology asserted that imported technology, as opposed to domestic 
technology, was more efficient and reliable. This stems from the fact that the 
imported technology must meet world standards to be competitive. It is proven 
technology, based on designs and processes that for the most part have sustained 
applications successfully in a variety of situations. Opponents of appropriate 
technology argue that for developing countries to raise their rate of economic growth 
over time, they have to develop their own advanced industrial sector as soon as 
possible. According to this argument, highly intensive investments are the only way 
for the developing countries to maximise investment in the shortest time. Labour 
intensive industries tie working capital too long to realise given output. Most 
importantly to compete with international markets, the most efficient methods must 
be used. Capital intensive industries provide the degree of quality control and product 
precision required in international markets. 
From the perspective of advanced information technology, the World Bank (1997a) 
argues that appropriate technology "ignores the profound social implications of 
technology and risks consigning the world's poor to a life of third-rate capacity and 
opportunity" (p. 1). Smith (1995) states that should developing countries be denied 
access to newer means of information systems, they will continue to be by-passed by 
developments and their information isolation will increase. Pitroda (1993) views 
information technology as a means of equalising differences between developed and 
developing countries, seeing information technology as: 
"a great social leveller,... It can raze cultural barriers, overwhelm economic 
inequalities, even compensate for intellectual disparities. High technology can put 
unequal human beings on an equal footing, and that makes it the most popular 
tool devised" (p. 1). 
There are two principal issues emerging from the controversies around appropriate 
technology. The first revolves around the relationship of technology to economic 
growth. The question is whether the technology selected could maximise labour and 
high quality output. With regard to this it is quite clear that the overriding criterion 
should be choosing a technique that best meets the needs of the country. In other 
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words should a labour intensive technique provide the desired quality product, then it 
is an appropriate technique. The second issue relates to the definition of the term 
'appropriate'. It has been argued that the term should not be restricted to a 
comparison with high or capital intensive technology. A particular characteristic may 
validly describe what is appropriate for the production of some products in some 
countries, but not what is appropriate for other products or other localities (Bhalla, 
1979). Others (James and Watanbe, 1985) argue that technology is only 'appropriate' 
(or 'inappropriate') by reference to criteria or objectives which themselves must be 
specified in empirical terms. The appropriateness of the technology is then made to 
depend upon its 'consistency' in meeting the objectives specified. Westphal (1984) 
stresses that the choice of appropriate technologies can be made by only individual 
producers who are familiar with the specific technological alternatives, and the 
characteristics of the industry in which they operate. Key roles therefore rest with 
policy-makers and local experts who establish the environment in which the choices 
are made. It is then possible for policy makers to interpret appropriate technology in a 
way that makes it convenient for them. Eckhaus (1977) for example argues that: 
"Recognition of technology's essential role in development does not imply a 
technological determinism. Not only can alternative products and methods be 
chosen, but the wider effects of these choices depend strongly on the political 
and economic environments in which they are implemented...The use of any 
technology is not an end in itself. The criterion for an 'appropriate' technological 
choice must be found in the essential goals and processes of development" (p. 6). 
Stewart (1985) argues along the same lines that the choice of technology is difficult 
to judge because it is sometimes influenced by local socio-cultural and political 
matters. Stewart notes that: 
"a strategy which might appear first best from the point of view of promoting 
appropriate technology may in fact to be ruled out in a particular context because 
it appears infeasible, and some apparently second best set of polices be 
recommended. This is a problem-ridden area because it is very difficult to judge 
what is and what is not feasible. Yet to ignore it can lead to useless 
recommendations" (p. 26). 
Stewart (1985) notes for this reason the dynamic dimension of technology choice 
needs underlining. The choice of technology must fit in with the dynamism the 
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economies and not simply consist in a static resource allocation exercise. Further, 
Stewart states technology is also changing at a rapid rate especially in some 
industries, rendering obsolete many existing technologies. The implications of rapid 
technology change emanating from developed countries also needs to be taken into 
account in determining policies for appropriate technology. 
Several examples are provided here to develop the above issues. Watanabe (1985), in 
a study of Japanese weaving factories explained that Japan maintained a large scale 
mechanised operation forty years after the introduction of modern weaving machines 
(in Germany). This was because the Japanese found that at the time mechanised 
operation was still profitable for their purposes. The Grameen telephone project in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh (Hague, 1998) exemplifies a choice that required a move to adopt 
new technology and which involved the initiative of a local banker. The objective of 
the project was to improve communications at the grass-roots level so that isolated 
villagers previously deprived of communication access could be provided with wider 
communication power and a means of helping them to generate new income. The 
Grameen telephone initiative indicates that in certain circumstances new technology is 
the only appropriate choice to cope with competitive activities. In another case in 
Delhi, India a move was made to re-introduce the rickshaw as an appropriate 
transportation solution for the lower middle-class travellers (Bhatnagar, 1997). 
Bhatnagar argues that for crowded and polluted cities like Delhi the reintroduction of 
the rickshaw was the most appropriate way to help people (rural migrants) to help 
themselves, thus enabling them to contribute to the social and economic development 
of their communities. 
The above examples indicate that the concept of 'appropriate' may be interpreted 
differently by different users and in different contexts. For example, a technology 
appropriate for Delhi may be inappropriate for Kuala Lumpur, even though Kuala 
Lumpur is also a polluted city. There are considerable social and economic 
differences the two cities. For similar reasons high-technology information 
infrastructures may be considered inappropriate for Kuala Lumpur by some (Bullis, 
1997; The Economist, 29 March; 30 September, 1997). International investors who 
invested in the construction of the infrastructure, however, clearly believe otherwise. 
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Cartwright's (1993) argument perhaps best describes the issue of 'appropriateness'. 
Cartwright notes that appropriate technology is not necessarily: 
"out-of-date - nor, of course, that all out-of-date technology is appropriate. 
Similarly, advances in technology are just as likely (at least in the short-run) to 
make the new technology less appropriate as more appropriate. I f new 
technology is more expensive and more difficult to use than the old 
technology..., then it is likely to be less appropriate for most applications and 
most users. 'Appropriateness', in other words, is a function not just of the 
technology, but ...as a 'socio-technicaP relationship between the technology, its 
users, and its uses" (p. 262). 
Choices of technology as such depend on an individual country's interpretation of 
'appropriateness'. In many instances and at least in the short term choice of 
technology is limited to that developed by advanced countries. Developing countries 
are required to learn how to make appropriate choices among the many available 
technologies and to try to bargain for suitable assistance. The following section 
explores some of the issues surrounding foreign assistance. 
3.4.1 The Role of Foreign Aid 
Notwithstanding the arguments against adopting foreign technology in some 
developing countries, foreign technology and foreign assistance may seem to be a 
rational choice (Morrison, 1984; Rush, 1984). Morrison writes that: 
"the poor are not necessarily poor because of their relations or lack of relations 
with the rich, nor will they make themselves better off (including self-sufficient) 
by avoiding interactions with the rich...including those interactions that give 
them access to hard technology. The benefits of international interdependence... 
creates mutual benefits, even i f the benefits are asymmetric" (p. 216). 
Accordingly, Rush (1984) argues that having to depend on foreign technologies does 
not mean that developing countries cannot bargain and receive appropriate choices. 
Consequently, Morrison argues for foreign companies playing a part in guiding 
developing countries to make appropriate choices by changing their business-
practice-clause. Morrison says that a developed country should not: 
"export Utopian, absolute notions that [the developed countries] have no 
intention of putting into practice [themselves]. In particular, [the developed 
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countries] must not get in the position of cutting developing countries off from 
the hard technologies on which their development plans have been laid...unless 
[the developed countries] are prepared to (a) develop and supply equally 
affordable and equally productive AT alternatives and (b) guarantee backup of 
their basic needs until AT is in place" (p. 218). 
Morrison and Rush stressed two important points. First, there is a need for a two-
way relationship in making technology choices. Second, there is a need for 
developing countries to be aware of their country's context, that is, choices should be 
'practical' in terms of the country's capabilities. 
In light of the above statements the following section explores the use of one 
advanced information technology, namely, Geographic Information Systems, in 
poorer countries. 
3.5 Geographic Information Systems in Developing Countries 
"GIS technology is not as scientifically objective and value-free as some authors 
assume. It is a product of industrial and post-industrial societies of the so called 
'First World'. The information...taking place in these societies is imbedded in a 
general context of socio-economic change in society as a whole. The socio-
economic realities and priorities of the 'Third World' are quite different and, i f 
GIS is to be of use to the challenges facing developing nations, then it must 
respond to these realities and priorities" (Taylor, 1991a, p. 1). 
Cartwright (1993) follows up Taylor's argument by posing the question that in the 
light of possible difficulties of implementing GIS in the Third World, "ought we even 
to be making the attempt? Is there not something fundamentally inappropriate about 
using 'high tech' in a 'low tech' environment? " (p. 264). 
In line with Rush (1984) and Morrison (1984) who argued for a two-way 
understanding in transferring technology to developing countries, some authors have 
concluded that the users and suppliers of GIS technology must be more aware of the 
social, political and economic context of where the technology is to be implemented 
(Masser and Campbell, 1991; Taylor, 1991a; 1991b). Furthermore, local 'experts' in 
developing countries can play a major part in 'fitting' the technology into their 
country's context because, firstly, they have an understanding of the technology itself 
and, secondly, they are aware of their country's own capabilities (Taylor, 1991a). 
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However, many studies found that gaining understanding between users and suppliers 
of GIS technology is not a straight forward process. Similarly, reliance on local 
experts to assist in GIS implementation have also been found difficult for a variety of 
reasons (Edralin, 1990; Hastings and Clark, 1991; Masser and Campbell, 1991; 
Hutchinson and Teledano, 1993). The following section explores these issues further. 
3.5.1 GIS Implementation 
Issues relating to implementation of GIS can be categorised as technical, 
organisational and institutional. Obermeyer and Pinto (1994) argue that the primary 
problems that underlie implementation of most information systems are usually 
organisational, rather than technical. On the other hand, some researchers, for 
example, Croswell (1989), argue that institutional matters dominate over technical 
issues. The most important obstacles come from lack of co-ordination and 
communication between organisations, and lack of management commitment to 
support to project causes. Common among most studies are views that technical 
factors are the least problem area in GIS implementation. However, the dominance of 
each factor may vary with situation, including project scale, design and place. For 
example, unlike other developing countries, India has only minor problems with the 
supply of trained computer specialists (Hastings and Clark, 1991; Taylor, 1991b; 
Hutchinson and Toledano,1993). Hutchinson and Toledano, for example, described 
the situation for a project on wasteland development as follows: 
"India's rapidly growing computer capability helped to reduce or eliminate many 
potential technical problems, such as the purchase of equipment and software 
and the training of technicians. Additionally, almost all technical centres had 
experience with some sort of GIS package before the start of the 
project.... Almost exclusively, members of the teams from each participating 
research institute were highly trained. . . No computing problem seemed beyond 
their ability to solve" (p. 457). 
The key problems for this Indian project related to data shortage and incompatibility. 
Efforts towards improving these difficulties were hindered by organisational and 
institutional barriers which could have been identified at the project initiation stage 
(Hutchinson and Toledano, 1993; Sahay and Walsham, 1996). Disagreements were 
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identified over issue on the overall project design. The USAID who was to assist the 
Indian government (represented by the Ministry of Environment and Forests) found 
the Indian team had no real measuring guidance on why the wasteland programme 
was to be undertaken. According to the USAID the Indian team interest seemed 
focused on obtaining the GIS technology and to demonstrate how well they can use 
the technology. The USAID insisted for the programme to use a goal that can deal 
with specific geographic area and users. Disagreements between USAID and Indian 
teams contributed to project delays. Hutchinson and Teledono (1993) report "thus 
the issues we [the USAID] faced involved the transfer of technology within, rather 
than to, India. Our role was not to transfer technology per se but to advise the 
purveyors of the technology on how best to achieve their objectives''1 (p. 456). Sahay 
and Walsham (1996) who follow-up the project progress provided specific difficulties 
which included the rapid transfer of personnel at different levels; GIS field staff being 
transferred to other districts after having gone through training; rapid turnover of 
vendors which disrupted training and installation; lack of consensus about a data 
model; conflicts between administrators and scientists over the project's purpose; 
unclear budget allocation; failure to define the agencies responsible for managing the 
project's progress. Complicated organisational and institutional issues wasted the 
advantages of having a skilled workforce and disoriented the project's objectives. 
Taylor's (1991b) study of an Indian land data project reached similar conclusions. 
Taylor argues that for India, the issue is not technology rather "it is the use made of 
that technology which is overwhelmingly important' and further Taylor notes that 
"the Indian model an example of the problems which a lack of co-ordination can 
bring" (p. 81). 
In a study of GIS implementation in Africa, Hastings and Clark (1991) identify further 
complexities. For many African countries, the social and political environments are 
controlled by internal as well as external factors, such as 'former colonists and newer 
offerers of bilateral and multilateral aid" (Hastings and Clark, 1991, p. 30). African 
colonial history has emerged from various roots: Islamic, Turkish, Spanish, Belgian, 
Dutch* Italian, German, British, French, Portuguese, and others. According to 
Hastings and Clark (1991) "foreign aid missions often try to help the most 
disadvantaged governmental organisations without adequately assessing the reason 
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for the disadvantaged status of the organisations" (p. 30). Assessment of 
organisational and institutional problems sometimes are further complicated with 
issues of poverty, high population growth and high levels of illiteracy (Hastings and 
Clark, 1991). Priorities of development technology can therefore be diverse. 
Differences in preferences can raise conflict among local interest groups and 
government agencies over priorities of project funds. Besides organisational and 
institutional problems in Africa, Hastings and Clark report that GIS often operate in 
poor technical environments, lacking basic infrastructural facilities and limited 
indigenous skilled support. In addition base information to start a GIS operation can 
often be inadequate, or not available at all. Clearly, though, Hastings and Clark are 
writing at the level of a continent and there will inevitably be important differences 
between, for example, GIS implementation in a local government office in 
Johannesburg, South Africa and that in a remote district in Ghana. 
GIS implementation problems faced by other developing countries, especially those in 
Southeast Asia, fall between those described above for India and Africa. Regarding 
technological capability, the level and amount of technical capabilities available in 
India is rare among many developing countries. Many developing countries (for 
example, see Specter, 1988; Yeh, 1991) are severely constrained by shortages of 
trained computer manpower, and shortages are especially apparent in relation to GIS 
expertise. 
Organisational and institutional issues often stem from the culture of government 
organisations which are rigid, where decision-makers lack up-to-date knowledge of 
technology (Spectre, 1988), and an inflexible bureaucratic hierarchy which restrains 
open participation in making technical decisions (Fox, 1991). A preference for large-
scale projects, rather than an incremental approach, is another important problem 
(Cartwright, 1991; Masser and Campbell, 1991; Taylor, 1991b; Cartwright, 1993). 
As Cartwright (1991) notes many developing countries do not responded to real and 
pressing organisational problems; rather they are tempted to create vast, general 
purpose information systems with vague understanding of its uses and the users. 
Rapid changes and instability of government are other powerful constraints 
(Cartwright, 1987; Hastings and Clark, 1991; Masser and Campbell, 1991; Taylor, 
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1991b). Taylor, for example, points out one of the problem faced by Indian IT 
programme was conflicts with important political power groups, A similar political 
conflict over information systems implementation priorities was illustrated by 
Hastings and Clark in some African countries. 
Some developing countries match foreign aid with funds from individual governments 
and in countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia, GIS projects are most 
often wholly funded by their governments (Yeh, 1991). With regard to infrastructural 
support some developing countries, such as Singapore (Mody and Dahlman, 1992) 
and Malaysia (Roa and Samad, 1992), have overcome basic infrastructural problems 
such as electricity and telecommunications. In these countries data supply issues are 
not as problematic as elsewhere; rather key problems relate to data incompatibility 
and technical capability. Generally problems are less to do with general computer-
related skills, but rather they are more concerned with skills in the operation of 
specialised information technology such as GIS. 
The issues discussed here are not new to the GIS community in developing countries. 
Information about them has been disseminated through various channels - seminars 
(international, national, and local organisational) electronic media (Internet) and 
academic publications. In many case studies (despite being limited to a selected 
region) research findings are often followed by suggestions of "do's" and "don'ts," 
Hedberg (referred to by Cartwright, 1993) for example, uses an African project to 
suggest twelve points that are necessary to consider when implementing GIS 
technology in developing countries. Among Hedberg's major points were for GIS 
implementers to understand the technological background of GIS, in particular that 
GIS is a foreign invented tool. Successful implementation of GIS therefore requires 
serious consideration of environmental and cultural differences in the receiving 
countries. 
3.5.2 GIS Operations in Developing Countries 
Goodman (1993) states that the "meaning of implementation success is inherently 
ambiguous"(p. 49) because there are various interpretations of the value of 
technology. In the wasteland study in India, for example, the GIS operation was 
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regarded 'unsuccessful' because the project failed to meet the specific goals provided 
by the funding body (the United States Agency for International Development-
USAID). In particular it failed to demonstrate the capability at the sub-district and 
district levels. Indian scientists, nevertheless, did not share that particular goal. Rather 
their goal was to demonstrate the capability of GIS for management (Sahay and 
Walsham, 1996) and they therefore viewed the project as 'successful' (Hastings and 
Clark, 1991). How then can we interpret success? Goodman (1993) argues that, with 
the use of new technology, it is important to recognise that there must be "interaction 
or adaptation among the technological system and organisational characteristics" 
that is, the "technology has both objective and socially defined characteristics''' (p. 
50). The meaning of technology must be understood in the context of the tasks and 
activities in which it is applied. The meaning of implementation success of a new 
technology could be evaluated by users through defining benefits produced before 
and after application of the technology. With regard to the wasteland development 
project there were multiple levels of users. GIS technology could not reach all 
intended users. In the context of Burrough's interpretation: 
"the goal of implementation should be to introduce the new technology in such a 
way that it produces tangible benefits, not just for the organisation as a whole, 
but also for the persons working in it and their clients and colleagues" (1993, p. 
59). 
The complexity of success criteria explains why it is difficult to cite 'successful' GIS 
projects, except in cases of agency-based operations because users are more easily 
identified and goals are more easily defined. 
Goodman's (1993) definition of success in the Metro Manila Physical Survey 
(MMAPS) is one example of successful agency-oriented GIS undertaking. Factors in 
its success were attributed to its scale and its incremental approach (Yeh, 1991). The 
author's personal experience indicates that Malaysia has many undocumented 
examples of successful agency-based GIS projects. Examples include the Agriculture 
Information System (AIS) at the Department of Agriculture both in Peninsular and 
East Malaysia, the Forest Management Information System S^ b%fa (FOMISS), the 
Environment Monitoring Information System (DOE-GIS) at the: Department of 
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Environment, the Landed Property Information System (LAPIS) at the Department of 
Valuation and Property Services and the Forest Resource Information System (FRIS) 
at the Department of Forestry Sarawak. All these systems have satisfied users not 
only at their individual organisational level but also other user agencies. 
With regard to large scale GIS, there are two commonly quoted examples of 
successful GIS use, the Singapore and Hong Kong land information systems. Both 
systems have applied an incremental development approach. Singapore's land 
information system, or the Land Data Hub project (Tang-Kwong, 1994), started as a 
prototype in 1987 and by 1990 the project was able to offer data sharing services. By 
1994 the land data sharing services were upgraded from off-line transfer using tapes 
and diskettes to on-line access. In Hong Kong the project started in 1983 covering 
only the Lands Department. Participation of other agencies was gradually promoted 
through the course of the programme's development (Yeh, 1990). 
The Singapore and Hong Kong information systems were not without their problems, 
however. Many of these difficulties, though, were recognised at an early stage and 
were handled practically and strategically. With the Singapore case, problems relating 
to GIS skills and data were faced at the time of project initiation. These issues were 
overcome in-house through mutual co-ordination between and within agencies. For 
example, to overcome their GIS staff shortages, on-the-job and self-training was 
developed (Tang-Kwong, 1994). Since the project was implemented incrementally 
ample time was provided for staff to share knowledge within and between agencies. 
In the Hong Kong project issues were handled in a similar manner. Hong Kong's 
initial problem was not only in relating to staff and data, but also in reaching a 
consensus among agencies on project methodology. Agreement was reached by 
deciding to start the project as a Lands Department application. Expansion of project 
applications was made incrementally over the course of several years (Yeh, 1990). 
3.5.3 Towards Successful Implementation 
The Singapore and Hong Kong projects discussed above contain several conditions 
necessary for effective utilisation of IT. For example, Burrough (1993) suggested that 
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successful use of IT requires that : a)managers know how to use it strategically, b) 
operators know how to use it technically and cjthey communicate effectively with 
each other" (Burrough,1993 p. 59). 
Masser (1991; 1994), Campbell and Masser (1995) suggest three necessary-
conditions for successful information system implementation. These conditions are: 
first, an information management strategy based on user needs; second, commitment 
of individuals and clear leadership; third, environmental stability. These conditions are 
used here to illustrate implementation issues found in the context of developing 
countries. 
With regard to the first condition, Campbell and Masser (1995) argue that an 
information strategy helps to "indicate the information priorities of the whole 
organisation, appropriate methods of handling these data and the necessary training 
provision, with each department identifying their particular needs" (p. 46). The 
Singapore and Hong Kong cases (Yeh, 1991; Tang-Kwong, 1994) indicated at the 
outset that strategic evaluations were made to understand environmental and 
organisational constraints. An incremental approach was selected because that was 
the only way that they could ensure that project users could be accustomed to, and 
learn and understand the problems of the new technology. 
An approach based on slow and incremental implementation is most likely to lead to 
success in developing countries. However, in many developing countries, staff often 
prefer to create vast information systems operations (Cartwright, 1991; Broadbent, 
1997). This large-scale approach is likely to lead to failure for three reasons 
(Cartwright, 1991). First, the lack of an adequate base of computer literacy in the 
organisations where computerisation is to be implemented. Second, the absence of a 
strategy that considers specific users and user needs. Third, failing to consider 
questions of data availability and costs. 
The second condition for success, as outlined by Campbell and Masser is a 
commitment of leaders to a programme, the capability to understand project 
objectives and problems, and most importantly the ability to solve problems amicably. 
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In many developing countries, since local GIS experts are still, in general, in poor 
supply a project may lack the 'luxury' of a local expert GIS leader, and may instead 
have to rely on expertise from outside. This lack of knowledge of GIS can lead to 
failure through, for example, choosing inappropriate software or hardware (Sahay 
and Walsham, 1996). The issue of leader awareness and understanding of GIS has 
been the subject of a study by the United Nations Ad Hoc Group of Experts (Fox, 
1991) which recommended that top policy-makers should be provided with short-
term intensive training on the fundamentals of spatial information, that high-level 
administrative and professional staff should be exposed to the workings of GIS 
technology, and that mid-career training in new technologies like GIS should be 
provided. 
Several colleges and universities in developed countries provide training courses in 
GIS. Few, however, provide courses in the politics of GIS and geographical 
information in a development context. One exception is the University of Durham's 
course which seeks to educate professionals (especially those from developing 
countries) in ways of exploring appropriate uses of GIS in the context of other 
geographical methods. In the United States and Canada there are a few similar 
initiatives provided by universities and community colleges1. Similar efforts are also 
been carried out at some institutions in developing countries such as the Asian 
Institute of Technology in Thailand (Fox, 1991) and in the Philippines. 
The third condition for successful use of GIS relates to organisational and 
environmental stability. Masser and Campbell (1991) suggest that given the pace of 
development, and the volatility of the political environment in many developing 
countries, it is necessary to develop a system that is adaptive to the changing 
environment In the Hong Kong case, for example, there was a re-organisation of the 
Hong Kong government in 1990 (during the project's development phase). Certain 
adjustment had to be made to fit the project into a new organisational setting (Yeh, 
1991). The change did not affect the project's progress, however. 
1 In Indiana, several Malaysians are undergoing training in community colleges and state 
universities. Other groups of Malaysians (mainly senior officers) are also currently undergoing 
short-term GIS training at the University of Milwaukee, Wisconsin; University of Cincinnati; and 
Mohawk College in Ontario, Canada. 
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In the context of developing countries in general, however, overcoming issues of re-
organisation is always problematic. For example, in evaluating GIS problems in Africa 
Hastings and Clark (1991) argued that beside other problems to overcome: 
"One only hopes that there is no major administrative change at the top of the 
organisation, as such changes often result in the cancellation of new programmes 
that are not already proven successes to make room for the new administration's 
initiatives" (p. 34). 
The current Hong Kong situation in a way illustrates Hastings and Clark's argument. 
Some observers (Kraemer, et al.; 1994; The Economist, 5-11 July 1997; Wehrfritz, 
1997) have argued that success stories for Hong Kong are gradually weakening since 
the China take-over. Even before the transfer took place Kraemer et al. (1994) note 
that: 
"The environment has changed, however, and will continue to change as Hong 
Kong is assimilated by China. Labour is much cheaper in China, not only for 
unskilled workers, but also for engineers, managers, and other 
professionals...Whatever advantages Hong Kong has as a manufacturing centre 
are rapidly disappearing . .." (p. 243). 
Having seen the Hong Kong case, one could argue that sometimes environmental 
stability in developing countries is not within the control of the individual country. 
The current Asian financial crisis is an example of environment instability meant here 
(for example, see Noland, 1997; Wolf, 1997). Instability in a financial situation will 
directly affect government policies and development approaches, which will in turn 
affect programme operations. When these complexities arise most often the remedy is 
beyond the ability of international experts (Hastings and Clark, 1991). 
3.6 The Future of GIS in Developing Countries 
The future of GIS in Asia (and, by extension in other parts of the developing world) is 
paradoxical according to Yeh (1991), while Cartwright (1993) argues that the future 
of geographic information technology in the developing countries "seems promising 
but not assured' (p. 269). Taylor (1991b) asks: "Can GIS contribute in a meaningful 
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way or are they a technology which is inappropriate to conquering these problems 
[scarce resources, ignorance, disease, environmental degradation]?" (p. 80). 
Some (for example, Dunn et al., 1997) argue that it is especially because of such 
problems that "GIS technology in some ways may be more useful tool to poor 
countries" (p. 157). Similarly Yeh (1991) believes that GIS could provide invaluable 
support towards the implementation of a sustainable development strategy (see 
World Commission on Environment, 1987). Yeh believes that GIS has the capability 
to analyse and monitor major environmental issues, such as deforestation, pollution 
and salination. Demonstration of the capabilities of GIS technology, however, must 
come from decision-makers and scientists from developing countries themselves 
(Taylor, 1991b). So far, with regard to indigenisation, initiatives are also taking place, 
but they are slow (Yapa, 1991; Yeh, 1991). Problems faced by these initiatives exist 
with manpower and the institutional set-up. Another major problem is language, for 
most GIS software is written for English speakers. Nonetheless, as Yeh (1991) 
argued the "development of GIS should be treated as an on-going process" (p. 25). 
GIS technology could become: 
"more and more appropriate for developing countries. There are still major 
obstacles to its widespread adoption, including high costs, shortage of training, 
and lack of user-friendliness. But these difficulties are not insuperable and may, 
in due course, be overcome" (Cartwright, 1993, p. 269). 
3.7 Conclusion 
There is no simple 'solution' to the challenges of development. Similarly, such 
'solutions' are not to be found by concentrating solely on technology. On the other 
hand, they are not to be found by avoiding advanced technology. What is most 
needed are criteria for identifying appropriate techniques to help make appropriate 
choices. Currently, with advances in information technology, development of these 
criteria could be made easier, because information on technology trends and issues 
are readily accessible. Inappropriate choices can arise for political and social reasons. 
IT knowledge can become accessible to a wider population i f political and 
organisational will allows it; there is a need for special attention to be given to 
educating public officials. In the long run, with growing IT knowledge, the public 
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may be more aware of value issues inherent in technological choices. Such knowledge 
will not only create new opportunities for people to participate in public decision-
making but will also increase accountability of decision-makers to the public. 
Successful application of IT is another matter. Most often the relationship of 
technology to development is confused. Technology should not be treated as an end 
to development but rather as a potential means for attaining development. In other 
words, the purpose of using a technology must be clearly understood. For example, is 
the technology used as a demonstration tool or to help solve an existing problem? Far 
too often, when technology is used as demonstration tool, the latest software and 
hardware will be selected and this is a major cause of project failure. 
Finally, for development to be of any value, appropriate technology must be 
employed. A major shortcoming in current efforts to develop appropriate technology 
is the lack of support from marketing and government sides. Experience from 
advanced countries indicates that when government takes the initiative in an R&D 
project, it usually succeeds. Here a project is formulated on the basis of concrete 
investment, or a production plan, with clear ideas about a target market, costs, and 
quality requirements. When government works jointly with the market the chances of 
success will be improved. 
This chapter has outlined a number of key issues which should take a central role 
when considering the place of information technology in general, and GIS in 
particular, in the context of'development'. Organisational, technical and institutional 
themes run as a common thread through the maze of reasons which determine 
whether a project succeeds or fails, although each individual situation or country 
brings its own specific characteristics. The following chapter examines these 
contextual issues from a different perspectives: by exploring information system 
developments in their different theoretical perspectives. 
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Chapter 4 Information Systems Development: theoretical perspectives 
4.1 Introduction 
Two levels of analytical complexity are integral to this research. First, explaining the 
operation of information systems that cut across multiple ministries and agencies, and 
multiple levels of government machinery. Second, understanding this operation in the 
context of the developing country in which it is 'situated,' and all that that entails in 
terms of social, economic, cultural and political dynamics. The discussion in this chapter 
is organised into three main parts. The first discusses ways of adopting a theoretical 
framework. Here there is a focus on the relationship between theory and research method 
and its role in developing a theoretical framework. The second part of the discussion 
focuses on ways of generating theoretical propositions. Discussion at this level entails 
exploring the current issues relating to understanding organisation and organisational 
theories. Finally, focus is placed on understanding theoretical perspectives which are 
most relevant to the present research. 
4.2 Theory in Research 
"The idea of theory, or the ability to explain and understand the findings of research 
within a conceptual framework which make 'sense' of the data, is the mark of a 
mature discipline whose aim is the systematic study of particular phenomena" (May, 
1997, p. 28). 
Theory helps to determine the type of data one needs to collect in the field. Without 
theory, explanation and interpretation of the research findings are impossible since we 
have no framework to enable us to engage in a systematic discussion of substantive 
issues (Bernstein, 1976; Giddens, 1982; Walters, 1983; Johnston, 1986; Giddens and 
Turner, 1987). The importance of theory is therefore undoubted; but how to choose and 
apply a theory that fits one's research is open to debate. Selection involves understanding 
the research method needed to guide the research; this is because theories and research 
methods are related, in the sense that theories guide methodology. However, as with 
theories, there are several choices of research method offered for qualitative research. 
Here, three of these approaches are explored, namely grounded theory, ethnography and 
case study approaches. The objective of exploring these approaches is to show the 
relationship between research method and theory, that is, the emphasis is on factors that 
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help towards building a theoretical framework. A detailed discussion of the research 
methodology itself is presented in Chapter 5 
4.2.1 Theory and Research Design 
The development of theory from data is the basis of the grounded theory approach 
(Glasser and Strauss, 1967). Here the best approach to generate theory is by using the 
researcher's own experience of the social world through the process of data collection: 
"whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data and decides what 
data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it 
emerges" (Glasser and Strauss, 1967, p. 45). 
The ethnography approach places importance on portraying images of others "as they 
are experienced and understood in the everyday lives of people who actually live them 
our (Cook and Crang, 1995, p. 4). Ethnographic methods do not necessarily begin with 
strong theoretical formulations, rather the method allows theoretical tendencies to 
emanate from the basic definition of ethnography itself - to focus the shared beliefs, folk 
knowledge, and behaviours of some groups of peoples (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984). 
Finally, a case study approach requires 'theory' to be developed prior to data collection 
(Yin, 1993; 1994). Theory in the context of Yin's definition is a research framework 
which constitutes five criteria. These are: 
1. The study's questions, 
2. Research propositions, 
3. Units of analysis, 
4. The logic of linking the data to the propositions, and 
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings. 
Yin argues that thinking of answers for these five criteria will enable one to construct a 
preliminary theory (research framework) related to one's study before the conduct of any 
data collection. Yin suggests that there are several ways in which one could develop the 
framework. Reviewing existing works is one of the ways. Other means are by reviewing 
the literature most related to the area of study, conducting discussions with related 
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professionals, asking challenging questions about the study topic and being aware of the 
full range of theories that might be relevant to one's area of study. 
The three approaches as outlined above have apparent differences in theory building 
because each suggests contrasting techniques for data collection. In some ways variations 
in techniques may offer different advantages and disadvantages for certain researchers 
(Van Maanen, 1988). For example, in the ethnographic approach the researcher seeks to 
draw directly from their fieldwork. In certain cases, there are very real limits to what a 
researcher can and cannot learn in a given fieldwork setting, such as, access to a 
particular area or organisation (Van Maanen, 1988). Since the reliability of information is 
directly dependent on the phenomenon being studied the method of data collection is 
restricted to a participation-observation technique (Van Maanen, 1988; Yin, 1993). 
Notwithstanding its limitations, the ethnographic approach was argued by Lincoln and 
Guba, (1985) as being most valuable when there are strong clashes in values. Here it 
could help to define a 'negotiated' set of recommendations. With grounded theory there 
is strong resistance to premature theory building, and its application is most appropriate 
in cases where no particular prior theory appears explainable (Yin, 1993). But the 
method may be impractical to some who are provided with 'program theory' at the start 
of a study (Yin, 1993). A case study approach, with its preference is to draw out the 
theoretical framework at the beginning of a study, is therefore more appropriate to such a 
situation. 
Each approach provides elements that are helpful in developing theoretical insights for 
the study. This research has taken the approach to relate methods to one another, an 
approach which has had its advocates among those who write about how research should 
be carried out. For example, Webb (1966), states that: 
"Every data gathering class -interviews, questionnaires, observation, performance 
records, physical evidence - is potentially biased and has specific to it certain validity 
threats. Ideally, we should like to converge data from several different data classes, 
as well as converge with multiple variants from within a single class" (p. 35). 
Denzin (1970) suggested a similar approach, through what he termed 'strategies of 
multiple triangulation'. Pettigrew (1973) advocated similar ideas, noting that: 
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"methods are not atheoretical. Research methods have a differential ability to shed 
light on theory. It is no accident that those concerned either with the symbolic 
interactionist perspective or with the analysis of social process have preferred to use 
observational methods" (p. 53). 
The research design for the present study has been guided by the spirit of the above 
suggestions. The present study adopted multiple methods, multiple data sources and 
multiple levels of analysis. The following section explores the means of combining these 
methods towards a coherent theoretical framework by way of viewing and understanding 
specific existing theoretical perspectives. 
4.2.2 Constructing a Theoretical Framework 
To adopt to a certain theoretical perspective one needs first to understand 'what is being 
studied'. For this present study there are three broad areas of study - development, 
information technology and organisation. The broad contextual perspective of these 
study themes has been discussed in Chapter 3. The review of contextual perspectives 
provided an understanding that the issues faced by this study in the context of Malaysia 
are not that dissimilar from experiences faced by other developing countries. 
Nevertheless, the evaluation and analysis of each study was approached quite differently, 
because each study had its individual contextual focus and objectives. In other words, 
despite demonstrating similar issues, the factors that generate these issues differ from 
study to study. However, at the broader level reviewing similar studies does help to 
enrich the perspective of one's research requirements. With regard to the present study, 
based on the examples of previous research and the subject matter of this study, a 
combination of theoretical perspectives seemed pertinent. 
The approach is commonly found in the work of Kling, (1980); Kling and Scacchi, 
(1982); Kling and Iocono, (1984) and Pettigrew, (1985). Kling (1980) for example 
argues that: 
"In coming to an understanding of computing technologies, particularly newer ones, 
it is important to understand which conceptions of social life are likely to aid in 
discerning critical social aspects. Analysts do not select random sets of concepts on 
which to base an examination of computing: They cluster useful concepts into 
coherent bundles which constitute a perspective on social life" (p .63). 
58 
Pettigrew (1985) suggests a similar approach, and argues that in research: 
"One approach is to discount ethnocentrism... [a second] is to be ostensibly a more 
reasonable man, and go into the mine lights ablaze, looking from many perspectives 
of process, and hope to see and explain without being blinded by all distractions and 
reflections. [A third] works towards making contingent statements... [fitting 
compatible theories, and a fourth] ...by combining [for example], political and 
cultural views..." (p. 42). 
In the light of the above suggestions, different theoretical perspectives are drawn upon to 
help in the design and analysis of the present research. This then requires an 
understanding of the unit of analysis, that is, the organisation and its related source of 
theories. The discussion is developed by way of exploring the nature of organisations and 
different interpretations of their meaning. 
4.3 Organisation and Organisation Theory 
An organisation can be defined as: "a consciously co-ordinated social entity, with a 
relatively identifiable boundary, that functions on a relatively continuous basis to 
achieve a common goal or set of goals" (Robbins, 1990, p. 4). This definition combines 
the understanding of a number of researchers and theorists. For example, the focus on 
achieving a common goal, is also characterised by Blau (1970) who defines an 
organisation as "a number of men [sic] that have become organised into a social unit 
that has been established for the explicit purpose of achieving certain goals" (p. 1). 
Robbins' phrase consciously co-ordinated is in line with the perceptions of Johnson et al. 
(1973) who notes: "The organisation's function is the means, or bonding agent, by 
which separate human and material resources are fused together to form an integrated 
operating system" (p. 65). The word system in the context of Johnson et al., (1973) is 
interpreted as: 
"an organised or complex whole; an assemblage or combination of things or parts 
forming a complex or unitary whole. . . the word system connotes plan, method, 
order, and arrangement . . . the focus of systems management is on providing a better 
picture of the network of subsystems and interrelated parts which go together to 
form a complex whole" (p. 4). 
The phrase continuous basis as used by Robbins links to the earlier work of Stogdill 
(1963), who viewed an organisation as an open system, having constant exchange with 
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its environment through a continuous inflow (input) and outflow (output) of energy from 
the external environment. Inputs in this context include material, financial, informational, 
and human resources. Organisations draw their energy supply or input from various 
environmental elements including other organisations. Outputs are products and services 
sent into the environment. Productivity, the efficient combination of input resources 
resulting from system operations, may also be regarded as an output. 
Katz and Kahn (1966) further expanded on Stogdill's definition of an organisation to 
incorporate the idea of a cycle of events with patterns of energy flow - input, throughput, 
output, and then recycle. The output provides new energy, and, i f it is a product, it is 
sold and the money is used to purchase new inputs. Katz and Kahn (1966) state that: 
"the structure is to be found in an interrelated set of events which return upon 
themselves to complete and renew a cycle of activities. It is events rather than things 
which are structured, so that social structure is a dynamic rather than a static 
concept. Activities are structured so that they comprise a unity in their completion or 
closure" (p. 21). 
Following the work of Johnson et al., Stogdill, and Katz and Kahn, approaches to the 
concept of an organisation began to be expanded further. The definition of organisations 
was systems of systems within systems, without regard to problems either of boundaries 
or of the distinctiveness in the way of the organisation's functioning (Robbins, 1990). 
Finally, came the postmodern1 perspectives which radically changed the concept of 
organisation. Here the meaning of an organisation is contextually embedded in social 
discourse, that is, "resides in the contexts and occasions where it is created and used by 
members" (Boje et al., 1996, p. 2). 
Notwithstanding the different ways of defining an organisation, the essence of all 
definitions includes co-ordination and interaction of members. In other words an 
organisation must exist to achieve something. Factors that make organisations different 
are their structures. In general the term organisational 'structure' is defined as: "how 
1 As defined by Fox (1996) 'postmodernism' and 'postmodernists' are used to signify the theory as 
opposed to 'postmodern' which signifies the era. 
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tasks are to be allocated, who reports to whom, and the formal co-ordinating 
mechanisms and interaction patterns that will be followed... " (Robbins, 1990, p. 5). 
Further this organisational structure also has several components. In this context it has 
been claimed that there are two perspectives: modernist and postmodernist (Clegg,1990; 
Hatch, 1997). Modernist perspectives associate organisational structure as complex, 
formal and centralised, more in line with Max Weber's definition of bureaucracy. The 
postmodernist views organisation as: "informal or flexible; and its management 
structure is functionally decentralised, eclectic and participative, overlapping in many 
ways with non-managerial functions" (Clegg, 1990, p. 17). The meaning of structure in 
the context of a postmodern view is that relationships form through human interaction. 
Individuals interact, and over time these interactions stabilise into recognisable 
relationships that define social structure and contribute to the ways that work is 
accomplished. The approach taken by postmodernism seems to be one based on radically 
and rapidly changing conceptions of organisations, and it involves a movement away 
from substantive conceptions of social actors themselves. 
The following sections explore key factors that separate postmodernism from 
modernism. The discussion explores the postmodernism debate in relation to organisation 
and organisation theory. There are two levels of ambiguity confronting the 
postmodernism views. The first ambiguity relates to how best to describe 
postmodernism; as a historical epoch (new age) or epistemology (how knowledge is 
obtained or created). The second level of ambiguity questions the basis of postmodern 
organisation theory. The following section explores the development of opinions 
concerning these ambiguities. 
4.3.1 Postmodernism and Organisation Theory 
Some argue from the perspective that postmodernism is an era after modernity (Fox, 
1996; Frederickson, 1996). In a general context the transformation is associated with the 
widely noted move from an industrial (modern) to a post-industrial (postmodern) society; 
from an economy based primarily on the production of material goods (modern) to one 
based primarily on information technologies, services, marketing, credit, and 
consumption (postmodern). 
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Power (1990), however, suggests that there is no absolute line to demarcate the modern 
and the postmodern; the latter comes to signify both the termination of the former and a 
differentiated continuation of it. In contrast, Jameson (1991) argues that: 
"Postmodernism is what you have when the modernisation process is complete and 
nature is gone for good' (p. ix). Key aspects of postmodernism, exemplified by Jameson, 
are the changes of values towards depersonalisation and a detachment from the 'real 
world'. Commercialisation (commodification) is the key to postmodern society where, 
for example, privatisation of public services means that goods are transferred from the 
government sphere to the economic sphere as a matter of necessity. The welfare of "the 
masses' is of minimal value, and only the logic of commodification counts. Featherstone 
(1988), like Power, suggests that in one sense the situation could be seen as a transition 
from one era to the next. But from a different context he argues that it could also mean 
that postmodernism is a break or abandonment from the modern era. This suggests the 
emergence of a new social totality with its own organising principles. 
Hassard (1995) argues that postmodernism is signalling a new historical period and is 
also suggesting a new form of epistemology. For example, Hassard (1995) argues that 
there are many signs that society is moving towards a postmodern era. What one needs 
to do is simply describe the right way (based on a realist notion of what is 'out there') to 
see the world. Descriptions of an industrial production shift explained by Fox, (1996) and 
Frederickson, (1996) are examples of the realist notion meant by Hassard. The notion of 
postmodern epistemology stresses how one sees reality as 'in here' (Hassard, 1993). 
That is, reality is defined by the individual's subjective experience, albeit under social and 
cultural influences. In other words, there is no claim made about whether or not reality 
exists independent of the observer. It is assumed that reality cannot be known since all 
knowledge is mediated by experience. This view opposes that of a modernist 
epistemology which argues that the phenomena they study exist 'out there,' and thus 
their theories can be tested against reality to assess their correctness (Hatch, 1997). 
With regard to the second level of ambiguity some (Cohen, 1986; Reed, 1993) argue that 
a postmodern organisation theory lack robust grounding. Reed, for example, argues that 
a postmodern epistemologieal break was assumed, rather than being demonstrated 
through detailed analysis and assessment of the intellectual trajectories that organisation 
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theory has followed since the early twentieth century. Reed (1993) explains what actually 
happen was between the 1970s and 1980s talk of crises has merely reinforced perception 
of postmodernism without really discovering an alternative formulation or formulations 
that could provide a sense of direction and purpose. 
But this situation had changed by the end of the 1980s, according to Reed. There was a 
general movement in organisational analysis away from a paradigm of 
incommensurability2 and polarisation arose between conflicting groups (modernism and 
postmodernism). There was growing awareness of the need for the field of study to be 
based on a shared intellectual heritage and a recognisable historical continuity. Cohen's 
statements put the theoretical debate in place: 
"one of the most important results of post-empiricism has been to overturn the 
Cartesian duality of objectivism and relativism. While no neutral algorithm exists for 
the choice between theories, this does not imply that science is an irrational 
enterprise. Rather scientists are obligated to submit good reasons for the acceptance 
of their programme in preference to competing schools of thought. The criteria to 
which these reasons refer are established as a result of the historical development of 
community of inquiry within which justicatory arguments are made. This implies a 
rejection of the thesis of incommensurability of meaning between theories... On this 
bias, the rational appeal to scientific criteria involves a limited degree of rational 
persuasion" (1986, p. 129). 
The cumulative impact of the shifts in theoretical focus and direction provides a context 
in which a different kind of research agenda for organisation analysis is beginning to 
emerge in the 1990s (Reeds, 1993). Reeds argues that, in part, postmodernist thinking, 
particularly in regard to a renewal of interest in organisational culture and symbolism, has 
some influence on the changing agenda. On the other hand, it is important to remember 
~ Assessment of organisation theory's paradigmatic status has interested many. Thomas Kuhn (1962, 
1970) claimed that traditional wisdom in the philosophy of science does not equate with the historical 
evidence. Kuhn's suggestion is that dominant theories of scientific practice are incompatible with the 
facts of how science has actually progressed. For Kuhn the everyday reality of science is more akin to the 
life-cycle of the political community than to the dictates of formal logic. When science changes, a new 
approach emerges based upon fresh dictates of an alternative community structure, the new tradition, 
like the old, being what Kuhn terms a 'paradigm'. Kuhn argues that a change of paradigm orientation 
cannot be based upon open debate, because there are no logical arguments to demonstrate the superiority 
of a paradigm over the other. Being a proponent of a particular paradigm means that one can never 
concede to the premises of another. In sum, "the normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a 
scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often incommensurable with that which has gone 
before" (Kuhn, 197&, p. 103). 
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to connect the new theoretical views with older well-established traditions of thought and 
mature research programmes. Clark (1988) provides a similar argument as such: 
"From within this model (post-modernism), it is possible to 'forget' the struggles 
which have taken place over the politics of data control and access; to 'forget' the 
struggles over the introduction and use of technology, to 'forget' the struggles 
which take place at the chip-producing and assembling ends of the Imperial 
communicating chain. . . the development and integration of new technologies. . . are 
enmeshed in, not separate from, the complex of economics, cultural and political 
struggles. . .What remains striking about this process is how narrow the range of 
meanings has remained in the dominant media of communication" (1988, pp. 395-
398). 
The above arguments argue for a continued search for collective understanding of a 
complex and ambiguous phenomenon as 'modern organisation'. The authors contended 
that the activity can only be maintained i f the shared sense of long-term historical and 
intellectual continuities between current concerns and past achievements is carefully 
evaluated. As Hassard (1996) notes, "/'» their current form, neither the ethnoindustrial 
nor the sociophilosophical prospect offers a robust basis for developing postmodern 
organisation theory. Instead, we suggested that the synthetic perspective appears to 
offer a more promising location for theory building''' (p. 59). 
4.3.2 Bureaucracy and Organisation Theory 
Some researchers argue that organisation theory idea is a product of modernity because 
it is based on the notions of bureaucratic division of labour (Clegg, 1990), with 
management rooted in the application of logical activity (Carter and Jackson, 1991) and 
adopts rational designs of organisations to minimise uncertainty and maximise efficiency 
(Gergen, 1992). These descriptions suggest that a bureaucratic organisation is a 
modernist organisation. 
The classic perspective of bureaucracy was proposed by Max Weber who sought to 
describe an ideal authority system; one that would be rational and legal (Pugh and 
Hickson, 1989; Robbins, 1990). The system is called rational because the means are 
expressly designed to achieve certain specific goals (like modern machines). It is legal 
because authority is exercised by means of a system of rules and procedures through 
offices which an individual occupies at a particular time. Offices are arranged in a 
hierarchy, each successive step embracing all those beneath it. There is a set of rules and 
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procedures within which every possible contingency is theoretically provided for. There 
is a clear separation between personal and business tasks. In such an organisation, 
authority is based in the office and commands are obeyed because rules state it. 
Government organisation is commonly associated with a bureaucratic form. In Weber's 
(1978) term government is a 'bureaucratic authority'. For example, common to all 
governments is a structured hierarchy of offices, for example, a Cabinet, Parliament or 
Congress and the Civil Service (Cox, et al., 1986). Within this set of institutions there are 
clear divisions of labour, a clear authority hierarchy, formal selection procedures, and 
detailed rules and regulations. 
Bureaucracies have received more than their share of unfavourable publicity (Robbins, 
1990). There are those who consider bureaucracy to be dead (Bennis,1970) or no longer 
functional (Handy, 1989; Clegg, 1990), but there are also those (Miedwald, 1970; 
Thompson, 1993) who believe that bureaucracy is alive and well. Those who argue 
against bureaucracy believe that the bureaucratic model is no longer consistent with the 
values and demands of the present day: bureaucracy has had its time (Bennis, 1970; 
Clegg, 1990). 'Modern organisations,' Clegg argues, are in direct contrast to Weber's 
bureaucratic form with initiative, drive and energy coming from the consistent parts, not 
the centre. This is held to be particularly appropriate to large organisations such as 
multinationals who are now concerned only with keeping watch on long-term policy and 
finance. Modern organisations are flatter (with no more than four layers) and are 
facilitated by a range of factors including 'downsizing' and the shrinkage of middle 
layers. The benefits not only to a narrowing of status differences, but also to a more 
effective and direct means of two-way communication. 
Handy (1989) claims that change is also affecting government organisation. Handy 
argues that government organisation is becoming a contractual organisation: "At the 
extreme the core of an organisation need contain no more than a design function, a 
quality-control function, a costing and estimating function, as well as some co-
ordinating management' (p. 80). According to some (Cooper and Burrel, 1988), this is 
the current contention of all organisations breaking away from the Weber 'iron cage' 
requirement. As Berg (1989) puts it: "the final rejection of the grand narrative of 
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organisations as tightly coupled rational machines run by conscious and mature men 
[sic] in full control of operations and proactive strategic choices" (p. 207). 
However, there are some who disagree that modern organisations have made a break 
from Weberian ideology (Best and Kellner; 1991; Thompson, 1993; Fox, 1996; 
Frederickson, 1996). Thompson, for example, argues that many postmodern views are 
simply a reproduction of old ideas. Similarly Frederickson (1996) argues that many new 
ideas about change such as 'reinventing government' or a 'new public administration 
movement' are merely: "old wine in new bottles... There is probably not much that is new 
under the sun, but, to each new generation, many things seem importantly new and 
useful" (p. 269). 
Thompson (1993) argues that breaking from a rational form of authority sometimes acts 
as a masquerade as part of the trend away from bureaucratic culture. The area of 
bureaucratic argument generally centres over misinterpretation of meanings. On the issue 
of centralisation and hierarchy, for example, Thompson notes that: 
"essentially what we are seeing is a duality in which the decentralisation of the labour 
process and production decisions [for example through mechanisms, subcontracting] 
is combined with increased centralisation of power and control over the spatially 
dispersed, but interdependent units" (1993, p. 190). 
Technology, for example, is an important 'facilitator' for decentralised organisational 
operation, but it does not effectively decentralise authority and power. Decision-making 
is still in the hands of the few. Indeed, computerisation could further strengthen the 
power of the decision-maker due to better information frameworks (Thompson, 1993). 
Hyman (1988) similarly argued that: 
"Advances in computerisation and telecommunications facilitate the concentration of 
'conception' (research, planning, directive and strategic management) at corporate 
headquarters, while 'execution' is dispersed around the globe..." (1988, p. 57). 
With regard to hierarchy some (Thompson, 1993; Frederickson, 1996) have argued that 
the notion of decentralisation, flatter hierarchies, contracting out, and systems of co-
production or public-private partnerships could also mean highly structured 
organisations. Thompson provided several examples, including the clothes manufacturer, 
Benneton, which has a decentralised form of subcontracted work inside Italy and 
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franchisee! sales throughout Europe. The organisation is firmly held together by 
centralised marketing and complete managerial control over the design, cutting and 
finishing of garments. 
The impression that 'work rules' are ending is another area which has been subjected to 
criticism. Some (Thompson, 1993; Frederickson, 1996) accept that traditional tasks-
based rules have declined in some sectors of the economy, but that does not mean that 
the overall bureaucratic regulation has lessened. Rather, Thompson argues that there has 
been a shift from work-based rules to behavioural rules, such as co-operativeness, 
adaptability and self discipline. Behavioural rules have become an integral feature 
measuring individual appraisal and performance-related schemes. 
Thompson (1993) goes on to argue that postmodernism has wrongly interpreted changes 
in the structure of modern organisations. The post-bureaucratic image portrayed by 
postmodernism can be seen as symbolic, because decentralisation, flatter, or smaller 
organisations are misinterpreted. Thompson (1993) argues that: 
"With some exceptions the whole concept of bureaucracy has become devalued 
through its lazy and stereotypical usage. Changes in the form and content of 
hierarchies, plus shifts in rule-governed behaviour, indicate that we have to 
constantly renew our understanding of bureaucratic processes. The 'break with 
bureaucracy' fits nicely into an era when entrepreneurial activities are a highly valued 
part of the cultural and political climate. It is a pity that postmodernism has seen fit 
to endorse the sweeping statements and global prophesies so characteristic of pop-
management" (p. 194). 
In summary the debate around bureaucracy, organisation and organisation theory, 
provides several points for consideration. First, organisation theory is not static but is 
adaptable to change. The context of 'change' nonetheless, needs to be understood in the 
context of shared meaning; that is, through a shared sense of historical and intellectual 
continuities between current concerns and past achievements. Second, postmodernism 
brought 'multiple viewpoint perspectives', and it provokes one to question the hidden 
ways of thinking and speaking. We should use our methods of understanding and 
discovery about ourselves as well as on the world around us, in order to reveal what it is 
that we are assuming when we produce or use knowledge. We can be contradictory, 
paradoxical and incongruous in order to avoid the traps of dominance hidden within a 
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singular view. Thirdly, both modernists and postmodernists provide constructive means 
of understanding the broader and specific aspects of organisational environment. 
Modernism permits an understanding of organisations from the activities they carry out 
(objective) while postmodernism allows one to be aware that sometimes the categories of 
language used to describe/understand organisations (such as environment, structure, 
culture) are not real or natural in an objective sense. Rather they are the product of 
beliefs held by members of the organisation or society. 
4.4 Selected Theoretical Perspectives 
In the light of the above observations the present study has selected two theoretical 
frameworks which allow the application of modernist and postmodernist perspectives -
Web models and Structuration theory. The following sections define the perspectives and 
explore how and why these perspectives are used. 
4.4.1 Web Models 
Web models are defined as a family of models which could "help make better predictions 
of the outcomes of using socially complex computing developments" (Kling and Scacchi, 
1980, p. 3). The following sections discuss the meanings embedded in this definition. 
First, it is necessary to make a distinction between 'a web model' and 'web models'. The 
purpose is to illustrate that there are some differences in levels of study coverage when 
one is using one or the other. To illustrate the distinction, the concept of a system applied 
in organisation theory is used. 
A "system is a thing with interrelated parts. Each part is conceived as affecting the 
others and each depends upon the whole" (Hatch, 1997, p. 35). On the other hand 
'systems' is a system operating within systems or, a nested system consisting of a 
supersystem, the system itself and its subsystems (Hatch, 1997). A key characteristic of 
all systems, nonetheless, is the existence of interrelated parts (Boulding, 1968; Johnson et 
al., 1973). Interrelation implies that there are interactions, interdependence and 
integration. Interaction means that parts of a system do not operate in a vacuum, but 
continuously relate with other parts or units with which they try to exchange or maintain 
some types of relationships. Interdependence means that parts of the organisation do not 
merely relate and interact with each other, but also provide mutual satisfaction for need, 
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and a means of attainment for other parts of the organisation. The characteristic can be 
compared to that of a web which displays a set of interlocking relationships, so that a 
disturbance anywhere means that the disturbance may be transmitted to other parts of the 
web. Finally, integration means that the holism of the system is emphasised. The concern 
here is with the ways in which the organisation is tied together; for example, the parts 
that share the objectives of the entire organisation and recognise their condition of 
interdependence and interaction. 
With reference to 'web model' and'web models'; 'a system'is comparable to a'web 
model' and a 'nested system' is comparable to 'web models'. Application of either one 
of the models as such depends on the level of analysis within a study. For illustration, 
several studies are reviewed here. Data operation management for the Australian Public 
Service Board (Mandata) (Sauer, 1993) and the Computerised Rural Information System 
Project (CRISP) (Madon,1994) are examples of studies which use web models for 
analysis. In the study by Mandata three levels of dependence were indicated. The first 
level is the project organisation; the group of people who are occupied with the 
development of the system. The second level is the information system itself. The third 
level comprises the supporters, such as monetary resources, material resources, 
information, social legitimacy and control of strategic contingencies. In the triangle of 
dependence, each relationship is subject to a variety of exogenous actors which influence 
how it will affect the rest of the triangle. That is, how well the project organisation 
conducts the innovation process depends on a variety of factors such as the extent to 
which the application is understood, the technical process employed, the rate of change 
of the technology, and the quality of the information systems professionals. Likewise, 
whether supporters decide to continue with their support depends upon factors such as 
how they perceive the system in relation to their interests, external pressures, and 
alternative uses. According to Sauer (1993): 
"Web models make it apparent that simple linear explanations are misconceived 
because the relationships surrounding information systems processes and the 
dependences on which they are based are highly interconnected" (p. 114). 
In the CRISP study the objective was to explore the ongoing interaction between the 
process of technology adoption and the social context within which the technology was 
69 
embedded. The study made the assumption that the objectives of an information system 
should be consistent with the objectives of the wider system which it is serving. To 
analyse the impact of CRISP two levels of system interrelationships were observed. The 
first is the situation within the rural development programme that CRISP served. Second 
was the situation among institutions that were to bring about the development. Between 
the two levels, each was open to two categorisations of contextual influences - outer and 
inner. Outer influential factors include national development policies, national technology 
policies, the structure of institutions, infrastructure, and perspectives of policy-makers. 
Inner influential factors include the interface between the formal and informal systems, 
the perspectives of local agents and local resources. 
Finally, computerisation in British local government (Campbell, 1990) can be viewed in 
terms of the application of a web model. The focus of Campbell's study was the 
relationship between innovation and organisation. Her investigation was specifically 
concerned with the interaction within and between one type of organisation at one level 
of operation, that is, the local government level. In contrast, the Mandata approach 
observed three levels - the public service systems, other related public service system and 
customers of the public system. Similarly the CRISP study observed two levels, rural and 
national systems. 
In the case of the present study, the contextual boundaries of organisational information 
systems are observed at three levels - Federal (offices under Federal administration), 
State (offices under State government administration which includes District offices) and 
local authorities3 (Figure 4.1). Detailed discussion of the methodology used for this 
observation and analysis is provided in Chapter 5. Here a brief explanation is provided by 
way of relating the work to the term 'web models'. Figure 4.1 illustrates three levels of 
administrative systems - Federal, State (including District) and local authorities. These 
make up the organisational context that forms the focus for this present research. There 
are four levels of relationship observed. The first level of interactions is between the diff-
3 All local authorities except the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan comes under the 
authority of State government. However, in many areas such as in the formulation of by-laws, collection 
of revenues and taxes, and forming consolidated funds, local authorities are provided with independent 
powers and autonomy. 
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of Study Context: three levels of organisational 
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Source: Adapted from Sauer, C. (1983, p.75) 
erent levels of administrations, namely between Federal and State (and including District) 
organisations, and between State organisations and local authorities. The second level of 
relationships is between organisations at each level, that is, various types of 
organisations, such as user and supplier agencies. The third level relates to 
interdependence within organisations, that is between the departments, agencies, units, 
and offices of an organisation. The fourth level involves relationships within the focal 
organisation itself; the co-ordinating offices. 
At each of these levels, there are sets of participants or actors, such as vendors, 
consultants, data users and suppliers, professionals, and administrators, who each have 
particular interests or power with which to influence programme development. Most 
often interests and power are directly contributed by various factors internal or external 
to the organisation, such as social, cultural, technical, economic and political factors. 
4.4.2 Web Approaches and Related Theoretical Perspectives 
The main emphasis of web approaches, (either with reference to a 'web model' or 'web 
models'), is the enlargement of contextual boundaries beyond that of the focal context. 
The objective of web approaches in this sense is to ensure that all possible factors are 
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investigated in order to understand the organisational context in which an information 
system is being implemented 
A second aspect of the web approach is the ability to analyse the dynamics of IT 
development and use within the contextual boundaries. Kling (1980) argues that in order 
to make the predictions, and to understand the ways in which the behaviour of people 
and groups in organisations influences the development, use, and consequences of 
computing, there is a need to have a theory about why the issues came about. Kling says 
that: 
"Any observation or claim about the uses or consequences of new computing 
technologies... rests on an array of assumptions about these issues, however, 
implicit. . . In coming to an understanding of computing technologies, particularly 
newer ones, it is important to understand which conceptions of social life are likely 
to aid in discerning critical social aspects" (1980, p. 62). 
Within the context of this argument Kling suggests six common perspectives that provide 
different terms with which to understand how people live and work with computing in an 
organisation. The six perspectives are: rational, structural, human relations, interactionist, 
organisational politics, and class politics. Kling argues that each of these perspectives 
provides a way for research to develop a coherent understanding of the issue under 
study. Application of these perspectives as such varies with the emphasis of one's 
research. Robey and Newman (1996), for example, use five perspectives because their 
research aimed to understand the process of system development from various 
perspectives - rational, structural, human relations, interactionist and politics. In the 
Mandata study only one theoretical perspective, namely the interactionist perspective, 
was used. In practice, according to Kling and Scacchi (1980; 1982), couplings are the 
most common approach taken by researchers; this is the approach adopted by the present 
study. The following section explains the major clusters of social assumptions and 
organising concepts that inform each of the six perspectives (Table 4.1); and within this 
discussion examples of previous research using one or another of these perspectives are 
highlighted. Subsequently, perspectives selected by the present study are also discussed. 
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Table 4.1: Theoretical Perspectives Adopted by Social Analysis of Computing 
Computing 
Elements/Perspectives Technology Social Settings Organising Concepts 
Rational equipment as 
instrument 
unified organisation rationalisation and 
formal procedures 
Structural equipment as 
instrument 
organisation and 
formal units 
organisational structure 
and organisational 
environment 
Human relations equipment as 
instrument and 
environment 
small groups and 
individuals 
trust, motivation, 
expectations and 
rewards 
Interactionist package as milieu situated social 
actors 
defining situations and 
labelling events as social 
construction 
Organisational politics equipment as 
instrument 
social actors in 
positions 
work opportunities or 
constraints 
Class politics equipment as 
instrument 
social class as 
stratified system 
ownership of means of 
production 
Source: Adapted from Kling, (1980, p. 64). 
Kling (1980) characterises the rational approach as assuming that technology is a tool for 
achieving the shared goal of greater efficiency. Organisations themselves are viewed as a 
rational means for attaining shared goals, so an information system should be designed 
to increase organisational efficiency. Where inefficiencies occur, the blame is placed on 
the quality of the technical solution rather than on the social system adopting it. Rational 
analyses, as such, narrow the utility of computing by avoiding the social context in which 
the technology is developed and used. The limitations inherent in rational analyses has 
made them unpopular among researchers, because they limit understanding of the 
dynamics of computing. Eason (1993) for example, argues that: 
"The dominant method by which major information systems are designed and imple-
mented in organisations has been characterised as rational and technocentric. 
... These characteristics do not make it easy for user and organisational issues to play 
a major part in design and implementation. As a consequence users and 
organisational issues are often barriers to diffusion when attempts are made to 
implement the solution" (p. 29). 
In other studies (for example, Hastings and Clark, 1991; Hutchinson and Toledano, 
1993) the weaknesses of a rationalistic view have been identified as the main barrier to 
achieving a realisation that computer developments are highly susceptible to a changeable 
economic and social environment. 
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A structural approach expands the analysis of the rational perspective by including the 
social context of the computing application. The social context of organisation includes 
its structure and environment, and rational objectives are achieved when there is a fit 
among the environment, the organisation's structure, and computing applications. 
Structural analyses argue that environmental changes can effect a change in an 
organisation's structure. Application of structural analyses are common in GIS 
(Stevanovic, et al., 1989; Taylor, 1991; Sahay and Walsham, 1996) and other large scale 
information system studies (Kraemer et al., 1980; Han, 1991). 
The human relations perspective also adopts a rational perspective about social analysis, 
but it also incorporates social and technical criteria into the analysis. 'Human relations' 
operates under the idealistic assumption that social and technical goals can be 
simultaneously achieved, or jointly optimised in the implementation of information 
technology. The primary means for achieving joint optimisation is the participation of 
users in the design of information systems. Through the involvement both of users and 
analysts in system development, the consequences of the application on individuals and 
groups can be considered as part of the design problem. A human relations perspective 
therefore widens the shared goal to include social objectives such as job satisfaction and 
work group autonomy, as well as economic objectives such as efficiency. In GIS or 
other large scale information studies this perspective is often used in combination with 
other perspectives. For example, the works of Hastings and Clark (1991) and Hutchinson 
and Toledano (1993), use this perspective in combination with a structural perspective. 
In the interactionist perspective, the focus is placed on the symbolic meaning of 
technology to subgroups with different interests and values. The organisation is viewed 
as a 'culture' in which objective reality is interpreted and understood in a social context. 
Computing is viewed as creating a complex social milieu that brings together a variety of 
participants in complex social arrangements. This perspective is central to the Mandata 
study (1993). However, there are some (Kling and Gerson, 1977; Kling, 1978) who 
couple this perspective with organisational political analysis. The latter focuses more 
narrowly on the interests of subgroups and the conflicts among subgroups. The 
organisation is viewed as groups of coalitions. Most often in order to gain control over 
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computer development, key actors will build sets of procedures about the computing 
arrangements that others in the organisation will accept. Within this perspective 
supporters believe that key actors usually develop long term strategies to mobilise 
support for their own preferences and to block the emergence of conflicting preferences. 
There are several studies that place central emphasis on this perspective. Examples 
include the analysis of ICI by Pettigrew (1985) and work by Kling and Iocono (1984), 
Laudon, (1974) and Kling (1978). There are also a number of studies that have blended 
this analysis with other perspectives, such as those by Kraemer et al., (1980) and Han 
(1991). 
Finally, class politics examines how the use of computing in organisations can enforce 
existing class relationships. Kling and Scacchi (1980) characterise class politics as a 
Marxist ideology; this is commonly used to examine how the use of computing in 
organisations reinforces existing class relationships. 
In the case of the present study, two perspectives, namely structural and organisational 
politics, are found to be the most fitting in terms of describing the dynamics of computer 
use and development. The reason for applying a structural perspective is because the 
present study accepts that the social context of an organisation includes its structure and 
environment. The organisational objective is achieved when there is an understanding 
among the environment, the organisation's structure, and the computer applications. 
Environmental changes play a crucial role in the change of an organisation's structure. 
The research also accepts the view of an organisation as groups of coalitions (Kling and 
Iocono, 1984), consisting of various stakeholders with competing interests in 
organisational resources, including computing infrastructure. Conflicting interests often 
result in incompatible goals and can be the direct cause of project failure. 
In general the web approach has offered a means of conceptualising and exploring the 
dynamics of computer use and development. The essence of the approach is to be aware 
that in understanding computing technology one needs to explore the social environment 
in which the technology is embedded. The six theoretical perspectives in many ways help 
to develop a perspective on a particular information system problem. In the case of this 
research the combination of structural perspective and one based on organisational 
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politics is found helpful in developing initial 'storylines' of how people behave with 
information technology in an organisation. Having this understanding, the present 
research is keen to explore the reasons why people behave as they do, on the 
understanding that there is no simple way to understand people's actions. The idea is in 
line with the postmodernist claim to: 
"learn to take nothing for granted. Deconstruct all claims of truth in order to 
determine whose point of view is benefited by a particular way of looking at or 
arguing about the world" (Hatch, 1997, pp. 46-47). 
Giddens' (1984) structuration theory contains the approach highlighted by the 
postmodernist's view. Giddens' work turns attention away from understanding social 
structure as a system for defining and controlling interaction and social relations, towards 
interest in how everyday practices in which organisational members participate construct 
the very rules of the organisation that they work in. The following sections develop an 
understanding of Giddens' theory and discuss how it fits into the context of the present 
research. 
4.5 Structuration Theory 
The aim of structuration theory as argued by Anthony Giddens (1976; 1982; 1984; 1989) is 
to strengthen social research whilst avoiding the weaknesses of major social theories as 
outlined in structuralism, functionalism, system models, ethnomethodology, 
phenomenology and symbolic interactionism. Structuration theory touches many points 
of social research. For the purpose of this thesis, two aspects of structuration theory are 
used as a means to sensitise the complexities of social relations surrounding information 
systems. The first is understanding the elements of social practices. The second is the 
element of a dualistic structure in explaining cause and effect in social practice. 
4.5.1 Elements of Social Practice 
The basic ingredients in the framework of structuration theory are communication, power 
and sanction. These three basic ingredients are necessary to enact social practices 
(Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4 .2: Analytical Elements of the Process of Structuration 
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Source: Giddens, A. (1984, p.29). 
According to Giddens, communication is important because social practices are 
organised through meaningful communication. Communications are made with the aid of 
interpretative schemes or mutual recognition. Interpretation is made by the use of rules, 
for example, in language rules of languages are used. In the context of Giddens rules do 
not necessarily refer to formal rules which might be written in a visible form; rather, rules 
are related to sense, beliefs, norms, and knowledge (facility). To enact a certain social 
practice, participants need to draw on a set of rules; these rules help to structure the 
pattern of social action. Here structure is used as an abstract term. Structure is not 
viewed in terms of physical dimensions nor as the concept understood by organisation 
theory or modernist views where structure has three components (complexity, 
formalisation and centralisation). Rather, here the definition of 'structure' is based on 
postmodernist views with 'memory traces' which are internal to a person. It is rule-based 
knowledge. The activity of social practices revolves around the structuring properties of 
rules, which actors define and redefine to shape the pattern which they wish to organise. 
Giddens termed this frame of action as duality. 
Power is the capability to make a difference (Giddens, 1984). Giddens argues that power 
is not to be equated with the meaning used in social science, where 'power' is defined as 
intent or the will to achieve a desired outcome. Power in structuration theory is defined 
as structured properties of social systems, drawn upon and reproduced by knowledgeable 
actors in the course of interactions (Giddens, 1984). Sahay and Walsham (1996), for 
example, applied this approach in the study of wasteland management in India. They 
demonstrated that one of the reason for the project failure (inability to transfer GIS to 
grassroots level) was a function of knowledgeable actors (scientific institutions) who 
mobilised elements of the context to enable a coherent and shared understanding, and the 
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concurrent creation of an asymmetric resource relationship among the critical actors to 
facilitate change. 
The production of interaction is linked to morality. Morality is a group of rules which 
actors are able to call upon in the production of interaction. According to Giddens 'moral 
rules' are all types of rules that actors draw upon to make of sense (legitimise) what they 
say and do (Giddens, 1977). These rules are drawn based on actors' stocks of 
knowledge, norms, culture, etc. (Giddens, 1984). Taking the India wasteland 
management study once again, one can argue that each group that participates in the 
programme was applying its own 'rules' to meet its own desirable objective. The 
scientific institution group, for example, was unable to adapt to a bottom-up approach 
(user-oriented approach) because they were bound by the "prevailing beliefs...[thai 
there is] a clear division between the 'technical' and 'social' people, with the former 
being considered superior^ (Sahay and Walsham, 1996, pp. 394-395). 
In the conception of structuration this is explained as a reflexive form of knowledge. It 
could be understood as 'self-conscious' knowledge and knowledge grounded through a 
continuous process of creation and recreation. In and through time, these actions 
constitute a social practice (Figure 4.3). As Giddens argues that: 
"Human history is created by intentional activities but is not an intended project; it 
persistently eludes efforts to bring it under conscious direction. However, such 
attempts are continually made by human beings, who operate under the threat and 
the promise of the circumstance that they are the only creatures who make their 
'history' in cognisance of that fact" (1984, p. 27). 
Figure 4.3: Stratification Model of the Agent 
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Source: Giddens, A. (1984, p. 5). 
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4.5.2 The Process of Structuration and the Duality of Structure 
The idea highlighted above is called the duality of structure. This states that social 
structures constrain the choices that humans make about their activities, but at the same 
time social structures are themselves created by the activities that they constrain. 
Furthermore, structures do not only constrain; they enable interaction. For example, 
Giddens says that in communication, one who wishes to communicate is constrained to 
follow the same rules of language. Thus when a person communicates something to 
someone else the process is a conscious (intended) part of the actor's action. When the 
other person tries to make sense of what has been said, they may repeat it for themselves. 
Since rules are not encoded, the action of repeating a sentence is based on a person's 
understanding of rules. Repeating a sentence (reproduction) and the continued repetition 
of the sentence by another is an unintended part of the actor's action. 
The essence of the theoretical framework based on structuration theory is the relational 
interplay between contextual elements and information system implementation, which, 
when analysed in terms of the concept of duality of structure, points to the importance of 
communication of meanings, resources and facilities, norms and values and the central 
role of actors in mediating between the context and the process. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored existing theories that could suggest methods to guide 
information collection for this research and ways to interpret its findings. Two theoretical 
perspectives are adopted: web models helps to explore the dynamics of computing use 
and development in organisations, and structuration theory is used to help in 
understanding actors' behaviour. These theories are selected because they offer two ways 
of studying an organisation. Theoretical perspectives provided by web approaches 
collectively take an objective epistemological position (modernist view), and which views 
organisations as objects with dimensions that can be reliably measured. The perspective 
seeks explanation for the various forms that organisations take and the outcomes that 
they achieve. Structuration theory takes a subjective epistemological position 
(postmodernist view), and treats organisations as subjects whose meanings are to be 
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appreciated and understood. It tries to understand the organisation through the 
individuals who are directly involved in the day-to-day activities of the organisation. 
Differences in epistemological stances taken by these theoretical approaches highlight the 
necessity of adopting multiple methods to guide the study design. The modernist 
perspective focuses on the organisation itself, relying on description and analysis 
grounded in objectivity which produces comparative views of organisations and 
information system development implementation in a similar context. The postmodernist 
perspective offers the application of ethnographic techniques, such as participant 
observation and in-depth interviews. Approaches provided by both theories fit well with 
the dual objectives of the present research, which is to understand context and process of 
information system use and development in large organisations, and to understand the 
role of organisational actors in the interconnection between context and process. The 
next chapter describes the methods used to carry out the objectives of the research 
within the theoretical frameworks discussed here. 
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Chapter 5 Research Focus and Methodology 
5.1 Introduction and Research Focus 
This thesis focuses on two large scale computerised information systems 
programmes: the Integrated Project Monitoring System (SETIA) and the National 
Land Information System (NALIS). Both programmes involved participation of 
national agencies, but differences in the types of information handled meant that there 
were separate agency-based focuses in the two programmes. NALIS concentrated 
more on land-related agencies, while SETIA, being concerned with more general 
information needs, involved several different types of agencies across Malaysia. The 
two programmes are also characterised by other distinctive organisational issues. 
These relate mainly to technology, human support, and actors that are responsible for 
handling, maintaining, and storing information. These key differences make it useful 
to develop a guiding framework to ensure that information from SETIA and NALIS 
was assessed equally. This framework comprised: 
• Identification of the focal agencies for each programme 
• Identification of the agencies related to both programmes 
• Development of guide questions for IT-related information 
This outline guide is discussed in more detail in the first part of this chapter. 
Fieldwork (information collection) and analysis are explained later in the chapter. 
The fieldwork was carried out in two stages; one month was allocated for a pilot 
study and six months for the main field study. Notwithstanding the fieldwork, several 
of the issues which concern this study have been followed by the author since 1981 in 
my capacity as an officer in a Federal agency, and from 1990 to the present as an 
academician in a Malaysian higher education institution. These roles proved highly 
advantageous for the present research in terms of gaining access to government 
agencies. My experience in the government service helped in understanding networks 
(both formal and informal) of government agencies and key actors in projects and 
programmes. The next section outlines the research strategy; this is followed by a 
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discussion of fieldwork planning and development and of the tools used to organise 
the field information. 
5.2 Research Strategy 
According to Yin (1994) there are specific forms of questions which a researcher can 
use to help provide important clues regarding an appropriate research strategy. Yin 
notes that 'how' and 'why' type questions are most appropriate for case study work 
because they lean more toward explanation and examination rather than just being 
exploratory. Many of the factors which the researcher seeks at the outset inevitably 
remain vague because the situation is embedded in multi-level complexity. Yin (1994) 
classified such concerns as appropriate for case study work: 
"A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (p. 13). 
This research has selected two case studies to describe, explore and explain the 
operation and development of large scale information systems in public organisations. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the selection of SETIA and NALIS, which are at different 
stages of their development, is expected to provide an understanding of three aspects 
of information system development at the national level, these being the designing, 
the planning and the implementation. With SETIA, the focus is on post-
implementation information system activities, and the ways in which organisational 
actors devise and implement enhancements to existing information systems. With 
NALIS, the focus is on the early stages of computer information system development; 
their conception, design, adoption and organisational implementation. 
Although, the research focuses on two case studies, the two cases are compared only 
in the final stage of the analysis, to derive insights that are common to both and 
specific to each context. The integrity, uniqueness and variety in each case was 
maintained rather than a design that would have reduced them to a few comparable 
variables. 
The SETIA programme has been the subject of research by a number of authors, 
notably Han and Walsham (1990) Han (1991) and Masser (1994). I i | general these 
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previous studies cover the early parts of SETIA's life and they raise a number of key 
issues. Han (1991) for example, argues that SETIA is a highly politicised programme, 
with its establishment being closely manoeuvred by political leaders. As such its 
future is highly uncertain because many of its participating agencies still lack the 
necessary knowledge to support the operation of a large scale IT programme. Masser 
(1994) views SETIA as a "system built upon well-established administrative 
procedures" and argued that it "represents a near ideal state that is unlikely to be 
achieved by most other monitoring systems". Remarks from these previous studies 
draw attention to the need to re-examine the operation and status of present day 
SETIA. In a way the present research intends to answer the questions posed by 
previous researchers; why do key developments take place and how do they come 
about? 
With regard to NALIS there are no previous academic studies for comparison, 
although in 1994 the consultancy Renong Berhad was commissioned by the MLCD to 
undertake a feasibility study for NALIS. The findings of this study were, to some 
extent, used as a guideline to explore the development of NALIS further. Discussion 
of Renong's study is provided in Chapter 6 (Section I I , part 1). NALIS has certain 
similarities to SETIA, especially in terms of its coverage which emphasises the 
participation of agencies across the whole machinery of government - the Federal, 
State (including District offices) and local authority levels. In the context of 
Malaysian information system development, no programme of the NALIS scale has 
claimed implementation success. SETIA, it has been argued, is an example of a failing 
programme (Han, 1991). Other examples include the National Land Data Bank and 
National Integrated Data System, which failed even to survive the pilot project level. 
In the broader context, as discussed in Chapter 3, implementation of large scale 
information systems is highly challenging for developing countries because many still 
lack the necessary IT infrastructural support. This research considers how far NALIS 
could set a precedent for Malaysia in particular and developing countries in general. 
5.3. Fieldwork Planning and Development 
A major objective of the fieldwork was to gather information that could provide 
descriptions of government organisational behaviour in administering and implemen-
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ting departmental computerisation, and consequently to observe efforts towards 
meeting national information system goals At both the levels of government (policy 
level) and departmental computerisation, the study of processes and actions and how 
these are conditioned by (and in turn condition contexts) are at the very heart of this 
research. 'Process' or 'action' is both historical and idiosyncratic and, as Becker 
(1967) asserted "what the case study does best is study process" (p. 239). A historical 
element is invoked in the research in order to understand the influence of 
organisations which are relatively stable and enduring on actions. The sequence of 
action and how action relates to organisations and vice versa can be traced in a 
longitudinal fashion. As it was not possible to conduct a full scale longitudinal study 
within the time-scale of this research project, a historical reconstruction and analysis 
of events was carried out. The inclusion of a historical dimension is crucial, both to an 
understanding of how organisations influence actions, and their leverage in generating 
management and policy prescription that would be socially and politically acceptable. 
As Tilly (1978) puts it, " w live in history and cannot escape it by assuming it away; 
when something happens, what has happened before shapes how it happens'' (p. 29). 
In Chapter 4 relevant theories were presented and these were synthesised into a 
framework for guiding both the empirical and analytical aspects of the study. This 
theoretical framework was used as a general guide to direct the fleldwork, and in 
attempting to explain what was found in the empirical work. The theoretical 
framework chosen provided a balance to the risk of over emphasising the 
idiosyncratic and ignoring the extensive work done in the area of social analysis of 
information systems. On the other hand, it has to be noted that an over-emphasis on 
theory would have risked missing important individualities of the cases and the 
influence and interpretations of real life actors; this is likely to distract from 
discovering new knowledge. The case studies are guided by the theoretical 
framework to the extent therefore that the research does not become an accumulation 
of anecdotes. That said, the description and analysis of the cases provided in this 
chapter and the joint analysis of the two cases in Chapter 6 are written in 'natural' 
language. 
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Since a primary aim was to devise a methodology whereby Malaysia specifically, and 
developing countries in general, can learn from the experiences of large scale 
information systems operation, it was necessary to capture the specifics of the 
contexts of the two cases before the relevance of prescribed intervention strategies 
could be judged. The case study's intensive approach to research can explain causal 
relations more effectively through rich description. In addition, its potential for 
developing what Stoecker (1991) called a theory of the idiosyncratic, by bringing all 
possible theoretical perspectives to bear and discarding and weighing each until valid 
and useful explanation of important idiosyncrasies of the case is obtained, holds 
promise for informing prescriptions that are likely to have impact on decision and 
policy makers. 
5.3.1 Approach to Information Collection 
Government information system programmes are multi-level phenomena, with 
multiple units of analysis at the levels of the individual, organisation and society. In 
order to obtain a better understanding of the interaction of these different levels, 
equal attention was devoted to policy and information systems in the empirical work. 
A multi-method approach to information collection including direct observation, 
interviews, both structured and semi-structured, and extensive use of archive and 
other secondary information was adopted. Information was derived from multiple 
levels within agencies and between agencies extending across regions and States. The 
types of organisational actors involved in contributing information were also from 
several different levels of professional and administrative hierarchies (Figure 5.1). 
This approach facilitates triangulation, as suggested by Denzin and Lincoln (1994): 
"Because different 'lenses' or perspectives result from the use of different 
methods, often more than one njethod may be used within a project so the 
researcher can gain a more holistic view of the setting" (p. 224). 
The approach is also in support: of the case study inquiry which according to Yin 
(1994): 
"copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
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relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result 
benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
[information] collection and analysis" (p. 13). 
Figure 5.1: Conceptualising a Triangulation Approach 
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5.3.2 Pilot Study 
Prior to the main fieldwork period a pilot study was carried out in June 1996. The 
main aims of the pilot study were: 
1. to identify new contact persons and agencies related to both programmes. 
2. to develop and improve questions design and format (ability to be understood 
by the interviewee answers) and to highlight new issues which were not initially 
included in the interview questions. 
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3. to highlight problems with practicalities: access, estimation of time required 
per office and area, time of travel between areas, use of tape recorder, expenses 
required, etc. 
Twenty five agencies from author's existing networks were contacted by letter from 
the United Kingdom. Fourteen of the twenty five agreed to take part in the study and 
be interviewed. Confirmation of appointments was made by telephone on the author's 
arrival in Kuala Lumpur. In general, several levels of calls were required to confirm 
an appointment. In key agencies, notably the Implementation Co-ordination Unit 
(ICU) and the Information Systems Division of the Ministry of Land and Co-
operative Development (MLCD) appointments were facilitated by prior contacts with 
ICU, with the present Director, the previous IT Division Director and other staff. 
Similarly with MLCD, the State Secretary in Selangor, Project Manager in Seberang 
Perai and Director of Land and Mines in the Federal Territory were known to the 
author. The final list of people interviewed is shown in Table 5.1 and the area covers 
is shown in Figure 5.2. 
All interviews were tape-recorded and, on average, each interview took 60 to 75 
minutes. All officers interviewed during the pilot study were well informed on persons 
responsible for SETIA and NALIS, and IT development issues in general. They 
introduced many new IT development ideas planned by the government, and 
identified problems and issues included in implementing the ideas. The initial views 
greatly helped to strengthen the research scope and to identify relevant issues for 
further exploration. These issues are as follows: 
First, it was apparent that administrators or managers are equipped to answer 
technical questions. In certain cases, in particular for the NALIS study, policy 
makers were also able to explain detailed aspects of technical matters in their 
office. For example, at the Melaka Land and Mines office, the director (a 
surveyor) was the decision-maker, administrator and technical master of his 
department. He was well versed in all aspects of his department, and certain 
issues had to be directed back to him for clarification. This example is common 
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Table 5.1: Pilot Study Interview Schedule 
Place, Date, Title, Office 
Kuala Lumpur 
07/06/96 
• Deputy Secretary, Information Systems Division Unit, Ministry of Land and 
Co-operative Development 
• Deputy Director, Department of Survey and Mapping, Ministry of Land 
and Co-operative Development 
8/06/96 
• Systems Analyst, SETIA Division, Implementation Co-ordination Unit 
• Deputy Director, Macro Planning Division, Economic Planning Unit 
Selangor 
11/06/96 
• State Planning and Economic Officer, State Secretariat Selangor 
• Valuation Officer, Valuation and Property Services Department 
Melaka 
12/06/96 
• State Planning and Economic Officer, State Secretariat Melaka 
• State Director of Survey, State Land and Mines Office 
Pulau Pinang 
17/06/96 
• Project Manager, Seberang Perai Municipal Council 
• Project Manager, Pulau Pinang Municipal Council 
Perak 
18/06/96 
• Assistant Director, Ipoh Municipal Council 
Kuala Lumpur 
21/06/96 
• Assistant Director, Computer Analysis and Computer System, Malaysia 
Centre for Remote Sensing 
23/06/96 
• Deputy Director, Special Projects, Forestry Department 
24/06/96 
• Director, Federal Territories1 of Lands and Mines Office 
1 Refer to Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and Federal Territory of Labuan. 
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among NALIS' participating agencies where senior officers monopolise all three 
roles. 
Second, IT-related facilities which were itemised before the fieldwork began 
required further refinement. The pilot study showed that the researcher's initial 
assumption and knowledge of each agency's IT facilities was too simplistic. 
Many agencies in fact maintain high profile computerised facilities, and in order 
to obtain satisfactory inventories several visits were required. Visits to key 
NALIS agencies in particular needed more time than had been anticipated. 
Third, different approaches were required to gain access to each agency. 
Although Federal agencies were very relaxed and access was straightforward, the 
situation was different for the State agencies where the best mode of introduction 
was not to reveal the research as an academic exercise, but to operate in my 
capacity as a (former) civil servant. Co-operation was then obtained at all levels. 
Fourth, the pilot study highlighted several distinctive characteristics of NALIS. 
These relate mainly to technology, human support, and actors that are 
responsible for handling, maintaining, and storing information. (These key 
differences were subsequently used as a guiding framework for the main 
fieldwork). 
In addition to understanding the situational issues, many additional names and officers 
were suggested by interviewees. In the case of the MLCD and ICU, the co-ordinators 
of NALIS and SETIA, interviewed officers provided official lists of agencies that are 
assigned to their programmes. At the end of the pilot study 356 agencies names had 
been contributed 103 agencies (91 public and 12 semi-government and private) were 
finally selected, the criteria for selection of which is explained in Section 5 .4.1. 
5.4 Main Fieldwork Programme 
Following the pilot study agencies to be interviewed in the main fieldwork 
programme were grouped into several categories: 
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e 
First, agencies actively involved in land-matters 
Second, agencies actively involved in SETIA 
Third, agencies involved both with land-matters and project monitoring 
Forty-nine agencies nationwide were selected as actively land-related and twenty-
three agencies were found to be active in SETIA (all from Peninsular Malaysia). 
Approximately 50% of land-related agencies were also found to be active SETIA 
participants. 
The 91 public agencies selected for the main fieldwork programme are represented by 
45 Federal level agencies a combination of 9 ministries 27 departments, units and 
offices located in Kuala Lumpur and 9 located in the States (Table 5.2); and 46 State, 
District and local authority offices (Table 5.3). 
5.4.1 Identification of Focal Agencies 
Focal agencies are identified here on the basis of two factors. First, in terms of the 
presence of a programme co-ordinator. Second, in terms of the supply of information; 
focal agencies are those which provide information at the most basic level, such as 
creating the foundation for land information, using topography or cadastral databases. 
These focal agencies are summarised in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.2: Federal Level Organisations 
Prime Minister's Department 
Economic Planning Unit 
Implementation Co-ordination Unit 
Klang Valley Development Authority 
Federal Territories of Lands and Mines Office 
Department, of Statistics 
Kuala Lumpur City Hall 
Malaysian Administrative Modernisation and Manpower Planning 
Standard Industrial Research Institute Malaysia 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
Department of Town and Planning 
Department of Local Government 
National Housing Department 
Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment 
Malaysia Centre for Remote Sensing 
Department of Environment 
Malaysia Science Technology Information Centre 
Malaysia Institute of Microelectronics Systems 
Ministry of Finance 
Accountant General's Department 
Treasury Department 
Valuation and Property Services 
Ministry of Land and Co-operative Development 
Department of Survey and Mapping Malaysia 
Director General of Land and Mines Department 
Information System Division 
Ministry of Primary Industry 
Geological Survey Department 
Forestry Department 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Department of Agriculture 
Department of Irrigation and Drainage 
Ministry of Works 
Public Works Department 
Ministry of Energy, Telecommunications and Posts 
Department of Telecommunications 
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Table 5.3: State and Local Authority Agencies 
Johor Selangor 
Johor State Secretariat State Computer Services Unit 
Johor Bharu Municipal Council Selangor State Secretariat 
Johor Computer Services Unit State Survey and Mapping 
Department 
State Survey and Mapping Department Sabah 
State Land and Mines Office State Agriculture Department 
Kedah State Survey and Mapping 
Department 
Kedah State Secretariat State Computer Services Department 
State Survey and Mapping Department Sabah Land and Survey Department 
State Land and Mines Office Sabah Forestry Department 
Kota Setar Land Office Sarawak . _ 
State Town and Country Planning 
Department 
State Forestry Department 
Kelantan State Planning Unit 
State Survey and Mapping Department Department of Agriculture and 
Development 
State Land and Mines Office State Survey and Mapping 
Department 
State Town and Country Planning 
Department 
Sarawak Land and Survey 
Department 
Kelantan State Secretariat Sarawak Information Systems Centre 
Melaka Terengganu 
Melaka State Secretariat Terengganu State Secretariat 
State Mapping and Survey Department State Computer Unit 
State Town and Country Planning 
Department 
State Survey and Mapping 
Department 
State Economic Planning Unit State Land and Mines Office 
State Land and Mines Office Pulau Pinang 
Negeri Sembilan State Survey and Mapping 
Department 
Negeri Sembilan State Secretariat Pulau Pinang State Secretariat 
State Town and Country Planning 
Department 
State Land and Mines Office 
State Land and Mines Office Seberang Perai Municipal Council 
State Mapping and Survey Department State Computer Centre- Penang GIS 
Pahang State Town and Country Planning 
Department 
Pahang State Secretariat Perak 
State Economic Planning Unit Perak State Secretariat 
State Development Corporation Ipoh City Council 
State Survey and Mapping Department State Land and Mines Office 
State Land and Mines Office State Town and Country Planning 
Department 
Perlis Perak Information Technology 
Centre 
State Survey and Mapping Department Taiping Municipal Council 
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Table 5.4: Focal Agencies for SETIA and NALIS 
Integrated Project Monitoring System 
(SETIA) 
National Land Information System 
(NALIS) 
• Implementation Co-ordination Unit, 
Prime Minister's Department 
• Information System Division, 
Ministry of Land and Co-operative 
Development 
e Economic Planning Unit, Prime 
Minister's Department 
• Department of Survey and 
Mapping, Ministry of Land Co-
operative Development 
• Accountant General's Department • Director General of Land and 
Mines, Peninsular Malaysia, 
Ministry of Land and Co-operative 
Development 
• Federal Treasury, Ministry of 
Finance 
• Sarawak Survey and Land 
Department 
• State Economic Planning Unit • Sabah Land and Survey 
Department 
• State Land and Mines Office 
• State Development Office/ State 
Secretariat Office 
• Federal Territories of Lands and 
Mines Office, Prime Minister's 
Department 
With regard to the SETIA programme, the Implementation Co-ordination Unit 
(ICU), the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), the Accountant General's Department 
(AGD), and the Federal Treasury Department are focal agencies. At the State level, 
the State Development Office (SDO) and the State Economic Planning Unit (SEPU) 
are the key agencies. Of these agencies, the ICU is perhaps the most important 
because it is the overall co-ordinator of SETIA. For the NALIS programme, of the 
focal agencies, the Information Systems Division of the MLCD is given in-depth 
observation because it is the co-ordinating centre for the NALIS. 
5.4.2 Agencies Related to Both SETIA and NALIS 
Certain key national level policy-making agencies, in particular the Economic 
Planning Unit, play important roles in both programmes. At the State level, branch of 
the Economic Planning Unit, the State Economic Planning Unit, is the major 
controlling agency. Since the major information sources for both programmes are at 
State level, two key State policy-making agencies, the State Secretariat Office and the 
State Economic Planning Unit, play important roles for both SETIA and NALIS. The 
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main officers (Directors and Assistant Directors) of these agencies are therefore 
answerable to both programmes. 
For this research agencies were selected for investigation based on their level of 
involvement with the programmes. In the case of SETIA, for example, some agencies 
contribute to SETIA's databases when working with federally funded projects. On 
completion of the project, their active participation ceases. The case is different with 
NALIS, however, where the types and number of participants remained stable 
throughout. Besides the 91 public agencies, 12 semi-government and private agencies 
were also included in the interview list. These agencies and companies were selected 
specifically to explore opinions on the national IT strategy (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5: Advisory Body, Semi-Government and Private Companies 
• Urban Development Authority • Renong Group Berhad 
• Election Board • Multimedia Development 
Corporation (MDC) 
• University of Malaya • Dexcel Sdn. Berhad 
• University of Malaysia, Sarawak • Intergraph Malaysia Berhad 
• International Business Machines 
(IBM) 
• The Sapura Group 
• National Information Technology 
Council (NITC) 
• Telecommunications Malaysia 
Berhad 
5.5 Information Collection Techniques 
The key methods employed to collect information for this study were first, structured 
and semi-structured interviews, guided by set of pre-established questions. Responses 
for both types of interview were tape-recorded and, additional notes were taken. 
Second, direct observation was carried out at seven agencies at Federal and State 
levels. Third, secondary information collection was undertaken involving archive 
searches, internal and external departmental publications, archive search, memos, 
minutes and letters. More detailed discussion of these methods follows. 
5.5.1 Interviews 
The main interviewing programme was carried out between July 1996 and January 
1997. Names of agencies that were planned to be interviewed were divided into five 
convenient sectors as identified in Figure 5.3. Agencies in East Malaysia were 
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approached first. Through assistance from the University of Malaysia, Sarawak 
(UNTMAS) seven appointments were arranged in Sarawak and three in Sabah. A total 
of three weeks were spent in Sarawak and one week in Sabah. During this time 
appointments were made for other States in Peninsular Malaysia. For practical 
reasons the intention was to plan complete interviews in a single sector, within one 
single month. However, for some agencies in the States of Terengganu and Johor, 
separate visits (November and December respectively) had to be arranged due to 
previous commitments of officers to be interviewed. These repeat visits to these 
States placed pressure on the fieldwork budget and schedule than would otherwise 
have been the case, but such problems could not be circumvented without seriously 
reducing the interview programme. From the 103 agencies a total of 149 semi-
structured and 68 structured interviews were carried out (Tables 5.6a to 5.6e). 
Table 5.6a: Interviews Covered in July for Sector 1 
No. of No. of 
State and Agency Interviews State and Agency Interviews 
Sarawak Sabah 
• ""Sarawak Information • Sabah Land and Survey 
Systems Centre 2 Department 2 
• State Survey and Mapping • State Survey and Mapping 
Department 2 Department 2 
• Sarawak State Planning Unit 2 • Sabah Forestry Department 1 
• Department of Agriculture • * State Computer Services 
and Development 2 Department 2 
• Sarawak Land and Survey • State Agriculture Department 1 
Department 2 
• State Forestry Department 1 
*Note: In addition to interview direct observation was conducted 
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Table 5.6b: Interviews Covered in August for Sector 2 
No. of No. of 
State and Agency Interviews State and Agency Interviews 
Johor Negeri Sembilan 
e ** Johor Computer Services 9 State Secretariat i i 
Unit 2 © State Land and Mines Office 1 
® State Secretariat 2 ® State Survey and Mapping 
Department 1 
® State Survey and Mapping • State Town and Country 
Department 1 Planning Department 1 
© + State Land and Mines Melaka 
Office 1 ® State Secretariat 2 
© Johor Bharu Municipal © State Survey and Mapping 
Council 2 Department 1 
• State Economic Planning Unit 1 
* ** State Land and Mines Office 2 
• State Town and Country 2 
Planning Department 
Notes: ** In addition to interview direct observation was conducted 
+ Interview was conducted in December 
Table 5 .6c. Interviews Covered in September for Sector 3 
No of No. of 
State and Agency Interviews State and Agency Interviews 
Kelantan Pahang 
• State Secretariat 1 • State Secretariat 1 
• State Survey and Mapping • State Land and Mines Office 2 
Department 2 « State Economic Planning Unit 2 
• State Town and Country • State Development Corporation 1 
Planning Department 1 • State Survey and Mapping 
• State Land and Mines Office 2 Department 1 
Terengganu 
» State Computer Unit 1 
* * State Secretariat 1 
e State Land and Mines 
Office 1 
a State Survey and Mapping 
Department 1 
*Note: Interview was conducted in November 
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Table 5.6d: Interviews Covered in October for Sector 4 
No. of No. of 
State and Agency Interviews State and Agency Interviews 
Pulau Pinang Perak 
• State Secretariat 1 • State Secretariat 1 
* State Survey and Mapping © State Land and Mines Office i i 
Department 1 • Ipoh City Council 1 
• Seberang Perai Municipal • State Town and Country 1 
Council 2 Planning Department 
• State Town and Country • Information Technology Centre 1 
Planning Department 1 • Taiping Municipal Council 1 
• State Land and Mines 
Office 2 
• State Computer Perlis 
Centre/Penang GIS 2 • State Survey and Mapping 
Department 1 
Kedah 
• Kota Setar Land Office 1 
• State Secretariat 2 
• State Land and Mines 
Office 2 
• State Town and Country 
Planning Department 1 
• State Survey and Mapping 
Department 1 
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Table 5.6e: Interviews Covered from November to January for Sector 5 
Agency No. of Interviews 
Prime Minister's Department 
Economic Planning Unit 4 
smrM 1 
Implementation Co-ordination Unit 6 
Department of Statistics 3 
MAMPU 3 
INT AN 1 
Klang Valley Authority 1 
Federal Territories of Lands and Mines Office 2 
Kuala Lumpur City Hall 1 
Ministry of Finance 1 
Accountant General's Department 1 
Treasury Department 1 
Valuation and Property Services Department 2 
Ministry of Land and Co-operative Development 1 
Department of Survey and Mapping Malaysia 4 
Director General of Land and Mines Department 3 
Information System Division 3 
Ministry of Primary Industries 
Forestry Department 2 
Geological Survey Department 1 
Ministry of Works 1 
Public Works Department 2 
Ministry of Agriculture 1 
Department of Agriculture 3 
Department of Irrigation and Drainage 1 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government 1 
Department of Town and Country Planning 3 
Department of Local Government 2 
National Housing Department 2 
Ministry of Science Technology and Environment 1 
Malaysia Centre for Remote Sensing 2 
Department of Environment 2 
Malaysia Science Technology and Information Centre 1 
Malaysia Institute of Microelectronics Systems 2 
State of Selahgor 
Computer Services Unit 1 
State Secretariat 1 
Department of Survey and Mapping (Federal Branch) 1 
Other 
Renong Group Berhad 2 
National Information Technology Council 1 
Urban Development Authority 2 
Election Board 1 
University of Malaya 1 
International Business Machines 1 
Multimedia Development Corporation 2 
Dexcel Sdn. Berhad 1 
Intergraph Malaysia Berhad 1 
The Sapura Group 1 
Telecommunications Malaysia Berhad 1 
University of Malaysia, Sarawak 3 
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Structured and semi-structured interviews were used to capture two levels of 
information. Structured interviews were used to obtain, first, an inventory of 
computerised facilities in each organisation; and second, to seek clarification and 
elaboration of issues particularly related to technical matters. The following guideline 
questions were devised as a basis for the interviews carried out in this structured 
format: 
1. Level of office automation 
® availability of personal computers 
© availability of office automation software 
2. Level of computerisation and availability of Management Information Systems 
(MIS) 
© computerisation in the organisation 
® availability of MIS 
© intra-organisation linkages & networking 
© readiness for inter-organisational linkages 
» expected date for inter-organisational linkages 
3. Availability of Land Information Systems (LIS) or Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) 
« LIS/GIS applications 
« LIS/GIS databases & data structures 
• Data administration and management procedures 
® LIS/GIS implementation and integration 
© planned LIS/GIS operation 
4. Area of coverage 
© relevant digitised database coverage 
© coverage level of administration area 
5. Classification as information provider or user 
(depended on type of information available and 
provided to or required by other organisation) 
6. Information transfer (to: / from: / by types and volume) 
7. Information sharing and confidentiality 
Structured interviews were carried out with technical staff such as systems analysts, 
systems engineers and urban planners, all of whom managed daily transactions of 
information. Responses were tape-recorded and at the same time written notes were 
taken In general each interview lasted between one and a half hours. 
Semi-structured interviews were used to provide qualitative depth by allowing 
interviewees to talk about a subject in terms of their own frames of reference. In other 
words the researcher did not apply a rigid set of questions beforehand because the 
purpose is to "understand the issues in the interviewee's own terms''1 (Valentine, 
1997, p. 118). This methodology still calls for guiding themes, however, a list of 
themes was therefore prepared to obtain details from individual offices and officers. 
These included officers at decision-making levels, such as the Directors of Economic 
Planning Unit, the Treasury, the Manpower and Management Planning Unit, the 
Multimedia Development Corporation, and the Ministry of Land and Co-operative 
Development. Themes related not only to the specific agency, but were also used to 
explore views of the programme in relation to national development. The following 
themes for example, were used to guide the discussion with the Chairman of NALIS 
technical committee: 
• The key issues and challenges in launching NALIS 
• How NALIS is different to previous MLCD undertakings of the 1970s, such 
as, the National Land Data Bank (NLDB), the National Integrated Data 
System (NIDAS) 
• How MLCD sees its responsibilities in the development of NALIS 
• The role of NALIS in helping to country to develop an integrated LIS 
To officers at an operational level, such as the Director of Survey and Mapping, 
Town Planners, and Agriculture and Valuation officers, questions were guided so as 
to understand their office relationships to a programme (either SETIA or NALIS) 
and how they perceived the benefit of programmes to their agencies and themselves. 
Emphases were placed on skills in handling new technology, such as GIS; the training 
provided to support the programme development; problems of communication 
between and across agencies; and how the introduction of the new system (NALIS) 
affects their daily routine. For officers at State agencies, in addition to questions 
about generalised operational problems and issues, special effort was made to elicit 
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opinions on State development preferences. This was necessary because of the 
differences in administrative practice between State and Federal agencies. Semi-
structured interviews on average each took about one to one and half hours, totalling 
about 225 recorded hours of interviews involving usually administrators and decision 
making level officers. 
5.5.2 Direct Observation 
The main aim of using a direct observational method was to support and cross-check 
against information gathered from interviews and secondary information (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994). Webb et al. (1966) argued that one great strength of observational 
methods lies in the ease through which the researcher can gain entree to the setting, 
because it is unobtrusive and does not require direct interaction with participants. For 
the present study, seven agencies were observed. These were: 
• Implementation Co-ordination Unit, SETIA Division 
• Federal Territories of Lands and Mines office - pilot studies for Computer 
Land Registration (CLRS) and NALIS 
• Melaka, State Land and Mines Office - developing Melaka Land Information 
System (MELIS). This provides an example of a State level GIS 
implementation programme. 
• Johor Computer Unit, providing an example of State level integrated 
computerisation effort. 
• Sabah and Sarawak computer centres, both of which exemplified integrated 
centralised computer systems. 
• Local Government Division's head office in Kuala Lumpur, focusing on 
SETIA's information collection process. 
Except for Sabah and Sarawak computer centres, where access was provided through 
the University of Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS) access to agencies were made 
through existing personal networks. Observation most often coincided with interview 
periods. On average, three days to a week were spent in each office. The exception 
was the Federal Territories of Lands and Mines office (for CLRS/NALIS studies), 
where three weeks were taken in observing, the negotiations carried out for the pilot 
project for NALIS. Few of these offices were used as a temporary base when 
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working in that particular geographical location. For example, for the month of 
December, when interviewing in the Kuala Lumpur area, the Federal Territories of 
Lands and Mines office was used as a base. The request for a temporary working 
base was readily agreed because senior officers from these offices were known to the 
author. Access was provided to their information system operations and sometimes 
were also invited to observe related programme discussions and meetings. When at 
the Federal Territories of Lands and Mines office, for example, the author was given 
the opportunity to observe two NALIS pilot project weekly technical meetings. The 
meetings involved technical officers from seven agencies (Survey, Valuation, City 
Hall, Town Planning, EPU, and Statistics) and the Federal Territories of Lands and 
Mines office was the co-ordinator. For Statistics and City Hall, a different officer 
attended each of the meetings and the officers were very junior compared to those 
from other departments; these junior officers acted as passive participants. Through 
conversation with officers from Statistics and City Hall it was apparent that their 
senior management were opposed to NALIS. Representation was merely an act of 
official duty rather than of serious interest in the project. 
At each of the observation sites issues emerged to give added detail to the research 
and to give richer insights to the process of IT organisation. For example, at the 
Local Government Division's head office in Kuala Lumpur, officers went through a 
repetitive routine of making reminder calls to implementing agencies (local authority 
and District offices) requesting submission of project progress information. 
Underlying concerns about the lack of co-operation from staff at the grassroots level, 
were apparent as were frustrations about the need to correct information before 
inputting it into the SETIA system. 
Efforts taken by the State surveyor at the Land and Mines office, Melaka, to 
introduce GIS to offices in the State were apparent through various means -
distribution of pamphlets, video presentations and briefings. These efforts seemed, 
however, to focus attention on the ability of GIS to produce impressive rather than 
seeking understanding of why GIS maybe useful for planning. The Director of Land 
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and Mines2, commented that he found the process of explaining the capabilities of 
GIS tiring and frustrating 
5.5.3 Secondary Sources 
Secondary information collection was carried out to understand events and 
relationships of past and present situations. For example, before carrying out 
interviews searches were made to develop appropriate questions for selected issues. 
After the interviews were conducted, further documentary searches were required to 
compare the interviewee's interpretation and those recorded in documents relating to 
those events. The activities in fact were carried out as a continuous process. A total 
of 143 agency documents and reports were collected for the present study. They 
consisted of agency annual reports including statistical reports from Educational 
Departments, Statistics Departments and Human Resource Departments; economic 
and financial reviews; legal documents; and historical literature on SETIA's 
development and land development. 
The final phase of the fieldwork involved gathering comparative information on 
Malaysia's information systems in the context of its neighbours, in particular ASEAN 
countries. The search was conducted at the end of the seven months of fieldwork. 
While in Malaysia, the Asia Pacific Development Corporation, and the Institute of 
South East Asian Studies were visited. Visits to the Commonwealth Secretariat and 
the School of Oriental and African Studies were made on return to the United 
Kingdom. Documented materials on development and technology (in particular on 
Information Technology) were searched as further secondary sources. 
5.6 Information Analysis 
Information analysis was divided into four main stages. 
• organising structured interview material; 
• translating and transcribing structured and semi-structured interviews; 
• classifying and analysing transcribed information; 
2 The said director has subsequently left the Department of Land and Mines to join a private survey 
firm. 
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• coding the transcribed information. 
5.6.1 Organising Interview Material 
Structured information consisted of written notes relating to quantitative and semi-
quantitative information, such as existing and planned computerised facilities, and 
tape-recorded answers which were generally used to clarify the written notes. The 
products from these interviews were organised into tables, and recorded materials 
were translated and transcribed for subsequent interpretation alongside the tabular 
information. Problems and issues highlighted by the officer, such as data and 
communications for example, are included in this analysis. 
5.6.2 Translating and Transcribing 
Translation was required because most interviews were conducted in the Malay 
language. As each recording was transcribed it was also translated into English. Each 
transcription of a one and a half hour interview took about 8 to 10 hours transcription 
time. A total of 1000 hours or 140 days were spent translating and transcribing. The 
number of hours does not include replay which is required to understand key Malay 
phrases for which there is no direct equivalent in English. 
5.6.3 Classifying and Analysing Information Using Qualitative Software 
The transcribed information produced about 1.1 million words and about 47 tables of 
structured information. To help make sense of this information the qualitative data 
software package HyperRESEARCH was used. As Crang (1997) notes, the time 
needed for learning a software package should not be underestimated, although this 
can sometimes form a barrier rather than helping the analysis to progress. In addition, 
different software packages have their own strengths and weaknesses. For example, 
Hyperqual, an alternative package, is a simple code-and-retrieve program (Tesch, 
1990). HyperRESERACH, Nudist and Atlas provide more sophisticated ways of 
storing and accessing, exploring and constructing knowledge from the data and 
HyperRESEARCH takes a specific approach to hypothesis testing. However, in 
general these packages maintain similar basic capabilities and, they offer assistance in 
the management of complex data. Crang (1997) argued that: 
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"they help speed up sorting through your materials, so instead of piles of paper 
or coloured pens the computer keeps codes assigned to different sections of 
text.. then allow very quick retrieval of all sections labelled with a certain code" 
(p. 187). 
In this study HyperRESEARCH is used to help analyse information within 
organisations to make comparison between agencies, and to compare Peninsular 
Malaysia organisations with those in East Malaysia. 
For this research a total of 112 files were created containing interviews and secondary 
sources, with each file comprising, on average, twelve pages of text (6500 words). 
HyperRESEARCH suggests organising the documents into a 'case' or 'cases'. In this 
study four cases were identified. These were: agencies concerned only with NALIS, 
agencies concerned only with SETIA, a combination of SETIA and NALIS agencies 
in Peninsular Malaysia and a combination of SETIA and NALIS agencies in East 
Malaysia (Figure 5.4). Each case was allocated one 'folder' which contains files 
(documents) from related interviews. For the NALIS case interviews included, for 
example, those from the Ministry of Land and Co-operative Development (MLCD). 
Having identified these levels of analysis, the next stage is to identify key common 
factors within each folder, through the process of 'coding'. 
Figure 5.4: Building Cases in HyperRESEARCH 
case 1 
agencies in 
NAIS 
case 2 
agencies in 
S E T l i 
* 
case 3 
SETIA-NALIS 
Peninsular Malaysia 
case 4 
_£ETIA-NALIS 
agencies in 
East Malaysia 
Note: arrow (_>.) indicates cross-analyses between and within cases 
5.6.4 Coding 
The process of coding takes many forms (Figure 5 .5). For this study auto-coding was 
used as a start to scan phrases and words most commonly appeared in documents. 
HyperRESEARCH allows codes to contain up to 32 characters. Thus one has the 
opportunity to make a code as descriptive as possible for easy reference. For 
example, in this study an auto-code can contain words such as training, skills, 
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education, etc. For example, in case one for NALIS, HyperRESEARCH was asked to 
find the word 'problem' as one example. HyperRESEARCH scans the document for 
every occurrence of the word 'problem3' and assigns a code to it. The purpose of 
auto-coding, then, is to carry out a quick preliminary coding of each document. Many 
levels of re-coding are necessary to create a better understanding of the codes thus 
generated. When these auto-codes are reviewed the package allows one to read the 
Figure 5 .5: An Example of the Coding Process (autocoding - preliminary coding) 
open study IT Study 
select case NALIS 
call files to code 
one at a time 
HyperRESEARCH search 
for 'problem' 
file(s) 
1 2 3 4 5 
refinement 
refinement 
Directional ,, Coding (A) Directional Coding (B) 
• management problems— 
• skills problems 
• data problem 
• communication problem 
array of 
codes 
management problems: 
—personalising organisational mandate 
—lack open negotiation 
—high level secrecy 
—weak publicity 
coded passage and to refine descriptions. This process is repeated several times so 
that meanings of themes raised in interviews became clearer. For example, when 
working with the code 'management problems' there was a generalised issue relating 
to officers' preference for a top-down approach, because they are unwilling to allow 
intrusion in their jurisdiction. This behaviour can be attributed to various personal, 
political, and other broader organisational factors. But after reading and re-reading 
interviews (from various NALIS participating agencies, for example), and relating 
them to the broad codes, one sees the need to refine the code because the meaning in 
3 Auto-code only looks for exact matches in words or phrases. 
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the code is too broad; it was thus further refined to 'officers personalising 
organisational mandate'. 
Other management problem codes included 'discourage open negotiation', and 
'prefer high level secrecy'. The final list of codes generated is as follows: 
• Common data model and exchange standard 
• Lack single common map projection 
• Lack local referencing 
• Consensus over implementation and integration 
• Consensus among organisations 
• Consensus of co-ordination between States 
• Land surveyors fighting for (co-ordinating) position 
• Other technical professionals assuming power 
• Public administrators assuming power 
• Re-engineering and re-organising 
• Importance of hierarchy and power unbreakable 
• Personalising organisational mandate 
• Lack of open negotiation between operational level and decision-making 
• High level of secrecy on non-essential matters 
• Weak publicity on organisational goals 
• Orders change as flow from top-down and no checking device 
• Disagreements are bottled-up 
• Severe shortage of applied computerisation skills 
• National IT policy too broad for organisational use 
(no written organisational IT objective) 
• Organisational head [depended too much on] vision 2020 
• IT standards are manipulated [from others not related to local situation] 
• Grass-roots participation is ignored 
• Too trusting of vendors 
• GISnodata 
• GIS no infrastructure 
• Necessary to privatise to enhance implementation 
• Training, upgrading of knowledge inadequate 
• Innovation is secondary, cloning is important 
• Felt left out 
5.6.5 Analysing and Reporting 
HyperRESEARCH was used to explore relationships between codes for the four 
cases shown in Figure 5.4 and to identify which cases contain certain combinations of 
codes, helping to draw out themes that are embedded in the information. 
109 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has described the main methodological 'framework' adopted in this 
thesis. The research 'focus' has been explained, differences and similarities between 
the SETIA and NALIS programmes highlighted, and the need for a multi-method 
approach outlined. The case study approach has been described and the key methods 
used to gather information have been discussed. 
This chapter ends the first part of this thesis. The chapters that follows concentrate on 
the evaluation, analysis and findings of the research. 
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Chapter 6 Evaluation of Information System Programmes: 
developmental context, process and change 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss, explore and evaluate the various levels of 
information that have been gathered from two information system programmes: the 
Integrated Project Monitoring System (SETIA) and the National Land Information 
System (NALIS). The rationale behind selecting these two programmes was dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. Briefly, the main reason is to evaluate information system devel-
opment during both the early stages (NALIS), and the later stages (SETIA), in a 
computer-based information system's life. 
This chapter aims to identify and assess issues related to the focal and broader con-
texts of these information system developments. The evaluation framework is guided 
by the concepts of web models, and is committed to the exploration of the intertwin-
ing social relationships between participants, the social infrastructure and the history 
of a programme's previous commitments. Web models suggest viewing the relation-
ships between the focal study's concerns; that is, agencies that are directly involved in 
IT programmes and the broader contextual boundaries which include the wider politi-
cal and socio-economic contexts within which the agencies are located. The dynamics 
of these relationships are expected to help to answer this study's central research 
questions: first, what is the leader's vision with regard to the use of information sys-
tems by public organisations as a means of delivering effective and efficient services 
to the people; and second, are information systems an effective means of reducing 
geographic distance between regions. 
This chapter is divided into three sections - part one discusses SETIA, part two 
NALIS and part three summarises issues from both of these programmes. Sections 
one and two are further divided into two parts. Part one of each section introduces 
the programme and relates historical accounts to the present context of the pro-
gramme. Part two expands and evaluates issues related to organisational, technical 
and institutional factors from both focal and broader contexts into several perspec-
tives. The main objective of part two of each section is to arrive at some understand-
ing of the relationships within the programme's social contexts - participants, the in-
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frastructure and the previous commitments to the broader environment, such as social 
and political elements. 
The chapter is guided by the findings from analysing fieldwork materials using quali-
tative software, as described in Chapter 5. Examination of the four 'cases' identified 
there highlighted the following broad themes: 
• Generally interviewees saw the country moving towards a capitalist system, 
involving centralised organisations, privatisation and corporatisation. Needs of 
the organisation based on political appointees and seniority were being re-
placed by professionals and corporate technocrats. 
• The character of some agencies in the Prime Minister's Department is chang-
ing. For example, EPU is moving away from handling projects that do not 
meet their organisation's expertise. ICU, on the other hand has maintained its 
status quo, with no changes in responsibilities; it is now beginning to lose 
power to newer agencies who hold the relevant resources and skills. 
• There is a conflict over decision-making and power distribution prevalent 
among Federal agencies, State agencies and between Federal and State. The 
direct consequences of problems with information co-ordination include disa-
greement over data models, exchange standards, common map projections 
and local referencing. 
• Top-down decision-making is strongly supported by programme leaders and 
many Federal agencies. The consequences of such an approach include ignor-
ing grass-roots participation, high levels of secrecy, lack of open negotiations 
between leaders and subordinates and conflict in development ideology be-
tween younger officers and more senior civil servants. 
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SECTION I: SET!A - Integrated Project Monitoring System 
Part i 
6.2 Introduction 
SETIA is the third management information system programme initiated by the Ma-
laysian federal government, although in the context of integrated computerised infor-
mation systems, SETIA is the first. Following the main SETIA programme several 
more management information systems have arisen out of it (Table 6.1). As a result 
of developmental changes, SETIA is sometimes referred to by different names. In this 
study, only one name, SETIA is used to denote the main programme and the addi-
tional information systems that are attached to it. 
Table 6.1: Summary of SETIA's Historical Background 
Date Programme Information and System 
Capability 
1 1960-1970 Rural Development 
Plan 
rural development only (fully 
manual) 
2 1970-1984 Project Monitoring 
Systems 
4 separate computerised in-
formation systems - *ICU, 
EPU, AGD and the Federal 
Treasury 
3 1984-1986 Integrated Project 
Monitoring System 
(SETIA) 
rural and urban manual and 
computerised 
4 1987-1997 SETIA/RedBook I I rural and urban fully comput-
erised networking 
4a 1991-1994 First addition to 
SETIA/RedBook I I 
(manual form) 
addition of financial aspects 
and progress problems 
(manual) 
4b 1994-
present 
Second addition to 
SETIA/RedBook I I 
(Gantt chart) 
addition of financial aspects 
and progress problems 
(computerised) 
*Note: ICU = Implementation Co-ordination Unit; EPU = Economic 
Planning Unit; and AGD = Accountant General's Department 
Source: Fieldwork 1996. 
6.2.1 SETIA: Historical Account and System Development 
The SETIA programme evolved from several generations of management information 
system initiatives. The first of such initiatives was the Rural Economic Development 
Plan introduced in 1960. The aim of this plan was to link development information 
from the District to the Federal level. The operation was based on the distributed 
authority given to District offices and the State Secretariat, and controlled by the 
Ministry of Rural Development which is headed by the Deputy Prime Minister. Fol-
lowing the launch of the New Economic Policy and Second Malaysia Plan in 1970, 
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projects and programmes emphasised a change in policy to urban and industrial rather 
than rural development. The function of monitoring development projects was trans-
ferred from the Ministry of Rural Development to the Implementation Co-ordination 
Unit (ICU), a unit in the Prime Minister's Department. By 1977 due to the expansion 
of development activities, computerisation of development projects was found to be 
essential. The activities of four central agencies responsible for national project de-
velopment, the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), the Federal Treasury, the Accountant 
General's Department (AGD) and the Implementation Co-ordination Unit (ICU) 
were all computerised. The separate systems, however, were found to duplicate data 
collection and were difficult to co-ordinate. ICU suggested that the four systems 
should be amalgamated. In the broader context the impetus to integrate was driven by 
new the Prime Minister's1 administration drive for efficiency and productivity in pub-
lic administration combined with a climate that promoted information technology as a 
productivity tool in government. 
In 1984, the four separate systems were amalgamated and came to be known as 
SETIA. The programme became the first integrated development information system 
in the country. In this new system set-up, ICU remained as the co-ordinator, while the 
EPU, the Treasury the AGD and operating ministries managed data at their own lo-
cations. The processing and distribution of the data and information are carried out by 
means of three forms, SI, S2 and S3 (Figure 6.1). 
Form SI which is used by EPU, contains details on project number, ministry, depart-
ment, implementing agency, purpose of development, location, scope, year of initia-
tion and completion, cost breakdown according to land, building, equipment, con-
sulting services, management expenditures, sources of funds and types of financing. 
Form S2, which is used by the Treasury budget office, contains basic project details 
as well as specifics on status of implementation, actual and budgeted expenditures for 
a five year period, current and the next year's budget estimates and expenditure fore-
casts for the remaining project 
1 Dr Mahathir Mohamad. 
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years. Form S3 is used by ICU to collect data on project progress. This form contains 
detail on physical projects, disbursements of payment, problems in implementation, 
date of initiation and completion of project activities. The Accountant General's De-
partment is responsible for making payments and disbursement on projects. Minis-
tries, departments and agencies send in payment and journal vouchers to the Ac-
countant General's Department for payments. These source documents which are 
captured and integrated by the Accountant General's Department, are sent to SETIA 
in the form of magnetic tapes. The output of the SETIA system includes general and 
primary listings from forms SI, S2, S3 (Appendices A l , A2 and A3) contain the 
content of these forms and expense patterns generated by the Accountant General's 
Department. These outputs2 (Appendix A4) are prepared by ICU into three reports 
for three levels of executives. Report one is for the Prime Minister and Chief Minis-
ters, report two is for management such as Director Generals of Ministries and report 
three is for project managers such as Public Works Department engineers. 
The SETIA corporate centre runs on an I B M 3083 mainframe linked to fifty-five ter-
minals; thirty-nine at ICU, ten at EPU and six at the Public Works Department. The 
main software package used is CLIO, a database management system with facilities 
to input, update, process, store, query and build reports. At the operating level a per-
sonal computer (mostly ACER 486s designed with a menu driven programme) and a 
dot matrix printer are provided. At the central corporate level the system is supported 
by staff from three divisions in ICU; Project Analysis with sixteen support staff, 
Computer Services with twelve staff and System Development with twenty-one staff. 
For the purposes of programme review and overall management there is a steering 
committee, chaired by the Director General of ICU with members including Director 
Generals of EPU, Treasury and Accountant General's Department. 
6.2.2 Implementation of SETIA 
SETIA's distributed system as shown in Figure 6.1 was planned to be fully imple-
mented in 1987. The plan was implemented but with minimal support from telecom-
munication devices such as LANs and WANs. Despite the shortfall with the imposi-
tion of mandatory reporting procedures for operating agencies, all agencies did report 
2 Outputs include general and primary listings from forms SI, S2 and S3 information. 
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as mandated but the information they submitted was often out-of-date for the pur-
poses of decision-making. SETIA was therefore called for revision. A stronger IT 
base design was re-emphasised to support communication by electronic means 
through the application of LANs and WANs. The expansion was targeted to be fully 
implemented by 1997. 
This present study traces and evaluates the significant changes which happened during 
this ten year period. The research has shown that the allocation of IT facilities for 
SETIA's purposes remained stagnant throughout the period. However, the use of IT 
among implementing agencies increased quite rapidly especially after 1993 when the 
administration's drive for the use of IT was combined with a stable economy. 
In the following section, field data on adoption and implementation issues are inter-
preted in the context of the conceptual and theoretical frameworks as outlined in 
Chapters 3 and 4. This evaluation includes an understanding of SETIA's organisa-
tional and institutional contexts, including changes in social and economic factors. 
This requires identification of stakeholders and their interests along with an under-
standing of the social context that presents opportunities for conflict. The evaluation 
begins by identifying works of others that are used to expand and enrich the findings 
of the present study. 
SECTION I: Part H 
6.3 Evaluating the SETIA Programme 
In the last ten years several studies have been conducted on SETIA (Kaul, et al., 
1987; Han, 1991; Rao and Samad, 1992; Masser, 1994) but, apart from work by Han 
(1991) and Masser (1994) previous research has focused basically on describing the 
nature of SETIA as a decentralised information system initiative. While research of 
this tradition helps one to understand SETIA as a programme, it does not elaborate 
on the issues of importance inherent in large scale information systems development. 
In contrast, work by both Han and Masser focuses on the dynamic and complex na-
ture of information system use and development in its focal and broader context. 
While both of these studies complement the present research, the approach taken by 
these two authors differs from that of this study. Han observed SETIA from a struc-
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tural and political basis and developed three main findings. First, that SETIA is a po-
litically motivated programme, initiated for the purpose of safeguarding the interests 
of poor bumiputeras in urban and industrial projects. The study believed that the suc-
cess of SETIA relied on the direct involvement and commitment of very powerful 
politicians. Second, Han believed that success could be achieved through provision of 
stronger power at local levels (State, District and local authorities) and through a 
loose co-ordination at the centre (Federal level). This would be, he argued, jointly 
serve the interests of both the centre and the local levels. The development of SETIA 
is believed by Han to be constrained by legacy of a previous programme, the Rural 
Development Plan, which adopted a top-down approach. Han's study suggests that 
with the growing diversity of interests among participating agencies and with the ex-
pansion of SETIA's coverage, the system should be heavily driven from the local 
level. Third, Han argued that development is mediated by knowledgeable actors at the 
middle level in the administrative hierarchy; primarily the technically-oriented admin-
istrators. Han's study suggests, then, that strategic planning is necessary for informa-
tion systems, but that generalist administrative officers and bureaucrats cannot be ex-
pected to be sufficiently knowledgeable to devise such strategic plans and to make 
timely tactical responses in technologically sophisticated and rapidly changing areas 
pertaining to IT. 
While Han's study provided useful comparable evidence for the present research, it is 
concerned largely with political issues of agencies, in particular the focal agency (the 
Implementation Co-ordinating Unit) and it overlooked the broader organisational and 
institutional factors (social and economic) that may have caused weaknesses in 
SETIA's computer use and development. The present study expands on the political 
factors which Han investigated and also explores other possible constraining and in-
fluencing factors for SETIA's development. 
The study by Masser took a more generalised approach. SETIA was chosen on the 
assumption that it provides an example of a well-established monitoring information 
system. Masser evaluated this assumption against three conditions, that, he argued 
must be present for successful information system development: 
[First] "There must be an overall information management strategy based on the 
user needs of the agency and the resources at its disposal; [second] There must 
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be personal commitment of individuals at all levels of the organisation with re-
spect to overall leaderships, general awareness and technical capabilities; and 
[third] There must be organisational and environmental stability of personnel, 
administrative structure, and environmental considerations" (Masser, 1994, p. 
438). 
Overall, Masser's study revealed that despite SETIA's well established monitoring 
and evaluation procedures, there are areas which need improvement. For example, 
Masser argues that there is no balanced strategy that ensures continued participation 
from agencies. The role of some agencies was found to be restricted to preparation of 
input data, with SETIA's data itself having no direct benefit to their operation. On the 
other hand, some agencies were not producers of data yet were dependent on the 
availability of such (SETIA's data) for their monitoring purposes. Agencies with lim-
ited use of SETIA's data could in the long run refuse to support SETIA's develop-
ment. In the light of such issues, Masser proposed the following questions for further 
research: 
"How far, for example, could the three conditions used to evaluate the achieve-
ments of the system be relaxed without jeopardising the chances of successful 
utilisation? To what extent should the development of a system of this kind be 
regarded as an organisational learning process in the management of complex 
information? To what extent might the existing achievements of the system be 
threatened by a substantial increase in complexity?" (Masser, 1994, p. 439). 
The present research, though not directly working to answer Masser's questions, has 
produced a number of findings which help to move towards addressing these issues. 
Answers to these questions are therefore arranged both as a means to support the 
present study and to enrich previous findings. 
6.4 Evaluating SETIA's Development - Organisational and Institutional 
Contexts 
At the beginning of 1983, a year before the initiation of SETIA, the continuing slow-
down in economic growth and growing external debt pressure meant that government 
expenditure was undergoing severe reductions. Privatisation policies were introduced 
in 1993 to scale down public sector expenses. The government kept public sector 
growth at around 1.1% per year between 1983 and 1986 and this was further re-
duced to 0.8% in 1987 (GOM, 1981; 1986). Government and semi-government proj-
ects were also badly hit by slow economic growth. In the mid 1980s, two out of nine 
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federal agencies incurred negative net profits, and of sixty-eight companies under fed-
eral agencies, twenty-two or about one-third suffered losses. A similar situation was 
faced by companies under semi-government agencies, where 83 of 201 companies 
incurred losses (MPE, 1984). 
SETIA was introduced, then, at a time of poor economic performance. The sugges-
tion to amalgamate systems from the Economic Planning Unit (Project Planning Sys-
tem), the Accountant General's Department (Federal Accounting System) and the 
Treasury (Computerised Information System) with the Implementation Co-ordination 
Unit (Project Monitoring System) was believed to be critical in reorganising the dis-
tribution of government money that was 'wasted' through project losses. Constraints 
imposed by the overall economic situation of the time deterred the development of an 
ambitious public programme. Planning for the amalgamation of the four subsystems 
was made under very stringent budget conditions. The system obtained assistance 
from foreign consultants only through the supply of the software package3; other as-
pects of the system were developed in-house by computer experts at ICU. Staff 
training on system applications was co-ordinated by local training centres and was 
administered by the Malaysian Administration, Modernisation and Manpower Plan-
ning Unit (MAMPU) of the Prime Minister's Department and the National Institute 
of Public Administration (INT AN). According to the then4 Director of the Division of 
Information Systems for SETIA: 
"SETIA already had most of the hardware and manpower required for the devel-
opment of the system. The only additional items that needed to be acquired for 
the development and implementation of the system were terminals, PCs and other 
peripherals for the distributed system as well as software. The cost for these ad-
ditional items was about US$800,000. I f we were to start the system starting 
from scratch, a reasonable estimate for the system budget would be US$3 mil-
lion" (Information Division, MLCD, fieldwork, interviewed November, 1996). 
Three years after implementation (1987) data submission to SETIA remained slow 
and a proposal was made by the Director of the Division of Information Systems (the 
head of SETIA) to computerise the whole system. However, the Director was subse-
quently transferred to the Ministry of Land and Co-operative Development (MLCD), 
Information System Division and SETIA was left with a temporary unit head for 
3 The CLIO Database Management System (DBMS) was supplied by Group Syseca of France. 
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some time. This change in leadership, in combination with pressure to compete for 
resources and a poor economic situation, worsened SETIA's performance. Personal 
computers and other peripherals were not delivered on time to operating agencies. 
Operations were carried out manually by most offices and due to a restriction on staff 
recruitment, most had to work with fewer staff. As a result monthly updating sched-
ules were consistently not met. Scarce resources also reduced site visits by federal 
officers. In 1990 when the financial situation finally recovered SETIA's progress re-
mained and continued to be slow. 
6.5 Effect of Organisational and Institutional Changes on SETIA 
The present study found SETIA's inability to supply the necessary computer facilities 
and infrastructural support to be a primary reason for implementing agencies lessen-
ing their support of SETIA. This weakness, however, was further exaggerated by 
other changes: the first was when leadership within SETIA was changed; and sec-
ondly, the three central agencies (EPU, AGD and the Treasury) began to place less 
attention on SETIA due to other major commitments. Similar changes occurred 
within the participating agencies. These processes are discussed in the following sec-
tions. 
6.5.1 Changes in Leadership 
SETIA's operation exists within the Computer Services Division, one of thirteen divi-
sions5 belonging to ICU. The director that originally headed SETIA was considered 
one of Malaysia's leading supporters of computerisation. The transfer of this Director 
to MLCD marked the loss of SETIA's main power-broker. The first programme initi-
ated in his new position (at MLCD) was the National Computerised Land Registra-
tion System (CLRS) and seven years later the CLRS was expanded to the National 
Land Information System (NALIS). SETIA's newer leadership lacked the ability both 
to make critical decisions at different phases of SETIA's development and to measure 
programme progress and identify potential risks in time to mitigate them. For exam-
4 At the time of the fieldwork interview (November 1996) he was Secretary of Information Division 
at the Ministry of Land Co-operative Development). 
3 The 13 divisions are the Administrative and Finance; Computer Services; Communications; Na-
tional Action Council Secretariat; Agriculture and Rural Development; Commerce and Industry; 
Corporations; Bumiputeras Coo-ordination and Participation; Education and Human Resources; 
Health and Welfare; Security and Information; Infrastructure and Public Utilities; and State Devel-
opment Offices. The ICU is headed by a Director General assisted by two deputy directors and State 
Development Offices. 
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pie, between 1987 and 1995 federal expenses on departmental computer purchase and 
upgrading increased from US$15 million to US$189 million (MAMPU, 1993; 1995). 
The ICU, however, was not one of the agencies involved in this purchase and up-
grading. During this period almost all agencies at every level of government were 
planning and building computerised information systems. Managers of SETIA failed 
to evaluate these developments in relation to SETIA's expansion, and data transfer 
continued to use manual approaches. 
6.5.2 Changes in Responsibility at Co-ordinating Level 
As separate departments the four central co-ordinating agencies are each affected by 
their own organisational goals. Differences in these agencies' goals have made it diffi-
cult for the four systems (Project Monitoring System of the ICU, Computer Based 
Information System of the Treasury, the Project Planning System of the EPU and the 
Federal Accounting System of the Accountant General's Department) to be realisti-
cally integrated. For the planning and financial agencies in particular - EPU, AGD and 
Treasury- although servicing SETIA's database is seen as important, it is secondary 
compared to meeting their individual agency's obligations. Obligations to SETIA 
changed drastically when the privatisation programme began to gain momentum in 
1990. The EPU, AGD and the Treasury were made key agencies for managing giant 
privatised projects such as the new Kuala Lumpur International Airport, Malaysia 
Airline System, Telecommunications Malaysia Berhad (Limited), and the National 
Car Project. As of 1996 (when fieldwork for this study was conducted) the list of 
projects had grown to include joint-venture international projects carried out, for ex-
ample, with Vietnam, China and Indonesia. The Secretary to the Budget Office, Min-
istry of Finance (interviewed November, 1996) explained as follows: 
"The recession has exposed the weaknesses of many public enterprises. Govern-
ment has to bail them out when they get into difficulty. We [Treasury and EPU] 
have to step in to oversee management of these enterprises. This office (Finance 
Ministry-Budget Division) is currently enforcing this mandate on public enter-
prise - to operate on fully commercial lines and maximise profits. Our office is 
made responsible and accountable to their success. Currently we are monitoring 
public enterprises which are based on multi-billion dollar capital and which are 
operating in many parts of the world. Our responsibility has certainly tripled since 
1990. Our operation is directly related to the data that we keep. Simplified ver-
sions of data transfer from us to them [ICU] is no longer possible for our data-
bases are becoming too large and complex. Special efforts are required to sepa-
rate information for SETIA's purposes and general needs. I find this effort is be-
coming more and more cumbersome. SETIA should be overhauled completely 
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to be more in-line with us" (Secretary to the Budget Office, Ministry of Finance, 
fieldwork, interviewed November, 1996). 
Public officials from the central planning office of EPU and the accounting office 
(AGD) expressed similar points, that is, the need for SETIA to be restructured in the 
face of changing development strategies and the responsibility of organisations. A re-
engineering of the SETIA system was suggested by the Assistant Director, Infra-
structure and Utilities Section, of the EPU. SETIA no longer is seen as appropriate 
to the controlling agencies or the participating agencies. 
6.5.3 Changes at Participating Agencies Level 
Changes in national development strategy have affected support by the implementing 
agencies. Since the initiation of privatisation and contracting-out, all ministries and 
departments at State and District levels have been working with one or another type 
of privatised venture. This change has affected both the situation with regard to data 
processing and the role of agencies. The present study found that with the introduc-
tion of privatised schemes and contracting-out, commitment to SETIA has become 
more blurred because participating agencies have no clear guidelines with regard to 
data responsibility. Operationally, due to the system of financing accorded by priva-
tised agreements, raw data and detailed information on projects are most often kept 
by private companies. Information kept by government organisations are in the form 
of reports, that is, with information that has been finalised. In other words, to write 
up SETIA's report an agency has to call out information from private companies. 
This extra effort was found to be beyond the specified official duties of agencies. For 
example, one agency explained as follows: 
"Within this office we have our own major objectives. Presently, the information 
requested by the programme is not related to our main operation and manage-
ment needs. I find it difficult to allocate staff to punch in the information when 
we are much too busy with our own routine duties" (Assistant Director, Depart-
ment of Works, fieldwork, interviewed January, 1997). 
Another common view is expressed by one Director for Ministry of Works as fol-
lows: 
"We have our own format for data collection, and we do not use the ICU's pre-
scribed format because our Director General requires detailed information on 
certain aspects of the project. Our office therefore has drastically lessened its 
contribution to SETIA because we simply could not meet the pressure of our 
123 
own work load and SETIA's requirements"(Assistant Director, Regional Devel-
opment Authority Division, Kuala Lumpur, Ministry of Works, fieldwork, inter-
viewed January, 1997). 
6.6 Administrative Constraints and Change 
The necessity for SETIA to change was apparent from views gathered at the Treas-
ury, AGD and EPU. Yet, there were no creative improvements taken towards 
change. The Director of Research of the Malaysian Administrative Modernisation and 
Management Planning Unit (MAMPU) commented as follows: 
"In general these leaders have their own beliefs about what SETIA should be. 
We meet and discuss but somehow it is so difficult to come to a resolution be-
cause each is holding to their own rationale. After a while the issue discussed is 
forgotten for we are facing too many critical issues as it is. For example, now I 
talk about SETIA because you [interviewer] brought the issue up. After this 
meeting I have an entirely different problem to face" (Director of Research, 
MAMPU, fieldwork, interviewed January 1997). 
This view indicates that SETIA is failing to make itself prominent among emerging 
new programmes and that the main co-ordinator, ICU, is not playing a sufficiently 
stronger role to make this happen. The ICU co-ordinating partners (the EPU, AGD, 
and the Treasury), despite having the same status appear to have reservations about 
interfering with ICU's judgement for SETIA. The present study found that even the 
implementing agencies (other participating agencies) were not committed to SETIA's 
improvement. There are several administrative reasons for these attitudes which are 
explored in the following section (Section 6.7). 
SETIA's organisation is designed in such a way that decisions ultimately come from 
the very top of the organisational hierarchy. This comprises a steering committee 
made up of ICU's Director General as the chairman, and Director Generals of EPU, 
AGD and the Treasury as committee members. The rationale for having these senior 
policy-makers was because they could be helpful in co-ordinating staff across agen-
cies. Nevertheless, this study found that these organisational leaders in fact represent 
the reasons that limit 'open suggestions' for SETIA's improvements. Some of these 
reasons can be explained by understanding the in-built social-administrative tradition 
of these policy makers. 
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This tradition can be expressed in the form of two sources of constraint. The first 
constraint relates to decision-makers bound by their professionalism (trained public 
administrators) and social class. They adhere to certain unwritten rules (based on 
friendship) which are not open to the understanding of others outside the social 
group. This reflects the situation described by Lindblom (1965) as deferential adap-
tive adjustment in which, in a given decision situation, a decision-maker takes care to 
make no demands on the other decision-maker and to impose no losses or depriva-
tions on them. A non-intrusive view provided by one Director General was as fol-
lows: 
"Unlike other agencies, offices in the Prime Minister's Department are account-
able directly to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. Each of us has 
our own duties and responsibilities. For example, ICU is answerable to SETIA, I 
have [another system] my programme to answer to. The complication I am fac-
ing is not that dissimilar to ICU. . . They are better informed of their duties and 
problems than us. My role in SETIA is to assist, not to overrule ICU's deci-
sion..." (Kuala Lumpur, fieldwork, interviewed January, 1997). 
Viewed from another perspective one can argue that the head of each of these organi-
sations is busy guarding their own 'territory'. An explanation of this position is suc-
cinctly provided by Power and Urban-Lurain (1989) with reference to their experi-
ence of United States programme initiatives. They argue that: 
"We have all heard the cry of the bureaucratic jungle . . .My programme; my 
money; my clients...Agencies come to assume that i f they are not sole service 
providers for a client population, they will lose programme funding; i f they lose 
their money, they lose staff positions; i f they lose staff, they lose status; i f they 
lose status, they lose future funding. Therefore, bureaucracies naturally tend to 
spend their time and attention building and defending turf, not in managing well" 
(pp. 4-5). 
The second constraint relates to the bind that these decision-makers have to political 
leaders. At all times the decision-makers have to maintain the 'correct' balance be-
tween public needs and political needs. Failure to attain such a balance may well re-
sult in resignation or dismissal. A case in point is found in the dismissal of the Lord 
President of the Supreme Court in 1988. In order to avoid 'mistakes' SETIA leaders 
have taken the 'middle road' which "reinforces the powerless, 'office boy' image of 
the bureaucrat that is destructive of self-respect so necessary for mature moral 
growth" (Rohr, 1978, p. 54). 
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Thirdly, constraints to change could also be attributed to one or more forms of bar-
rier. SETIA's administrators make up the controlling 'offices' that receive grievances 
or complaints for action or in-actions of public services. As an illustration the Public 
Complaint Bureau falls under the Prime Minister's Department; and enforcement is 
handled by the Economic Planning Unit. Similarly the Committee on Government 
management which enforced internal control and accountability in public administra-
tion is headed by the Minister of Finance, and enforcement is handled by the Minis-
ter's executive. The Auditor General, which audits and reports on the accounts of 
government, though, is an autonomous body, its members being made up of staff 
from the Accountant General's Department. As Rourke (1978) notes: 
"Democracy assumes that citizens can hold government officials accountable for 
what they do and can expel them from office when their policies do not meet 
with public approval. By shielding official action from public knowledge and re-
view, secrecy makes such accountability impossible" (p. 361). 
Although SETIA has had many reviews, all have been conducted internally, and have 
been managed and controlled by ICU staff. Rationally, as Caudle (1989) explains, in-
ternal evaluators in certain circumstances can be useful for they are likely to be more 
familiar and sympathetic with the practical accommodations of policy implementation 
and programme operations. At the same time, however, internal evaluators are 
clearly less likely to be critical than external evaluators. 
6.7 Constraints and 'Real' Issues 
The constraints discussed above have restricted SETIA's capacity to be part of Ma-
laysia's dynamic IT development initiatives. The present study found that decision-
makers within SETIA are 'uncertain' of SETIA's prospect in comparison to newer IT 
development programmes. SETIA's objectives and goals have generally remained 
unaltered despite changes in development issues. In addition despite the fact that 
certain issues that previously restricted SETIA's development (such as supply of ba-
sic computer and staff shortages) no longer exist, SETIA's staff persist in retaining 
these matters as important. Based on nationwide counts of information systems that 
are already in use or are at the stage of development and planning. Current staff 
shortages in IT relate mainly to the operation of advanced programmes. Tables 6.2 
and 6.3 show the major existing computerised information systems that are opera-
tional or are at various stages of development. 
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Table 6.2: Existing Major Computerised Information Systems at National 
and Federal Levels 
Information System1 Organisation 
Chief Executive Information System 
(SMPKE)1 
Prime Minister's Office 
Klang Valley Information System2 Klang Valley Development Authority, 
Prime Minister's Department 
Planning, Mapping, and Infrastructural 
Information System2 
Public Works Department 
Islamic Information System1 Islamic Religious Affairs, Prime Min-
ister's Department 
Local Network Management System1 Telecommunications Malaysia Berhad 
Image Processing System1 Malaysian Centre for Remote Sensing 
Census Information System1 Department of Statistics 
National Forest Information System1 Forestry Department 
Agricultural Information System1 Agriculture Department 
Landed Property Information System1 Valuation and Property Services 
Note. GIS operations not included; 
1 operational 
2 development 
Source: Fieldwork 1996 
Table 6.3: Existing Computerised Information Systems at State Level 
State 'information System 
Penang SPHT and SIB 
Perak SMP, SPHT, SIB, SPBT, WPIS and PELTANAM 
Johor SMAT, SPHT, SIB, PIS, AIS, FRIS, SPJ and WPIS 
Selangor SMAT, CIS, SIB, LAPIS and SFIS 
Terengganu SPHT, STAR, SIB and SISMI 
Pahang SPHT, SIB, SMAKP and FRIS 
Kedah SPHT, SIB and SJMKET 
Melaka SPHT and SIB 
Kelantan SPHT, SIB and AIS 
Negeri Sembilan SPHT, SIB and NFIS 
Perlis SPHT, SIB and SISMI 
Sarawak CPFS, SMART and FOMISS 
Sabah SPNSA and SFMIS 
*Note: GIS operations are not included; all systems are at operational level. 
See pp. xiii-xiv for list of abbreviations 
Source: Fieldwork 1996 
With regard to general computer use, all agencies, even those at District administra-
tive level, have access to computers. One IT related issue which participants high-
lighted was the need to up-grade telecommunication facilities, namely through instal-
lation of LANs or WANs to enhance communication within and between agencies. 
With regard to skills, the results of this study show that all agencies that maintain 
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computers are equipped with supporting staff, such as programmers and systems 
analysts, and in general other officers and general staff have various levels of com-
puter knowledge. 
Another of SETIA's goals which has remained unaltered despite changes at national 
level is that regarding participation of bumiputeras and eradication of poverty. These 
issues have faded in significance through time, as participating agencies no longer 
considered data on bumiputeras' projects as significant to the SETIA database. One 
officer from a State Economic Planning Unit explained: 
"To my knowledge in terms of project participation it is no longer necessary to 
monitor projects according to ethnic groupings. In one project, for example, 
GAP AM, [industrial project in Melaka] the land belongs to several groups -
companies with a mixture of representation - nationals, foreign companies and 
about 30% owned by the State. Factories and other development on the land 
belong to many owners as well. There are no exact percentages. Currently this 
system is our [Malaysia's] trend towards development. We can monitor devel-
opment but it is no longer practical and possible to monitor information on equity 
by race" (Director, State Economic Planning Unit, Melaka, fieldwork, inter-
viewed August 1996). 
Another Assistant Director from the State Development Corporation even com-
mented as follows: 
"Currently we are facing the reverse form of development. We no longer need to 
be concerned with bumiputeras' projects. Most projects our office handles be-
long to bumiputeras [companies or individuals] or foreign expatriates with bumi-
puteras holding large shares. This is no longer a mystery or secret affair. I think 
most people involved in development know it" (Assistant Director, Pahang State 
Development Corporation, fieldwork, interviewed September, 1996). 
This study finds that SETIA is a programme which has matured through time and 
which has become an appropriate information system for Malaysia. 'Appropriate' in 
this context means that SETIA's technology requirements met skills availability and 
institutional factors such as rules and regulations between and within organisations. 
Participating agencies are well aware of SETIA's difficulties and incrementally have 
developed the means to overcome these issues. Similarly committees that are set to 
oversee SETIA's overall development now consist of members that are knowledge-
able in terms of IT. 
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However, these advantages have not been effectively used to promote SETIA's de-
velopment because SETIA's leaders are being attracted (and diverted) by other lu-
crative assignments handled by the Prime Minister's Department (which includes 
SETIA's main co-ordinators the EPU and ICU), namely mega-scale privatisation 
projects. This diversion has been further reinforced by policy changes initiated by the 
Prime Minister, which emphasised advanced IT ventures6 and closer relationships 
with the private sector. Policy changes affect participating agencies as well and offi-
cers that are assigned to manage private programmes often leave the public sector to 
join the private programme that they managed. A similar situation exists in agencies 
where management's main interest is to expand services which could bring in profit. 
For example, local authorities focus on activities such as parking services and garbage 
disposal, and the Ministry of Public Works concentrates on a toll road bypass. Since 
the promotion of a new policy for development beginning in 1990 SETIA has been 
left to operate without co-ordinated effort even among the co-ordinating agencies. 
This discussion is further evaluated in Chapter 7. The following section examines the 
second main national information system - National Land Information System - and 
makes comparisons with SETIA. 
SECTION I I : NALIS - National Land Information System 
Parti 
6.9 Introduction 
The SETIA study provides one example of understanding aspects of a large scale in-
formation system in the post-implementation stages. The NALIS programme is used 
here as a means of evaluating an information system in the early stages of its life. This 
section is divided into two parts. The first part summarises the historical development 
of NALIS. It provides a brief description of several computerised land information 
systems' activities that are associated with the establishment of NALIS as well as a 
discussion of the NALIS programme itself, its developmental requirements, system 
architecture, technology and problems related to these factors. In part I I evaluations 
6 Malaysia has had many examples of successful migration to advanced IT ventures including net-
working. Agencies which have successfully implemented networking concept include the Immigra-
tion Department, the Inland Revenues Department, the Royal Malaysian Police Department, the 
Road Transport Department, the Employee Provident Fund, the Ministry of Education and all major 
universities. 
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are made based on these issues. The key issues are discussed from three perspectives; 
organisational, technical and institutional. Pertinent to the discussion are the findings 
and recommendations of the feasibility study conducted by Renong Berhad on behalf 
of the Ministry of Land and Co-operative Development as the co-ordinator of NALIS 
(MLCD, 1995). Renong's study came about as a result of several key developments. 
Following the decision of the Cabinet in 1987 to establish a Land Information System 
in Malaysia the Ministry of Land and Co-operative Development was assigned the 
task of establishing the System (MLCD, 1994; GOM, 1997). Subsequent to this deci-
sion at the Training Workshop on Urban Land Information System for Human De-
velopment in June 1992 a suggestion was made toward establishment of NALIS. In 
March 1994 the need for an integrated land information system was fomalised in two 
reports by the Ministry of Land and Co-operative (MLCD, 1994; 1995). These re-
ports highlighted the major components which would form NALIS; existing land 
components that were available in the country; a proposed NALIS hardware configu-
ration; proposed corporate data model and the proposed implementation concept. At 
the same time a task force was formed which consisted of members of 36 land-related 
agencies (Task Force Report, 1998). The framework was endorsed by the participat-
ing agencies whereby in November 1994 a consultancy, Renong Berhad, was ap-
pointed to carry out a national scale feasibility study. The objectives of the feasibility 
study were: first, to evaluate all relevant issues related to the setting up of NALIS. 
This included analysis of participating agencies, the design and function of the pro-
posed System, and the implementation of the System; and second, to propose rec-
ommendations for the development of NALIS to be used by land-related agencies in 
order to effectively support land use and land related management functions (MLCD, 
1995; Renong Berhad, 1998). A total of 355 agencies at Federal, State and local 
authority levels was covered by the study making use of two major methods of infor-
mation collection: questionnaires and a desk-based assessment of secondary sources. 
Information was categorised into three broad categories: Information Technology, 
administration and development, and legal issues. The Consultant's study was sub-
mitted to the MLCD in December 1995 in nine volumes (MLCD, 1995; Renong Ber-
had, 1998). The key findings and recommendations of Renong are summarised below. 
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Data availability and common reference systems: 
The lack of adequate digital maps for both topographic and cadastral data was found 
to be most critical. The consultancy therefore recommended that the land custodian 
agency (the Department of Survey and Mapping) should accelerate the digital map-
ping programme. The lack of common reference systems was also regarded as weak 
and, as such, Renong suggested that the Department of Survey and Mapping should 
work towards developing the necessary references. 
Communications: 
The consultancy stressed that the success of NALIS would require an adequate com-
munication infrastructure for inter-and intra-information exchanges. The consultancy 
therefore recommended that co-operation with the telecommunication agencies be 
increased to accelerate the upgrading of existing communication systems between 
agencies, and to install local and wide area networks. 
Funding for NALIS: 
In building up NALIS the consultant's study highlighted various areas that required 
extensive, upfront financial support. Among these were communications, hardware, 
software and data conversion (a breakdown of these costs is provided in Section 
6.12.3. The consultancy therefore recommended three options for NALIS funding: 
full government funding, increased use of franchising and full privatisation. The sec-
ond and third of these options were rejected by the participating agencies because of 
issues related to classified data (GOM, 1997). Some of the difficulties of enforcing 
Renong's recommendations, as well as the links between Renong's findings and those 
of the present research are discussed below. 
6.9.1 NALIS: Objectives and Approaches 
The objective of the NALIS programme is to provide government with an informa-
tion and technology infrastructure to support interrelated aspects of strategic plan-
ning, land and land-use management, resource management, environmental manage-
ment, and physical infrastructure planning management (MLCD, 1995; Task Force 
Report, 1998). NALIS was proposed to support these integrated uses through com-
puter hardware, software, communication networks and standards. Specific emphasis 
was given to the application of Geographic Information Systems. 
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At the operational level, the programme is designed to function on a single window 
concept, that is, an electronic information sharing architecture that allows users ac-
cess to land-related data in government agencies, regardless of where the data are lo-
cated. Broadly the system is designed to function as follows. Access to the data is 
provided through user software: interested users can browse through and search a 
central directory to identify which data are available for a specific geographic loca-
tion. On recognising the data that are required, users instruct a purchase order by 
means of specific regulations. The purchase order is then routed through a gateway to 
the data repository (data custodian). On approving the purchase, the custodian sends 
the data back through the gateway to the requester or purchaser. With regard to re-
strictive data, such as titles and revenue information, there is a screening device to 
limit open access (MLCD, 1994; Task Force Report, 1998). 
6.9.2 The Establishment of NALIS 
In actual terms the planning for NALIS has taken seven years (1987-1994). In 1994 
the NALIS steering committee gave their final endorsement based on two under-
standings: first, that the major building blocks for NALIS, the baseline information 
systems, were believed to be ready; and second, the availability of a wide and diversi-
fied technology base within land-related organisations in the country. The programme 
is planned to progress in phases of five years, beginning in 1995 and scheduled to be 
completed by the year 2020 (MLCD, 1995). When fieldwork for this study was con-
ducted, the NALIS programme was at its earliest stage of development. The ap-
proach and design were at the first stages of conceptualisation and a pilot study was 
being developed. In order to move towards an understanding of the processes of 
NALIS's development this thesis focuses on three major aspects: first, land-related 
information systems support that forms part of NALIS; second, the conception, de-
sign, adoption and proposed implementation coverage; and third, the perspectives of 
land-related agencies towards NALIS. The findings of the investigation are discussed 
and evaluated in the following sections. 
6.10 Basic Land-Related Information Support for NALIS 
There are three systems that are considered by the NALIS committee to be of major 
significance in providing initial support. The first is related to land parcel information; 
the second is related to building up cadastral base information and the third focuses 
on building up topographic base information. The Computerised Land Registration 
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System (CLRS) is the main system for computerising land parcels and holding land 
transaction databases. The Computer Aided Land Surveying System (CALS) is used 
mainly to create a cadastral survey database and to produce cadastral base maps, 
while the Computer Aided Mapping System (CAMS) is used for the creation of 
topographic databases. The following discussion evaluates each of these systems. 
6.10.1 The Computerised Land Registration System (CLRS) 
The CLRS is the first national land-based system developed in the context of NALIS. 
The main objective of the system was to enable on-line access to land records both by 
other State government departments and the Federal government for the purpose of 
effective planning. Four subsystems were proposed; an Inventory System (IVEN) for 
State land reserve information, a Temporary Occupancy Licence (TOL) for permits 
and licences, Quit Rent Titles (QT) for land revenue and a Land Registration System 
(LRS) for alienated and non-alienated land. Development of the system did not, how-
ever, progress as planned (Figure 6.2). 
Within the proposed schedule (1987-1993) only the QT subsystem has been imple-
mented nationwide. The IVEN and TOL subsystems have been postponed indefi-
nitely. The fourth subsystem, the Land Registration System, has undergone several 
phases of change. In 1990 the Ministry of Land and Co-operative Development de-
cided to build up the LRS database to follow through the development of the 1987 
Figure 6.2: Computerised Systems of Land Parcels, 1987 to the Present 
Computerised Land Registration System Computerised Land Registration System 
Proposal 1987 Present 
MLCD 
District Land Office ' k Land & Mines Office 
(Nationwide)" (Nationwide) 
Federal Territories of Lands 
and Mines office 
Land Registration System 
Database Land titles (alienated and non-alienated) 
Database alienated land only 
IVEN TOL 
state land Permits & 
& reserves Licences 
QT 
Land revenue 
Database 
Source: Fieldwork 1996 
proposed computerised system. The programme began with a pilot, with a scheduled 
completion date of 1993. At the time of this study's fieldwork the LRS (presently 
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called CLRS) pilot was still in progress at the Federal Territories of Land and Mines 
Office, Kuala Lumpur, in combination with a NALIS pilot project. 
According to the CLRS pilot office there are three major areas of difficulty. First, in 
computerising the land parcel information there are several problems related to data 
conversion. As an example, it takes an average of 12 minutes to convert each land 
record (title) from a manual to a digital format. With an estimated 145,000 land rec-
ords, the pilot office does not expect conversion to be completed in the foreseeable 
future. The second major problem is related to land administration. First there are 
anomalies in the subdivision of lots and boundary disputes, which defer the presenta-
tion of qualified titles. Second, there are difficulties in the conversion of qualified t i -
tles to final titles. In qualified titles, the information regarding the lot is not finalised, 
that is, it has not been officially surveyed by a license authority. Information at this 
level therefore cannot be placed in the cadastral map and has thus resulted in further 
delays in the conversion to a digital format. Currently, from the estimated 11.8 million 
lots in Malaysia, only 50% (about 5.9 million lots) have been issued with final titles 
(MLCD, 1994; 1995). The remainder are still at various levels of designation. The 
third major problem highlighted by the pilot project is that related to legal land mat-
ters. There are many old land titles which have not been changed to new land code 
titles. For the purposes of computerisation, old titles have first to be transferred to a 
new titles format before any conversion can be carried out. The process of change 
from old to new title has been very slow, resulting in subsequent delays in mapping 
and computerising. 
6.10.2 Computerisation of Maps and Map Databases: CALS and CAMS 
The main custodian for the production of digital maps and map databases is the De-
partment of Survey and Mapping Malaysia (DSMM). As noted earlier, two systems 
are currently used by the department for the purposes of digital map creation. The 
first system, the Computerised Assisted Land Surveying System (CALS) is used to 
create a cadastral survey database and to produce base maps both in graphical and 
digital forms. Currently, only two States are using the system, namely Johor and Pa-
hang. The State of Johor has been able to produce a 100% digital cadastral database 
although Pahang's is only about 20% complete (DSMM, 1994; MLCD, 1994; 1995). 
This study finds that the operation of CALS in other states in Malaysia is at various 
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stages of planning, which implies that current cadastral databases are maintained in a 
manual (textual) format 
The second system, the Computer Assisted Mapping System (CAMS), is used to 
capture raw map data to create a topographic database. According to the DSMM, 
from the total land area for Malaysia, 377,858 km 2, only about 50,000 km 2 or 13% 
have been converted to a digital form. The remaining area for Peninsular Malaysia 
was scheduled to be completed by end the of 1996, while for Sabah and Sarawak, no 
specific time frame has been given (DSMM, 1994; MLCD, 1994). By the end of the 
fieldwork period (January 1997) for the present study the status of the digital topo-
graphic database for Peninsular Malaysia remained unchanged. Based on interviews 
with the Secretary of the Information Division (head of Division), at the Ministry of 
Land and Co-operative Department (also the technical chairman of NALIS) progress 
is expected to continue to be slow, for variety reasons including difficulties with staff 
support and delays in data collection due to environmental reasons such as cloud 
cover in remotely sense images. As the Secretary explained: 
"In the area of mapping we also have problems with time, .when aerial photo-
graphs are to be taken is not fixed. In aerial photography they have to wait for 
the cloud to clear. In addition to this the aerial photographs need to be verified 
by ground checks and this also depends on the weather. These are the main bar-
riers to upgrading" (Chairman of NALIS technical committee and Secretary of 
the Information Division, MLCD, fieldwork, interviewed October 1996). 
The factors indicated above show that there is still much to do with respect to base-
line information. For land parcels (land records) and maps, the area within the country 
that has been provided with digital information is still very small. Digital land records 
are available only for the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. Cadastral digital data-
bases are available only for the State of Johor and some parts of the State of Pahang. 
With regard to the topographic digital database, the area covered is only a small por-
tion of the area of Johor. In terms of baseline information for networking communi-
cations, in particular land records, the system remains separately operated as an 
agency-based system. 
6.11 NALIS Design and Methodology 
According to Eason (1993), "The dominant method by which major information 
systems are designed and implemented in organisations has been characterised as 
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rational and technocentric" (p. 29). Eason argues that this approach has four major 
characteristics: 
The first is that of 'technology push' when a technology is selected before the nature 
of the problem is fully appreciated and understood; second, there is waterfall or se-
quential model development, when development is taken through a series of steps, 
generally, "analysis precedes design which precedes implementation" (p. 29). Eason 
argues that this approach has serious disadvantages because users' requirements 
could not be assumed rather, especially with new technology, their requirements can 
be known only after having had the opportunity to access the technology, observe it 
or learn it. The third characteristic is described as the 'dominance of technical spe-
cialists', or system development that is controlled by technical specialists; and fourth, 
there is a rational technical language, when development programmes use language 
that can be understood only by technical people or specialists. Eason argues that these 
are the characteristics that make it difficult for general users to participate in the de-
sign process and to participate effectively in the implementation process. 
These characteristics fit well with the design and implementation methodology drawn 
up for NALIS. NALIS' design is based entirely on an approach adopted from a for-
eign context, that was believed to be able to fit into a Malaysian context. The design 
was made by a few selected land custodian organisational heads who acted on the ad-
vice of a consultant group. In other words, these organisational heads lack in-depth 
knowledge of the design which they adopted. The approach to implementing NALIS 
has been based on the 'waterfall or sequential model'. Agencies participating in 
NALIS have therefore been identified and each of these agencies' technology and re-
lated requirements have been carefully organised. All of this planning was carried out 
by consultants. 
The planning stages for NALIS then, were principally managed by consultants with 
the assistance of a NALIS technical committee, comprising one officer from each of 
the major land-related departments (State Land and Mines, Survey and Mapping, 
Valuation and Property Services, Agriculture, Geological Survey, City Halls and 
other local authorities, Forestry, Malaysian Centre for Remote Sensing, Town and 
Country Planning, Environment, Drainage and Irrigation, Klang Valley Development 
Authority, District Office, Land Office and Telecommunications and Energy Compa-
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nies. Of other potential users of NALIS (government agencies and departments at 
Federal, State (including District) and local authority levels, a total of 356 were in-
formed of NALIS activities and objectives by way of briefings and demonstrations 
after the design and implementation approaches were endorsed by the Cabinet) 
(GOM, 1997). 
In the following sections the background to the design and method of NALIS is dis-
cussed along with exploration of the resources needed to support the NALIS design 
(technology, data and human support). Following that, in Section I I , the discussion 
turns to organisational, technical and institutional problems and issues related to de-
velopment and implementation of NALIS. 
6.11.1 System Development 
NALIS's development is based on the concept of an 'information community' 
(MLCD, 1994; 1995). This concept, which involves the grouping of organisations 
with related functions and business areas, is based on existing practice among organi-
sations, that is, organisations using similar types of data and information co-ordinated 
among themselves in conducting their daily business. The difference between the 
community concept and existing practice (sharing of information across and within 
land-related agencies) is the addition of electronic media as a means of communica-
tion between the related communities. The building of information groupings forms 
the basis of the NALIS corporate data model; this is to be the standard referencing 
and cataloguing system. The results of this study show that the process of identifying 
the various data groups has currently begun in five agencies at Federal level only - the 
Departments of Survey and Mapping Malaysia, Valuation, Agriculture, Environment 
and Forestry. 
Management and administration of data transactions within and between particular 
information communities placed under the responsibility of a central body or clearing-
house. Clearinghouses are planned to closely approximate the administrative levels 
and machinery of government in the country. The NALIS committee has proposed 
the establishment of several levels of clearinghouses at each administrative level: Fed-
eral, State and District (MLCD, 1995). It is clear from the findings of the present 
study that there is no consensus on clearinghouse status. Some agencies, namely the 
Department of Survey and Mapping Malaysia, and District Offices and local authori-
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ties, proposed that the clearinghouse should be placed in the office with the highest 
level of administrative authority; in other words an office which can command power. 
However, some felt the management of the system to be at risk under such circum-
stances because in most cases the highest level administrative office lacks the techni-
cal understanding of a sophisticated information system. These agencies proposed 
clearinghouses to be placed at a central computer unit, such as the State Information 
Technology Centre, local authority information technology centre or District Infor-
mation Technology Centre. As explained by an officer from the Penang GIS centre 
(PEGIS). 
"At present, to view or obtain data, the PEGIS centre must receive permission 
from the relevant Data Custodian, although no formal guidelines exist for this 
procedure to take place. . . Our experience with land data management [in par-
ticular GIS] places us as the best choice for the NALIS clearinghouse. Our ex-
isting function perhaps needs only to be ratified to provide the necessary support, 
that is, to ensure that various State departments and agencies concerned accept 
the authority and advice of the PEGIS centre" (Project Manager, PEGIS, field-
work, interviewed October 1996). 
A similar explanation was provided by an officer from the Sarawak Information Sys-
tems Centre: 
"We are establishing a State GIS centre to undertake the role of the State clear-
inghouse. The clearinghouse will be run by highly skilled IT personnel to ensure 
efficiency in running of our data sharing within the State" (Director, Sarawak 
Information Systems Centre, fieldwork, interviewed July 1996). 
6.11.2 System Architecture 
NALIS's system architecture is based on a client-server framework. The basic re-
quirement of this system is directly related to a LAN and WAN. The results from this 
study show that only about eleven agencies (from a total of sixty-eight which this 
study investigated) have LAN capability. This implies that many organisations have 
no central information management unit to handle and administer the flow of data to 
and from agencies, and between divisions within the organisation (Table 6.4). With 
regard to WAN only two agencies have this capability: EPU and ICU, but it is not 
used for data transfer purposes. 
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Table 6.4: Communication Framework 
Communication Number of agencies from a 
total of 68 investigated 
Back-up 21 
LAN 11 
WAN 
Leased line 0 
Source: Fieldwork 1996. 
Most agencies maintained that inadequacies with respect to WAN or LAN have not 
been a significant drawback because many agencies still maintained restrictive infor-
mation access to outside users (Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5: Network Access Capabilities 
Number of agencies from a total of 
Access 68 investigated 
Department Use 32 
Inter-agency 10 
Semi-public 4 
Public 2 
Top secret 1 
Intra-agency 0 
Others 4 
Source: Fieldwork 1996. 
Nevertheless, to have local area or wide are network facilities will be an advantage 
but since the costs of installation and maintenance are high, many agencies felt that it 
would be wasteful to pursue the idea. There are at least two costs which an agency 
has to meet up-front for LAN or WAN installation: equipment rental and line rental. 
Equipment rental is estimated at over US$12,000 per annum (1996 prices) and line 
rental rates increase by distance from the main communication line. In other words, 
the costs for an agency in Kuala Lumpur will be less than those agencies at State 
level. Figure 6.3 illustrates an estimation of line rental cost per annum (from the main 
point of communication) for each State in Malaysia. 
6.11.3 Software Technology 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) represent a key technology for NALIS be-
cause the linking of databases - combining textual and digital geo-spatial information 
- across the boundaries of different organisations, is the programme's main objective. 
The basic requirement to incorporate GIS handling capabilities into the proposed 
139 
U) 
Z) 
</> 
(D 
la 
c 
"5 a. 
e> c o 
o 
JO 
0) 
CO 
o 
a. 
0) o c (0 
w 
b 
"5 c 
<D 
Q) 
C 
0) 
3 
E 
C/) 
to Sg, g 
15 
I I 
J! « 
= I 
« i 
0) .— 
I E ! * * 
g U 
ai 1 
v 3 
2 E I I e u 
• • 
Tt ° 
e ° 
140 
NALIS design was, however, found to be quite difficult. As Sahay and Walsham 
(1996) argue: 
"Although there are similarities between IS and GIS, there are also important 
differences; for example, while they both deal with the computerised handling of 
data, spatial and non-spatial data are central in the case of GIS, as compared to 
primarily non-spatial data in most other information systems" (p. 388). 
In line with Sahay and Walsham's argument, this study found that collecting and or-
ganising data appropriate for GIS purposes has been one of NALIS' major problems. 
For example, with the exception of the Penang Centre for GIS, all other states and 
agencies currently implementing GIS have proceeded to collect data without first 
constructing the prerequisite data model. By doing so, individual agencies have ef-
fectively taken an approach which neither clearly identifies the intended usage of data 
being collected, nor establishes what linkages and data exchange standards are to be 
adopted between different databases. The absence of a data model and common data 
exchange standard for the implementation of NALIS causes ongoing difficulties in 
data sharing between agencies. In addition, information systems implemented by 
many agencies are not accompanied with proper data documentation or metadata. 
This creates difficulties for data users in determining the accuracy and currency of 
data obtained from other government agencies. The following sections explore these 
issues in further detail. 
6.11.4 Current Status of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Facilities 
Based on a total of forty-nine7 land-related agencies investigated in the present study 
there are thirty-two GIS/LIS users (Table 6.6). This is small in comparison to the 
potential total number of NALIS participating agencies (356 agencies). The major 
GIS users are agencies at Federal level and these make up about 80% of the total 
thirty-two. Of the remaining land-related agencies the majority are at the stage of 
planning for GIS installation. Within organisations that are employing GIS, the find-
ings from this study show that GIS are used for eleven main types of application 
(Table 6.7), with Land Information Systems being the most widely used form of GIS 
especially among agencies at State level. Eleven main types of GIS software are used 
to support the above applications (Table 6.8). Among agencies that manage complex 
databases there is a trend to own more than one GIS product. For example, the 
7 For a detailed breakdown of agencies interviewed see Chapter 5. 
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DSMM uses SysScan, Intergraph, Arc/ INFO and System 9; the Agriculture Depart-
ment uses Arc/INFO, Terrasoft and Intergraph; the Forestry Department uses 
ERDAS and Intergraph; and the Valuation and Property Services Department uses 
INFOMIX, UMAX and Arc/INFO. 
Table 6.6: Operational GIS/LIS in Malaysia 
State Agency Operational GIS/LIS 
Johor State Survey and Mapping CALS 
Kedah State Survey and Mapping Mini CALS 
Kelantan Town and Country Planning 
State Survey and Mapping 
GIS (Terrasoft) 
Mini CALS 
Kuala Lumpur Economic Planning Unit 
Statistics Department 
Department of Agriculture 
Survey and Mapping 
Department of Environment 
MACRES 
Public Works Department 
Valuation and Property Services De-
partment 
Forestry Department 
GIS (Pilot-Arc/INFO) 
GIS (Arc/INFO) 
GIS (ArcINFO, Terrasoft and 
Intergraph) 
GIS (SysScan, Intergraph, 
Arc/INFO and System 9) 
CAMS and FMS) 
GIS (Environmental Decision-
Support System) 
GIS (ERDAS, Arc/INFO, Map-
Info) 
Local Network Management Sys-
tem (Pilot) and CAMS 
GIS (InfoMix, UMAX, 
Arc/INFO) 
GIS (ERDAS and Intergraph) 
Melaka Town and Country Planning GIS (Terrasoft) and Mini CALS 
Negeri Sembilan Town and Country Planning 
State Survey and Mapping 
GIS (Terrasoft) 
Mini CALS 
Pahang State Survey and Mapping CALS 
Perak Ipoh City Council 
Taiping Municipal Council 
GIS (Arc/INFO) 
GIS (Arc/INFO) 
Penang State Computer Centre 
State Land and Mines 
Town and Country Planning 
Penang GIS (PEGIS) 
GIS (Terrasoft and Arc/INFO 
GIS (Terrasoft) 
Sabah State Agriculture Department 
State Survey and Mapping 
State Forestry Department 
Land Information System 
Cadastral Information System and 
LandUse Information System 
Forestry Management Information 
System 
Sarawak State Planning Unit 
State Agriculture Department 
Forestry Department 
State Land and Survey 
GIS (Pilot Intergraph) 
GIS (Intergraph) 
Forest Management System 
Land and Survey Information 
System 
Selangor State Survey and Mapping Cadastral Information System 
Terengganu State Survey and Mapping Mini CALS 
Source: Fieldwork 1996. 
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Popular GIS uses are to process transactions and support simple queries related to 
location and condition of geographic features. This study found that among the 32 
Table 6.7: GIS Applications 
GIS Applications 
Percentage (from a 
total of 32 agencies) 
Land Information Systems 21.6 
Planning Information Systems 7.8 
Transport Management Systems 7.8 
Socio-economic Information Systems 7.8 
Geological Information Systems 7.8 
Other Environmental Information Systems 7.8 
Facilities Management 6.0 
Agricultural Information Systems 3.9 
Automated Mapping 3.9 
Forestry Information Systems 2.0 
Public Policy Information Systems 2.0 
Others 21.6 
Source: Fieldwork 1996. 
Table 6.8: GIS Packages Currently in Use 
GIS package Agencies from a total of 32 investigated 
Arc/INFO 17 
Terrasoft 8 
SPANS 6 
Genasys 4 
ERDAS 4 
Intergraph 4 
Maplnfo 3 
SysScan 2 
ArcCAD 1 
GDS 1 
System 9 1 
Others 25 
Source: Fieldwork 1996. 
users of GIS and LIS only three departments, namely, the Agriculture, Environment 
and Forestry Departments use GIS for modelling, simulation and forecasting. Most 
agencies explained their lack of adopting GIS in terms of difficulties in recruiting GIS 
support staff. This study found that even in major land-related organisations, such as 
the Departments of Survey and Mapping, Town and Country Planning, and Public 
Works, on average only two officers have formal GIS qualifications or skills. Im-
provement in the supply of GIS skilled personnel is expected to be slow because of a 
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lack of institutions that can provide GIS training. Basic short-term training is nor-
mally carried out by software companies and although government training centres, 
universities and a few private colleges have recently started to initiate training courses 
for GIS, entry to these institutions is limited by a number of conditions. 
Training offered at higher learning institution is not open to mature students such as 
government personnel, for example. Training at government centres also has its limi-
tations. Since there is only one centre, application for admission is very competitive, 
and selection is normally based on criteria set by the head of the agency. The fol-
lowing sections examine GIS-related issues in those agencies that have adopted GIS. 
6.11.5 Using GIS: technical issues 
Selection of specific GIS packages by an agency is related to the individual job func-
tions of that agency. In the case of NALIS, since data sharing within and across agen-
cies is the objective, differences between packages have given rise to a number of 
problems. Different types of GIS software use different data structures and store the 
data in different ways. The results of this study show that at individual agency level, 
for example, as highlighted by the Department of Environment, Department of Agri-
culture, Department of Valuation and Property Services, and Department of Survey 
and Mapping, this incompatibility was solved by designing a computer program to 
group data specification from separate packages under one common record. The 
same approach, however, could not be applied when data needed to be shared across 
agencies. 
Another key issue indicated by users relate to difficulties in determining a co-ordinate 
system, since most GIS packages offer a range of co-ordinate systems. Therefore, 
integration is possible only after transformation to a common projection system. One 
example of this problem was illustrated by the Department of Survey and Mapping 
(DSMM). The department explained that major problems arise when there is a need 
to convert cadastral basemaps to topographic basemaps. The topographic basemaps 
use a Rectified Skew Orthomorphic (RSO) for their referencing system while the 
Registry Office (producer of cadastral data) uses a Cassini Soldner Projection for its 
referencing system. The State Survey and Mapping officer argued as follows: 
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"We are aware that presently the work of one body are not officially transmitted 
or referenced by others. But there is nothing much we can do because there ex-
ists no requirement for us to communicate with one another" (Director State 
Survey and Mapping Department, Terengganu, fieldwork, interviewed Septem-
ber 1996). 
Presently therefore, there is a variety of systems used by departments and agencies for 
referencing geographical data (Table 6.9). The Rectified Skew Orthomorphic (RSO) 
is the most popular system for topographic data and this is used by land supplier de-
partments such as Survey and Mapping, Valuation and Property Services, Town and 
Country Planning, Geology, Drainage and Irrigation, Agriculture, Public Works and 
Forestry. The Cassini Soldner Projection is popular among State Land and Mines Of-
fices and State and Survey Mapping Departments for cadastral survey. Other less 
popular referencing systems, such as Latitude/Longitude and State plan projection, 
are used by minor agencies at State Offices, District Offices and local authorities. 
Table 6.9: Locational Referencing Systems in Use 
Referencing Systems No. of agencies from a total of 
49* investigated 
Rectified Skew Orthomorphic 20 
User defined 18 
Cassini Soldner 14 
State Plan 14 
Latitude/Longitude 13 
*Note: Some agencies use more than one type of referencing system. 
A further issue highlighted during the course of interviews with the Public Works De-
partment, Department of Agriculture and Department of Environment was that of 
GIS data structures. Different types of GIS package adopt different data structures 
(vector or raster or their variants) and data conversion is generally necessary before 
data exchange can take place. These departments argued that to come to an agree-
ment regarding data exchange has been difficult since various users utilise data for 
different applications and depending upon their interests data representation is 
viewed differently. For example one senior officer in the Public Works Department 
explained that: 
"Whenever one tries to compare data from different sources there are differences 
in terms of the data types on which the data is based. A road in one data-set may 
have the schema road [name, surface, type, number of lanes], while in another it 
has simply road [name, type]. Furthermore even where the attributes have the 
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same name we find that they do not take on the same range of values. In order to 
effectively share information we need some means by which we can agree on 
some common types [for example, road or surface type] which can then be used 
at least within some specific community" (Senior Engineer, Public Works De-
partment, Kuala Lumpur, fieldwork, interviewed January 1997). 
6.11.6 Standards for GIS Use 
With an increasing need to share spatial digital data most agencies indicated their 
concern over ways to enhance co-ordination among various user communities. In 
1992, a proposal was brought forward by the land supplier community to the Council 
of Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM) to introduce a 
standard data exchange format. In 1994 the Malaysia Standard 1074 (MS 1074) was 
introduced but was based on customised Computer Aided Mapping System (CAMS) 
output. In other words, the standard does not meet the requirements for GIS opera-
tions. One major weakness of the MS 1074 standard for the purposes of NALIS (GIS 
operations) is its rigid description of features and feature codes. Topological proper-
ties of spatial features are not defined, and thus relationships of geometric primitives 
(points, lines and areas) are not provided. In addition, only basic attribute descriptions 
are supplied. Finally, relationships between spatial features and their attributes are not 
supplied and thus GIS users are not able to query such data in any meaningful way. 
At the time of this study standard agreement on exchange standards has still not been 
reached. The responsible co-ordinating institutions, in particular the National Map-
ping Committee, National Remote Sensing Committee, Military Mapping Council and 
the Standards & Research Institute of Malaysia, have not been able to bring together 
provider and user communities to agree on feature and attribute interpretations, and 
feature and attribute definitions. Even the key land data custodian agencies - the De-
partment of Survey and Mapping Malaysia and Land Registry Offices - have not been 
able to solve basic problems with projections, as alluded to earlier. Conversion of 
spatial data to a digital form is also slow because the work is done in-house for 
'security reasons'. Any involvement of the private sector in the acquisition, conver-
sion and production of data on behalf of an agency to spread costs and utilise existing 
expertise is not possible because all data are classified. 
In the light of the above issues, one could argue that current GIS users are aware of 
the problems intrinsic in GIS use. However, levels of awareness and laiowrledge of 
GIS problems can not be generalised to all technical and professional staff in the user 
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agencies. For example, the Town and Country Planning Department at the Federal 
level, a typical technical agency, with a total of about 500 staff of which 40% are 
technical (technicians, semi-professionals and professionals8). From this total only 
about 1% have technical skills in GIS. This situation is likely to be worse among 
agencies that are yet to install GIS. Section I I explores these issues further and con-
siders further possible impediments to the effective use of GIS and its implementation 
in NALIS. 
SECTION H: Part H 
6.12 Evaluating the NALIS Programme 
Issues regarding the adoption and implementation of information technologies such as 
GIS may be conceptualised in technical, organisational or institutional terms (Dunn et 
a l , 1997). Technical perspectives generally deal with impediments related to system 
design and components such as hardware, software and data. Organisational perspec-
tives focus on structural and human related issues such as staff relationships with 
technology and their attitude and beliefs about computing and the use of computers. 
Finally institutional perspectives generally relate to factors external to an organisation 
such as political and economic factors that have the ability to influence an organisa-
tion's capacity to adopt or use GIS. Of these three frameworks, an organisational 
perspective is perhaps considered the most meaningful in providing explanations in 
information systems implementation (Kling, 1980; Kling and Scacchi, 1982; Camp-
bell, 1991; Masser and Campbell, 1991; Obermeyer and Pinto, 1994). Obermeyer and 
Pinto (1994) suggested that paying close attention to organisational behaviour or hu-
man factors can greatly facilitate success of information system implementation. This 
assertion has been found to apply here in the case of NALIS. However, though less 
prominent, institutional and technical factors cannot be undermined here because they 
also appear to influence the implementation of NALIS. The discussion in this section 
explores these perspectives in turn. 
Professional workers possess a degree or equivalent higher qualification in a specialised field, for 
example Town Planning. Semi-professionals are educated to diploma level. Technicians possess 
certification in drafting, for example. 
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6.12.1 Organisational Issues 
Onsrud and Pinto (1992) reviewed over thirty factors that might influence the adop-
tion of GIS within organisations. Incentives and barriers to changes in organisational 
practices included personal factors, real and perceived costs and benefits, intra - and 
inter-organisational communications, organisational decision-making structure, meth-
ods of technology introduction and training, and many others. Organisational issues 
found in the case of NALIS appear to be similar to those identified by those authors. 
Willingness to change, for example, was found to be lacking due to individual atti-
tudes towards new technology. As highlighted earlier, limited facilities for training 
form one impedance towards knowledge upgrading. Beside this, however, the present 
research found other barriers. Some professionals (surveyors, planners and engineers) 
for example, argued that to study a new set of skills is difficult for them because of 
time and other official and social priorities. The Deputy Director of the Sarawak Land 
and Survey Department explained: 
"We have so much work to attend to daily, as such we have no time to learn 
anything new in line with advancement of IT. At home we have our family, they 
are our first priority" (Sarawak, fieldwork, interviewed July 1996). 
Similar opinions were expressed by general staff and some were reluctant even to dis-
cuss GIS issues. 
A further reason which emerged related to the way in which GIS is introduced to an 
agency. In many agencies GIS hardware and software are situated in a separate room 
controlled by selected staff and this approach acts as a physical barrier for staff (even 
senior managers). Thus although GIS has been adopted by a number of agencies, in 
practice the system is monopolised by a small number of staff. 
Similar behaviour was also found to operate in terms of sharing knowledge within 
NALIS. In every agency only one officer is assigned to attend NALIS meetings or 
briefings. The findings from this study show that in almost all cases (forty-nine land-
related agencies) information obtained from meetings was not shared in an official 
manner (for example, by briefings to other staff) but rather was kept as individual 
knowledge. So- called 'participation' then, operates at the level of the individual. 
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Notwithstanding the attitudes of the officers it is proposed here that lack of informa-
tion sharing results from low levels of knowledge amongst individual officers. Of 
forty-nine land-related agencies which made up this study about 50% of officers in-
terviewed could not explain the design and methodology of NALIS and almost the 
same percentage was still vague about the programme itself. The findings of this 
study show that the officers who were most knowledgeable about the NALIS design 
and methodology come mainly from technical agencies such as Survey and Mapping 
Department, Town and Country Planning Department, Public Works Department, 
Agriculture Department, Malaysian Centre for Remote Sensing, Land and Mines De-
partment, Department of Environment and major local authorities such Kuala Lumpur 
City Hall, and local authorities in Perak, Pulau Pinang and Kedah. Even so, most of 
these agencies, an average of only two officers were knowledgeable of NALIS in 
terms of the design and methodology involved in NALIS. 
Agencies in management/monitoring roles such as the Local Housing Department, 
State Secretariat Offices and District Offices are aware of NALIS but could not ex-
plain what NALIS is about. As stated by a senior administrator and system analyst in 
the Local Housing Department: "We have heard of NALIS. But we are not sure what 
actually it is" (Kuala Lumpur, fieldwork December 1996). Another category are 
those agencies such as the Urban Development Authority, Federal Land Development 
Authority and many local authorities that have not heard of NALIS. In fact, some of 
these agencies were surprised that they were not informed of the NALIS undertaking. 
One planner at the Urban Development Authority explained: 
"We are regular customers of the Department of Survey and Mapping. And we 
share our information [housing and commercial development information] with 
various land agencies particularly Town Planning and City Hall. I don't under-
stand why we were not called to participate" (Senior Planner, Operational Divi-
sion, Central Zone, Kuala Lumpur, fieldwork, interviewed November 1996). 
As might be expected, those staff with only very limited knowledge of NALIS are 
also those that are unaware of the capabilities of GIS. 
Awareness of GIS and NALIS was further explored by attending two briefings (at the 
Federal Territories of Lands and Mines Office and Ministry of Land and Co-operative 
Development) and one demonstration (at the Melaka Land and Mines Office). These 
were official events where permission to observe had to be requested from the or-
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ganiser (department director) where the briefings and demonstration were carried 
out. Problems of access were, in fact, minimal since I used my desire to learn about 
NALIS (rather than to observe NALIS development process) as a reason for my 
presence. The key issues stressed in these meetings were allocation of budget and IT 
peripherals. Issues such as data sharing and exchange, compatibility, standards and 
costs of conversion which were already revealed at the pilot project level were not 
brought to light by the presenter. Perhaps the action was intentional because among 
the participants many were not aware of the said issues since many were unfamiliar 
with electronic data sharing in general and GIS in particular. These meetings looks 
similar to other meetings that author had participated at structure and local plan lev-
els, where minimal questioning from participating communities could be expected 
because proposals presented were broad and inclined towards picturesque presenta-
tion rather than emphasising on issues. 
It appeared that there was an obvious lack of 'capability' on part of the professionals 
(for example, the surveyors who were the co-ordinator of these meetings) in deliver-
ing and clarifying the programme's intended goal. With the NALIS promotion it was 
obvious that the co-ordinator's main interest was to 'impress' user communities with 
new technology rather than to explore users' understanding and needs on new IT. 
This study found that since many participants were not able to question the impres-
sive IT proposal, professionals regarded them as 'disinterested' with the undertaking. 
The promoters of these meetings failed to realise that there were gaps of 
'information' and 'skill' between co-ordinators and participants. The case highlighted 
here where users (or the general communities) were 'catching up' with development 
ideas is typical in the Malaysian planning context. The Multimedia Super Corridor is 
one example of a project where only a handful of Malaysians understood its purpose. 
It appears from the findings of this research that the approach to the development of 
NALIS has not always included formulation of realistic goals. In the following sec-
tion, a facet of reality is discussed through analysing current information sharing is-
sues within and amongst land-related agencies. 
Information Sharing Issues: 
Since the establishment of computerised information systems has been approached 
individually and independently, information sharing amongst agencies still largely fol-
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lows a manual protocol. This is because many staff view data to be proprietary 
(restricted to individual agency use). Secondly, inter-departmental system linkages 
have not changed from the traditional pattern of information exchange. That is, in-
formation exchange is restricted under a set of organisational rules which directly dis-
courage an agency from data sharing, especially across agencies. Thirdly, co-
ordination across jurisdictional boundaries remains strictly determined by administra-
tive and political differences. In the three tiers of government departments, State, 
District and local authority offices are closely linked, whereas links between Federal 
and State departments are not well developed. Rather, Federal departments play the 
role of advisor to the State departments but have no real jurisdiction over the State, 
District or local authority level agencies. The initiative to change from the current 
situation is perhaps difficult because, as the findings of this study show, there are di-
verse and opposing interests among participants in the direction towards general co-
ordinated goals. The following section explores these issues. 
Professional Issues and System Control: 
Professional disagreements were found to be related specifically to issues of control 
over NALIS. Land surveyors, in particular, perceived the administrators to have a 
poor understanding of NALIS, particularly in terms of data and technology. They be-
lieved that NALIS should be managed and controlled by surveyors, as the staff most 
knowledgeable in terms of land and technology (GIS) matters. As one surveyor 
commented: 
"...all over the world the land surveyor is the one that is given the mandate to 
handle land data; not the administrator. For example, they can't even interpret 
the co-ordinate system of this country" (State Director, Survey and Mapping 
Department, Kelantan, fieldwork, interviewed September 1996). 
The land surveyors' perception of their own professionalism appeared to dominate 
over all other NALIS participants. They often disagreed with other professionals, not 
only from other organisations, but also within their own institution. Some surveyors 
argued that even though the role of managing NALIS has been given to their Minis-
try (Ministry of Land and Co-operative Development), since those actually control-
ling NALIS are not land professionals, many intrinsic GIS and land-related matters 
issues are likely to be overlooked. One senior surveyor from the Ministry of Land and 
Co-operative Development stated that: 
151 
"they [NALIS administrators] are still ignorant about computing. . . Actually they 
installed a powerful network. They did not even realise that they do not have 
people to do the work. Anyway, even i f they have the people they do not know 
what is needed" (Director, senior surveyor, MLCD, Kuala Lumpur, fieldwork, 
interviewed November 19%) 
Another officer from the same Ministry, but operating at State level, expressed a 
similar view: 
"These administrators depend so much on us. I am not putting them down, but 
generally they do not know what they are talking about. But most of the time 
they would not tell us they do not know.. But we know. Once we leave they are 
lost. This is what happens now... most of our directors are leaving to join the pri-
vate sector. Now the co-ordinator is worried. They do not have a strong backing 
to translate NALIS requirements. The co-ordinator has lost his support and does 
not know what to do" (Director, Melaka Land and Mines Office, fieldwork, in-
terviewed August 1996). 
The administrators believe that NALIS should be managed at the policy level rather 
than by technical staff. They argue that even though NALIS is technically oriented, its 
implementation deals with land. Land is a policy matter and decisions regarding ac-
cess and operation of land-related matters rest with administrative offices. The ad-
ministrators argued that supervision of NALIS should be placed at the highest ad-
ministrative authority to ensure both co-operation and that operations follow the 
regulations set forth by individual State controllers. The NALIS Central Council, for 
example, was proposed to consist of the following: the Prime Minister as chairman, 
the Deputy Prime Minister as deputy chairman and with other administrative members 
to include the Economic Planning Unit, Attorney General's Office, Standard Indus-
trial and Research Institute of Malaysia, Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics Sys-
tems, and Malaysian Administrative Modernisation and Manpower Planning. Two 
major technical departments included are the Department of Survey and Mapping and 
the Malaysian Centre for Remote Sensing. 
The arguments put forward by the administrators seemed to support a 'top-down' 
approach. The rationale is that power to effect change rests with the highest author-
ity. With regard to computerised information systems some authors have argued that 
characterisation of computing as either 'top-down' or 'bottom up' is meaningless 
(Kraemer and Dutton, 1979; Kling, 1980; Kraemer and Danziger, 1984). The context 
in which computers are used appears to be a much stronger influence than is the tech-
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nology itself on whether organisations centralise or decentralise. Technology supports 
either arrangement, but the traditions of the organisation determine which arrange-
ment will be followed. Taylor (1991b) for example, argues that: 
"In some instances, a decentralised approach to GIS will be the most effective 
solution, especially... where a micro-based system in the hands of the individuals 
directly involved makes a great deal of sense. In others, such as the need 
for...control over vast areas, then a 'top-down' national approach is required" 
(p. 81). 
Similarly Dunn et al. (1997) argue that successful implementation of GIS depends on 
"appropriate control and with informed use" (p. 157). Introduction of technology 
should, therefore, be accompanied by education and training, not only on technical 
factors, but also through exposure to the "thorny questions of geographical infor-
mation for development (p. 156). The authors' key point is that GIS for developing 
countries should be given time to mature. They emphasised that: 
"A GIS should never be used as a 'quick fix' strategy; rather its introduction 
should be slow, with long-term or medium-term training programmes, directed at 
real needs, and the design should be relevant to local conditions..." (p. 157). 
The points highlighted by Taylor (1991b) and Dunn et al. (1997) are all critical issues 
pertinent to NALIS. However, as the findings of this study show many of these fac-
tors have been overlooked because of the programme decision-makers' (technical and 
steering committee members) focus on control over the system rather than on com-
mitment to the user community. To be in a position of control over NALIS means 
power or an increase in status. As one director explained: 
"My department [Land and Survey] does not allow me to continue servicing the 
MLCD co-ordinating office. . . because according to him [the Director General] 
why should I give them [MLCD co-ordinating Office] expert advice ... and make 
people think that they [MLCD co-ordinating office] are the one capable of un-
dertaking NALIS" (Director, Melaka Land and Mines Office, fieldwork, inter-
viewed August 1996). 
Jealousy among top-ranking officers is apparent and one consequence of this seems 
to be a lack of understanding of the user community's needs. Instead, responsibility 
for evaluating user needs was left in its entirety to the discretion of a group of con-
sultants. As a result a design was introduced which was totally incompatible with lo-
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cal users' capability. From a total of 356 agencies, only 32 use GIS and 95% of staff 
in these 32 agencies have no hands-on experience with GIS or with the operation of 
large scale information systems. NALIS decision-makers perceive GIS simply as a 
collection of hardware and software. 
Successful implementation of GIS "depends on who constructs and analyses the in-
formation and who controls the GIS" (Dunn et al., 1997). In the case of NALIS, the 
large number of agencies, in particular heads of agencies, wanting to be in a control-
ling position has meant that implementation planning has been highly disorganised. 
This environment of chaos is partially explicable by the fact that GIS is a new field 
(for Malaysia) which has not been fully explored and developed. An individual or 
agency who is in a position to control NALIS, as a large scale GIS operation, could 
therefore dictate the path of GIS development in Malaysia. Power struggles in the 
venture of new development undertakings are common in Malaysia. For example, in 
the area of IT research there is the Malaysia Institute of Microelectronics Systems 
(MTMOS) and there is Malaysia Science Information Technology Centre (MASTIC) 
both of which lack respect of the function of one another. MASTIC officers believe 
that MTMOS staff have no special capability other than duplicating ideas from other 
countries. MTMOS officers on the other hand contend that they are the leader for 
Malaysia IT research and development. This research, however, finds that there is 
some truth in MASTIC's view. However, thusfar MIMOS has not been disturbed by 
criticism rather it has remained one of the favourite agencies of the present admini-
stration. Rourke (1978) notes that: "a single agency may draw power from several 
different sources, and there is no way of telling how much of an agency's success 
should be attributed to bureaucratic expertise, constituency strength, organisational 
vitality, or skilful leadership" (p. 225). 
One can argue that NALIS decision-makers have underestimated the complex nature 
of agencies as adopters of new technologies and the operation of large scale informa-
tion systems. To centre interest and awareness of NALIS and GIS among only a few 
users and decision-makers is a clear recipe for failure, for the development and im-
plementation of NALIS is dependent on many agencies, both technical and adminis-
trative. It appears that, thusfar, decision-makers have not recognised the importance 
of understanding the different types of user, with their different ways of interacting 
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with the programme, different levels of technical understanding and different reasons 
and purposes for using the programme. 
6.12.2 Institutional Issues 
For the purposes of the present study, institutional issues are taken to be those issues 
external to an agency's environment that influence the agency's ability to adopt or use 
technology. The external environments of an agency include intergovernmental rela-
tions, and the political and legal environment in which the agency functions. Inter-
governmental relations affect the operation of NALIS at two principal levels; between 
State and Federal agencies, and between agencies at Peninsular Malaysia level and 
those on the Island of Borneo - Sabah and Sarawak. Issues highlighted at these levels 
concern the question of who gains and loses with the implementation of NALIS and 
there are many tensions between State and Federal level officers. There has been 
some reluctance at State level, for example, to fully support NALIS since it is a Fed-
eral programme. Some State agencies (Terengganu, Johor, Sabah and Sarawak) ra-
tionalised this perspective through previously bad experiences with Federal initiatives. 
This demand for support is not, in most cases, because they (the States) are incapable 
of making their own purchase of IT facilities; rather it was to ensure that the States 
are not being 'used' for Federal benefits. One officer from a State office described the 
situation as follows: 
"...we couldn't tell Federal everything. Like valuation information for instance, 
we can't devolve all our findings to them. I f they know we have lots of income 
(revenue) they want more...The very top, [the State Secretary] dictates what we 
show In our State case, when we prepare a budget we always make sure we 
have a deficit every year..." (Senior System Analysts, IT Division, Terengganu 
State Secretariat, fieldwork, interviewed September 1996). 
Correspondingly, one officer from the Federal Treasury office commented that it is 
not uncommon to find State unwillingness to supply effort or money to support Fed-
eral initiatives. A senior Federal officer working at State level discussed one of his 
experiences with his State office as follows. 
"We [Federal officers working in a State office] are not treated as equals. As an 
example, I submitted a proposal to buy software and hardware for this project 
[NALIS pilot study] but they are reluctant to help because according to them 
NALIS is a Federal initiative programme. Therefore it is a Federal responsibility. 
We are sent here to help them but they think otherwise. They are very sceptical 
about our request ... the proposal is still sitting in the State Economic Planning 
Unit. It has been six months now.. .and I am due to report back to the Federal 
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office. The next person taking my place has to do the work all over again" 
(Director, State Town and Country Planning Department, fieldwork, interviewed 
October 1996). 
The situation on Borneo Island is somewhat different in nature. Due to their physical 
distance from the Federal office, officers in Sabah and Sarawak believe that they are 
being left out of matters concerning NALIS' development. The Deputy Director of 
Sarawak's Department of Land and Survey, portrayed his frustration over NALIS as 
follows: 
"With regard to NALIS, it is confusing to me... from what I see, it seems NALIS 
covers only Semenanjong (Peninsular Malaysia). . . I don't think I want to com-
ment for the situation is very confusing. At the very beginning we were the only 
agency invited because we are the land people. After a few meetings we were 
told that we are no longer the co-ordinators for Sarawak State. Instead we are 
told the correct representative body is Sarawak State Planning Unit (SSPU). So 
we are no longer invited to subsequent meetings. But lately we have been invited 
again. The SSPU on the other hand has not been invited. This puts us in a very 
difficult position because we have been told again that we are no longer the offi-
cial co-ordinator. I f NALIS wants to do anything in Sarawak we cannot help in 
an official capacity any longer" (Deputy Director, Sarawak Land and Survey De-
partment, fieldwork, interviewed July 1996). 
These findings reveal that intergovernmental relations require careful understanding in 
order to implement NALIS successfully. NALIS being new in every aspect, 
(technology, concept and approach) has created high levels of anxiety and curiosity 
among agencies. These feelings increase as the agencies are further from the project 
head office in Kuala Lumpur. 
Successful implementation of NALIS requires what Goodman (1993) has termed an 
"appropriate social system" which "identifies the targets for socialisation" (p. 51). 
Goodman argues that different targets in the social system require different attention 
(knowledge) through different socialisation actions. In the case of NALIS this refers 
to differences between agencies at State and Federal levels and differences between 
technical and administrative agencies. Applying the idea to NALIS means that the 
Federal office should view the State as a group with varying motivations towards 
NALIS as an initiative (especially for politically sensitive states9). Each State in Ma-
laysia has a quite different view of managing land and of the level of 'intrusion' which 
9 Politically sensitive States refer to Sabah and Sarawak which have been part of Malaysia only 
since 1963; and States that are administered by the opposition party - namely Kelantan and Sabah. 
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is allowable from the Federal authorities. Because of specific historical influences 
(Siamese and Arabic), the State rulers (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu, 
(Unfederated Malay States) uphold a different culture. Penang and Melaka, being 
British Straits Settlements, are oriented to yet different rules. Similarly, a different 
orientation again is found in Sabah and Sarawak legal, political, social and cultural 
differences are more pronounced compared to states in Peninsular Malaysia. 
6.12.3 Technical Issues 
Technical issues relate not only to system design and components (hardware, soft-
ware and data), but also to the technical capacity to understand the tools and con-
cepts that NALIS uses. Many of these technical problems are manifestations of un-
derlying organisational and institutional issues. 
The findings from this study indicate that a complete assessment of existing systems 
was not carried out by the co-ordinator. This has led to misidentification of the func-
tional requirements and capabilities of existing hardware, software, and data. Al-
though major departments are steadily revising their data, doubts about data quality, 
suitability and access are still significant impediments. Lack of official data standards 
means that documentation of data is still haphazard and incomplete. Disagreements 
between agencies about data quality and scale have remained typical at operational 
levels. For example, engineers and infrastructural managers argue for greater accu-
racy while planners and environmentalists are willing to work with available data of 
poorer quality. This attitude has discouraged data sharing and instead has encouraged 
the development of individualised data collection systems. 
Many agencies have proceeded to collect data without first constructing the prerequi-
site data model. The rationale behind this was argued by most agencies as the only 
way since they believed that a standardised approach is difficult where there is a large 
and heterogeneous user community such as in Malaysia. One project manager in the 
Sabah Land and Survey Department explained: 
"The adoption of a single common data model over a community as large and 
heterogeneous as the government of Malaysia is highly unlikely. Furthermore, the 
adoption of a common data model does not, on its own, ensure data or service 
interoperability across agencies. For example, take our experience with the com-
mon relational data model. Its use guaranteed that all requested data arrived in 
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the form of tables. However, it would not guarantee that the attributes in tables 
from different data sources were consistent with one another. An attribute 
'parcel' in one data table may not mean the same as 'parcel' in another. Two at-
tributes with different names in different tables may have exactly the same 
meaning. None of these sorts of ambiguities are resolved by the adoption of a 
common data model" (Project Manager, Sabah Land Information System, Sabah 
Land and Survey Department, field work, interviewed July 1996). 
In addition, delays in the production of digital topographic and cadastral maps (by the 
base-map custodian Department of Survey and Mapping - DSMM) has prompted 
some agencies, particularly the Agriculture and Forestry departments, to produce 
individualised digital topographic and cadastral maps for their own use and for other 
interested users. By doing so, Agriculture and Forestry (and other users) have dupli-
cated the production of digital base maps and thus have continued a tradition of in-
compatible map production. 
In general, agencies indicated a lack of shared interest and trust in the objectives and 
goals of NALIS. This was found to be attributed to two factors. First, many believe 
that land-related agencies are difficult to co-ordinate because of a diversity in agency 
requirements. For example, an initiative towards a common map projection for both 
topographic and cadastral mapping has not come to agreement despite about ten 
years of negotiation. Second, the operational design of NALIS is too complicated for 
many to understand and too sophisticated for some agencies to support. The language 
used to explain the system was 'foreign' to the majority of users. Consultants argue 
that since NALIS' development will be operated in phases of twenty years it is neces-
sary to ensure that its hardware and software are in line with the latest developments 
in technology. For example, to transfer datasets of a large scale topographic map 
sheets (which currently use 2-3 megabytes of storage space), there has been a sug-
gestion to adopt a Frame Relay. Frame Relay is a technology that supports data 
transmission over a connection-oriented path. The technology was believed suited 
with land-related applications which requires infrequent intervals of high bandwidth 
traffic. According to one consultant, 
"in Frame Relay the traditional network topology of WANs is modified. Instead 
of a few LANs connected via routers over dedicated point-to-point lines, each 
site is connected to a network 'cloud' via an access line. This network 'cloud' 
consists of switching nodes interconnected via trunks used to carry traffic aggre-
gated from many users. This has tremendous advantages in terms of reduced 
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numbers of routers and numbers of end to end lines. This leads to an overall re-
duction in the complexity of network management" (MLCD, 1995). 
While this suggestion could be a practical solution for managing land-related datasets 
it is not practical in the context of NALIS since, as discussed Section 6.11.2, many 
agencies are still at the stage of assessing the costs and benefits of L A N installations. 
Since information sharing is restricted by the high level of classified information, in-
stallation and maintenance costs for LANs and WANs remain high. Until these basic 
communication and information sharing problems are met, suggestions for upgrading 
have been regarded as meaningless by most agencies. 
With respect to technical capability, NALIS remains far behind its stated objectives. 
Many types of GIS/LIS that have been assumed to form the building blocks of 
NALIS are still at the planning and development stages and established information 
systems are not compatible with one another. Similar conclusions were reached by the 
consultancy Renong (MLCD, 1995) and the Chairman of the technical committee: 
"At this stage NALIS is not yet in the picture. Now we are still talking about 
land data. Because we do not have data there is no NALIS...What they 
[DSMM] are still doing now is converting paper maps into digital form - com-
puter readable. In terms of map sheets they still have lots to do. In Peninsular 
Malaysia alone they have about 120 map sheets. In Sabah and Sarawak they have 
another 200 map sheets. We use computers to help us digitise but improvement 
is still slow. So far they have completed only 10% and only around the Rompin 
area [remote rural area in south-east of Peninsular Malaysia].... So when you talk 
about basemaps for Malaysia that is the situation now...In the area of mapping 
we also have problems with time.. when aerial photographs are to be taken is not 
fixed . . . I see the 10% level of database completion will remain for some time" 
(Chairman of NALIS technical committee, interviewed in August 1996). 
Since NALIS is at its early stage of development, prospects for improvement are still 
wide. Many of the technical data issues faced by NALIS are common to most GIS 
development experiences. For example, Post and McLaughlin (1993), with reference 
to their Canadian GIS experiences reported that the "cost of building databases to 
support GIS applications was often a multiple of 3 times [$42.3 million] the cost of 
hardware and software [$14.1 million]" (p. 283). Similarly, for NALIS, database 
building has been proved to be the highest developmental cost. Database conversion 
expenses as estimated by the consultancy Renong Berhad are ten times the cost of 
hardware and twenty-four times that of software. In addition, there are communica-
tion network costs which are about eighteen times smaller than the costs of database 
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conversion (MLCD, 1995). The following section breaks down Renong's projection 
costs in more detail. 
Cost of Databases: 
1. Topographic data 
The total estimated cost for converting topographic data from a manual to digital 
format is US$148.15 per km 2 (exchange rate of US$1 to 3 Ringgit Malaysia, ap-
proximation based on 199610 exchange rate). Of the total land area of Malaysia, ap-
proximately 13% have been converted to a digital form. The remaining area for Pen-
insular Malaysia was scheduled to be completed by the end of 1996. However, this 
target was not met, and, indeed in 1998, the figure of 13% completed remains. 
2. Cadastral data 
From the estimated 11.8 million lots for Malaysia, only 50% of this total lots have 
been issued with Final Titles. The cost of converting a lot with final and qualified t i -
tles (using key-board entry) has been estimated at US$3.33 per lot. The estimated 
total cost for conversion of all cadastral data is US$ 39.33 million. 
3. Attribute data 
The preliminary estimated cost for conversion of attribute and miscellaneous data is 
about US$89 million and US$63.33 million, respectively. 
Hardware and Software Costs: 
The estimated total cost of hardware for NALIS is US$27 million. This figure is in-
clusive of 30 clearinghouses (one at each of national and Federal levels, fourteen at 
State and fourteen at District levels) with the estimated cost per clearinghouse at 
US$161,146. The remaining costs cover participating agencies with two types of 
hardware status: agencies with existing GIS or LIS and agencies without GIS and 
LIS. With regard to software the estimated cost is US$10.97 million. Software re-
quirements are calculated based on current technology and the preliminary cost esti-
mates of the hardware required by clearinghouses and participating agencies. The 
preliminary estimated cost of software per clearinghouse is US$68,232 for organisa-
1 0 According to a report by MLCD (March 1998) due to the devaluation of the Malaysian Ringgit 
against US$, the estimate has increased to about six times higher than the 1996 figures. 
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tions with GIS or LIS it is US$6,840, and for agencies without GIS or LIS it is 
US$39,312 . 
Communication Network Costs: 
The preliminary cost estimates of communication networks includes facilities for 
clearinghouses and participating organisations based on the minimum requirement to 
facilitate NALIS' implementation. The estimated cost also includes monitoring of 
network linkages between the clearinghouses and participating agencies. The cost of 
the communication network equipment per clearinghouse is estimated to be 
US$73,848. In estimating the cost of the communications network equipment re-
quired by participating agencies, two types of agencies are considered; agencies with 
existing intra-agency linkages and those without existing intra-organisational linkages. 
It is assumed that each participating agency will require a WAN interface card for 
connection to the leased line but in the case of agencies without existing linkages ad-
ditional cabling and hub facilities will be required. The estimated costs of equipment 
are US$2,875 for agencies with existing intra-organisation linkages and US$4,640 
for agencies without. 
Post and McLaughlin (1993) argued that the costs of building databases to support 
GIS applications "usually killed projects and it remains a major impediment to tech-
nology diffusion" (p. 283). Based on follow-up findings to the present research (early 
1997), the costs highlighted above and skills shortages resulted in changes to NALIS 
planning. It was originally decided that NALIS could cover organisations with 
databases and with adequate communication facilities. However, since NALIS is still 
in its early stages of development a change in planning could be implemented over 
time. But central to this situation is awareness among decision-makers firstly to iden-
tify NALIS' current impediments and secondly, to acknowledge the objectives which 
NALIS is set to achieve. A renewed development strategy is crucial for, it is agreed 
here, NALIS is beginning to follow the path of a potentially failing programme. Cur-
rent shifts in planning will have direct impacts on agencies that are without intra-
organisational communication facilities, agencies without GIS facilities and agencies 
with minimal skills support. The consequences of this situation are such that those 
agencies that are already being marginalised, namely those in poor states, will suffer 
further. These states are also those that lack skills and infrastructural support. Any 
improvement to this situation is difficult to foresee since change in the process of de-
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velopment is constrained by resources and political factors, and limitations to devel-
opment in turn constrain organisational improvement. As Friedmann (1966) (in Pred 
and Tornqvist, 1973) says: 
"A rudimentary pattern of urbanisation and regional development will tend to 
maintain itself. Such a pattern may be established quite early in a country's his-
tory. Subsequent flows of controlling decisions, innovation diffusion, migration, 
and economic location will tend to reinforce this pattern so that, whatever hap-
pens, the future will look very much like the past" (Pred and Tornqvist, 1973, p. 
47). 
Similarly Feldman and Florida (1994) argued that: 
"innovation in the late twentieth century is unusually dependent on an area's un-
derlying technological infrastructure...innovation is increasingly dependent on a 
geographically defined infrastructure that is capable of mobilising technical re-
sources, knowledge, and other inputs essential to the innovation process...The 
regional capacity to sustain innovation is thus embodied in institutions and re-
sources that reflect significant investments over time (pp. 210-212). 
Thusfar, it appears that the NALIS programme will be unable to break existing trends 
of failed 'development' projects. Large and urbanised areas will continue to reap the 
benefits of infrastructural development at the expense of poor States and geographi-
cally remote areas. This chapter is concluded by way of summarising the salient points 
about SETIA and NALIS issues. 
SECTION HI 
SETIA and NALIS: Conclusion 
SETIA was initiated during a period of serious economic cut-backs and continued to 
progress under constraining economic factors until 1990. During this time major pol-
icy changes were being introduced, amongst the most important of which was a pri-
vatisation policy. As government became more involved in privatisation investment 
on an international scale, subsequent changes occurred among three central agencies 
(the Economic Planning Unit, the Treasury and the Accountant General's Depart-
ment). These agencies were made accountable and responsible for managing multi-
million dollar development projects and SETIA was left as the Implementation Co-
ordinating Unit's main responsibility. However, with increasing national development 
and the introduction of varying types of projects, the duties of managing the system 
became too onerous for ICU. The situation was further constrained when ICU limited 
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the evaluation of SETIA's problems to internal reviews only. Based on the findings of 
this study the major constraining factors to SETIA's progress are administrative is-
sues that are influenced by continued change in external factors (policy and adminis-
trative changes). Problems relating to technology and skills were paramount for 
SETIA's during its very early stages of development. But when the economic situa-
tion changed in the early 1990 computer procurement increased and skills steadily 
improved so that by the time of the fieldwork for this study access to computers and 
skills were no longer highlighted as problems for SETIA. 
In contrast to SETIA, NALIS was initiated when the Malaysian economy was at its 
peak. In addition, the development of NALIS was guided by detailed IT development 
policy and a national vision (Vision 2020) which emphasised IT as the main factor 
towards development. IT use has been widespread among all public organisations. 
According to the findings of this study, all organisations are using one or more forms 
of information system. NALIS' initiation came at a time when political leaders were 
concentrating on the expanding use of advanced technology. The 'Single Window 
Concept' from the experience of British Columbia, Canada was adopted. Conse-
quently, software and hardware requirements for NALIS were co-ordinated directly 
with international consultants' offices in Canada (MacDonald Dettwiller and Associ-
ates Limited), Sweden (Central Board for Real Estate Data) and the USA (ESRI). 
However, many organisations lacked the appropriate skills, technology and infra-
structure to support NALIS, and consequently appropriate policies and standards to 
organise the co-ordination of data were unavailable. In addition, besides lacking or-
ganisational and institutional co-ordination, upgrading of technology demanded con-
siderable up-front costs. By 1997, for a variety of technical, financial and administra-
tive reasons, NALIS' area of operation was re-adjusted and participation became re-
stricted to those agencies with appropriate data, skills, technology and related infra-
structural support. 
Although both SETIA and NALIS claim to be user-oriented, bottom-up systems, the 
findings of this study do not support this claim. Both programmes were initiated by 
the Prime Minster's Office; NALIS, however, due its 'technical' nature, was handed 
over to the Ministry of Land and Co-operative Development. Nonetheless, the hand-
over was not to the Ministry per se but to an individual in the Ministry, namely, the 
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Secretary of the Information Division. The idea for the programme was conceived at 
this level and involved a very few, top ranking decision-makers. As a result, the pro-
gramme's approach was large and ambitious. SETIA's design was conceived through 
the ideology provided by a French consultant and was therefore based on French de-
signer values while NALIS adopted an essentially Canadian design. 
The broader participating agencies, normally represented by a director or assistant 
director were invited to response on programme design after the consultants had 
submitted their technical findings. The co-ordinators had decided in advance, how-
ever, to accept the consultants' recommendations. The rewards for endorsing these 
recommendations were visits, at Federal expense, to the consultant offices (France, 
Canada and other related overseas offices) to view examples of such systems in op-
eration. At the operational level, the programme co-ordinators realised that the 'real' 
issues, namely organisational and institutional, were not anticipated at the programme 
initiation stage, although at this stage the budget for facilities had already been allo-
cated. 
Throughout the fifteen years of SETIA's life staff have tried to resolve some of the 
key operational issues. However, these attempts have met with little success because 
the source agencies (State agencies) have not been willing to change their beliefs that 
the State officers are being 'used' for Federal benefits. It appears that NALIS is suf-
fering the same treatment and the findings of this study indicate that NALIS needs to 
avoid the mistakes of SETIA rather than sourcing ideas from foreign experiences. 
SETIA is an ideal education source, has more than fifteen years of experience and 
operates in similar organisational and environmental contexts. 
Nevertheless, bureaucratic inertia looms large in both programmes. Leaders of both 
have their own logical rationale for their programme. This concords with Osborne 
and Gaebler's (1992) view of public programmes in the United States, "Each has its 
own rules, its own forms, its own hoops through which people must jump." Most 
government offices are not aware that their programmes are failing because they sel-
dom measure the results. Unless there is a financial disaster, "most programmes keep 
chugging along, year after year... While the general public remains oblivious, the 
programme's beneficiaries fight tooth and nail to protect it" (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992, p. 287). 
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The issues highlighted in this chapter are an indication of the factors that have im-
peded geographical, organisational and technological development for Malaysia. 
Chapter 7 further develops these issues in terms of the theoretical frameworks identi-
fied earlier in this thesis. Structuration theory is used as the principal means to recon-
struct the social reality of organisational actors. Emphasised is placed on how indi-
vidual actions implicate development geographically, and how they affect organisa-
tional development and technological progress. 
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Chapter 7 Information Systems, National Policy and Development: 
an analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
In the present study evaluation using web models has helped to illustrate that 
development of large scale information systems is characterised by multifaceted 
problems which are inter-linked. These problems often arise from poorly co-ordinated 
action and planning. The findings of this research show that in adopting new 
technology like GIS, consideration of the requirements of all users is paramount. 
Sharing of implementation ideas, however, as illustrated by SETIA and NALIS, is not 
easily achieved since each user agency (the co-ordinator and end-user agencies) has a 
different interpretation of the benefits of information technology. This finding 
supports previous studies which have indicated that many failed information systems 
projects are traceable primarily to human and other non-technical factors (Campbell 
and Masser, 1991; Croswell, 1991; Garson, 1993; Nedovic-Budic, 1993) and are 
often enmeshed in a variety of political and organisational issues (Niemann and 
Niemann, 1994). 
Critical in the findings of this research is the dominance of a 'top-down' approach, 
attributed to a tradition of management dominated by a bureaucratic-elite. Such an 
approach, especially in the context of development projects that have differentiated 
interests, as with SETIA and NALIS, has been argued as being fundamental to 
project failure (Kottak, 1985; Harrison, 1987; Little, et al., 1987; Hutchinson and 
Toledano, 1993). Despite many development impediments the programmes studied as 
part of this research are, nonetheless, still accepted as 'functioning'. Difficulties in 
measuring success or failure arise because SETIA and NALIS are administrative 
programmes, that is, conceived by government for the purpose of improving 
government performance. In other words, government is an end-user of these 
programmes, and thus programme failure is seldom open to public knowledge. 
Except for inquiries made by external researchers and a few local academicians (for 
example, see Jomo, 1989; Chee, 1990; Jomo, 1994) cases of project failure in 
Malaysia tend not to be highlighted. However, it should be stressed that the broad 
GIS literature also shows a very low percentage of papers discussing failed projects. 
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In this chapter the SETIA and NALIS programmes are considered in the context of 
Giddens' structuration theory. As explained in Chapter 4 SETIA and NALIS are 
considered in the context of this theory because it contains the basic premises which 
helps in understanding behaviour in the context of social system. The chapter is 
divided into two parts. In part I , the discussion explains how structuration theory is 
used to help reconstruct social events or social change. Giddens argues that although 
generalisation is possible in explaining social change, the explanation will be 
incomplete because there are no "patterns of universal causation in the social 
sciences ...because all causal connections in human social life are mediated in one 
way or another by agents' knowledgeability and agents' reasons" (p. 206). In Part I I 
of this chapter, the insights derived from the analyses in Part I are considered in 
relation to Malaysia's development and its people. 
Part I: Analysis and Insights 
7.2 Introduction 
The findings of this study are interpreted and analysed by considering the behaviour 
of actors at two levels; national policy level and programme level. The two levels are 
combined in the discussion because the relevant actors operate in the same 'social 
context' and their actions undeniably intersect with one another, and act as a vital 
means of social reproduction. In addition, the two programmes are examined together 
as a single case where the activities of one help to explain the other and vice versa. 
For analytical purposes, the establishment of SETIA is taken as the start of a large 
scale IT concern for Malaysia. Significant changes in information system development 
are explored from this time and are linked to the broader social system. The main 
concepts of structuration theory have been discussed in Chapter 4 but further 
explanation is provided here to help clarify the association of Giddens' terms with the 
present study. 
As illustrated by figure 7.1 there are interrelationships between the various 
dimensions of structure and action (vertical arrows) and between meaning, 
resources/facility and norms (horizontal arrows). Three analytically separable 
dimensions of structure (signification, domination and legitimation) and three 
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equivalent dimensions of action (communication, power, and morality/sanction) are 
mediated by three 'modalities' of meaning (or interpretative schemes), resources and 
norms. The implementation of SETIA and NALIS is now considered with respect to 
these interaction across two distinct periods 1970 to 1980 and post-1980. 
Figure 7 .1 : Dimensions of the Duality of Structure 
Structure 
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Action 
(activity) 
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Source: Adapted from Giddens (1984, p. 29). 
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Structuration refers "abstractly to the dynamic process whereby structures come into 
being" (Giddens 1977, p. 121). Structure involves generative rules and resources 
produced and reproduce by actors in patterning a social system. Structure is highly 
dynamic and open to changes through time and space (factors external to the 
participants' control). For example, i f an information programme co-ordinator 
decides to adopt a new technology, the success of the adoption will depend upon 
participants' willingness or ability to accept, learn and adapt the new technology. A 
participant's willingness to accept a new technology is dependent on the time when 
the technology is proposed. Other external factors, for example, a weakening 
economy, may directly or indirectly influence decisions regarding acceptance of the 
technology. Should participants be unable to change, old relationship patterns will be 
maintained and the intended objective of the co-ordinator will not be achieved. As 
Giddens (1994) puts it, this is structure as "external to human action, as a source of 
constraint on the free initiative of the independently constituted subject (p. 16). 
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The process of production and reproduction of social change can be understood 
further by referring to elements of 'action' and 'consciousness' which act as 
constraints and enabling factors (Giddens, 1984). Each of these elements is said to 
operate at three levels (Figure 7.2). 
Figure 7.2 : Stratification Model of Consciousness and Action 
interaction through time 
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Source: Adapted from Giddens, (1984, p.5). 
The three layers of action (reflexive monitoring of action; rationalisation of action; 
and motivation for action) are coupled with three layers of consciousness: discursive 
consciousness (what actors are able to say about the conditions of their own action); 
practical consciousness (what actors tacitly know about the conditions of their action 
but cannot articulate); and motives (in part unconscious). The layers of actions and 
consciousness make clear that in the production and reproduction of a social system 
the feedback to an action is affected by actors' knowledge; this is despite the 
existence of unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences. 
The blending of enablement and constraint in the production and reproduction of 
social change involve the properties of structure, signification, domination and 
legitimation (Figure 7.1). Structure as signification involves semantic rules. Under the 
heading of signification Giddens includes all types of rules that actors could draw on 
to offer reasons for their actions. Structure as domination refers to the facilities 
(materials and non-material resources) which actors bring to a situation of interaction. 
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Structure as legitimation relates to moral rules and here Giddens includes all types of 
rules that actors use to justify their conduct. 
The interpretative schemes (meaning), resources and norms are modalities which 
Giddens describes as the "mediation of interaction and structure in the processes of 
social production and reproduction" (1976, p. 122). Interpretative schemes refers to 
standardised shared stocks of knowledge that actors draw on to interpret behaviours 
and events, in achieving meaningful communication. Facility or resources are the 
means through which intentions are realised, goals are accomplished and power is 
exercised. Norms are the rules and values governing appropriate conduct, and they 
therefore articulate and sustain the established normative order. These modalities are 
drawn upon by actors in their constitution of interaction and also form the media for 
the reproduction of the institutional properties of social systems. The three modalities 
provide the linkages between the level of inter-personal interaction and the levels of 
the organisation and its environment. The findings of the present study are considered 
below with respect to these interactions. 
7.3 An Information System of the 1970s - Integrated Project Monitoring 
System (SETIA) 
The development trajectory of the SETIA information system has been described in 
this research in terms of two distinct temporal phases (Section 6.2.1). The first phase, 
from 1970 to 1980, was characterised by a series of administrative circulars aimed at 
co-ordinating public sector computing, and the second phase, from 1980 onwards, 
was characterised by the emergence of multiple agencies involved in IT initiatives and 
various attempts to formulate an overall integrated IT policy. These developments in 
the two phases are now discussed in terms of underlying social structure and action, 
and their linkage is elucidated in terms of aspects of meanings, resources (power) and 
norms. 
7.3.1 The First Phase: 1970-1980 National Computerisation and the 
Beginnings of Computerisation for SETIA 
With the rapid increase in the number of tasks taken over by computers government 
realised the need to gain greater co-ordination in the use of computers. Beginning in 
1970 (through Administrative Circular No. 1) (PMD, 1970) an inter-agency sub-
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committee was set up to review the acquisition of computers for Federal ministries 
and departments. In 1973 (through Administrative Circular No. 4) (PMD, 1973) the 
sub-committee was replaced by the National Data Automation Processing Council 
(NDAPC), and control was expanded to statutory bodies. In 1976 (through Circular 
No.l) (PMD, 1976) and Treasury Circular No.8 1 (Federal Treasury, 1976) the 
council was replaced with the Automatic Data Processing Committee (ADPC). 
Duties of this committee included prescribing and guiding all agencies in matters 
related to procurement and installation of an electronic data processing (EDP). In this 
year serious attempts were also made by the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime 
Minister's Department to set up an integrated information system for central 
agencies. 
The circulars which established the various committees, however, were not successful 
in exercising control in the acquisition of electronic data processing (EDP) 
equipment. Agencies, in particular statutory bodies with their own sources of income, 
acquired and enhanced EDP equipment without the endorsement of the ADPC. 
Similar results ensued when the EPU's integrated information system failed to 
command co-operation and when, at the same time the relevant computing skills to 
maintain and operate the system were lacking. These actions clearly indicate the 
limitations of the committee and of a key central agency, like EPU, in exercising 
control over agencies (ministries, departments and statutory bodies) and highlight the 
preferences of agencies to act individually. 
The shortcomings of the control and co-ordination mechanisms can be explained in 
terms of the linkage between structures of signification, domination and legitimation. 
The need to ensure effective utilisation of computing resources in the public sector 
was not well communicated across the range of organisations, and some computer 
installations were not aware of the existence of the various administrative circulars. 
This was compounded by the fact that the committee had no executive responsibility 
for procurement and development of computer systems in departments, and no 
authority over personnel matters as these rested with the Public Services Department. 
1 Treasury Circular No 8 (Federal Treasury, 1976) included detailed procedures and guidelines 
regarding: installation of an electronic data processing (EDP) system; upgrading or improving 
existing system; replacing the existing system; and procedures for using the electronic processing 
system at other agencies. 
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In addition, the secretariats supporting the committee had limited expertise in and 
experience with IT. The committee also failed to facilitate the sharing of information 
between departments and thereby did not achieve an effective structure of domination 
to exercise control and co-ordination. Neither could the committee impose the 
sanction of accountability for use of funds in statutory bodies having their own 
income sources, or in departments and agencies with strong political connections. 
This lower representation in the committee reduced the perceived legitimacy of the 
centrality of the committee in relation to the control and co-ordination function. 
However, despite a lack of support from agencies, the ADPC and other high-ranking 
central officers were keen to establish centralised computerised control. The ADPC 
recommended that a computerised system be centrally placed and controlled in the 
Prime Minister's Department. The committee drew upon various reasons to support 
their action. For example, the committee argued that with a centralised system all 
relevant data can be brought together in a single computer installation. This, it was 
argued, would not only provide opportunities for the use of a richer array of data but 
would also reduce data duplication. A second reason proposed by the committee 
related to data confidentiality; central staff could be appointed to be responsible for 
data access. Thirdly, since Malaysia has limited skills resources, centralisation 
minimises the demand for skilled personnel. Finally, a centralised system would 
minimise problems of organising and operating the diversified and specialised needs 
of various agencies. 
7.3.2 The Second Phase: 1980 Onward and the Beginning of SETIA 
In early 1980 the Implementation Co-ordination Unit (ICU) was formed and was 
placed under the Prime Minister's Department. The integrated information system 
project initiated by EPU in 1976 was revitalised and was placed under the control of 
ICU. In 1981 a revised interpretative scheme emphasising co-ordination in project 
management was communicated through Cabinet report on 'Steps to Speed up' 
implementation of development projects. This was subsequently embodied in the 
design and implementation of SETIA, and was integrated in the procedures of the 
Federal government machinery related to the creation, budget allocation, 
implementation, progress reporting and the financing arrangements of development 
projects. As the physical embodiment of this interpretative scheme, SETIA drew 
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upon a structure of signification that was expanded to include the needs for co-
ordination of the central agencies handling the separate tasks of development 
management. This emphasis on co-ordination at the centre made an incremental 
modification to the preceding structure of signification with its focus on new 
technology to enhance efficiency. 
The communication of this interpretative scheme was facilitated through an 
authoritative resource - the Director General of the Implementation Co-ordination 
Unit - who was to elicit the support of other central agencies (the Treasury, the 
Accountant General's Department, and the Economic Planning Unit) to co-operate in 
the integration of their existing information systems. However, the power relations of 
the central agencies and the implementing agencies remained the same, and as there 
were asymmetries in those relationships, this did not change the existing structure of 
domination. SETIA, as a facility in development management, reproduced the 
existing structures of domination in the relationships among central agencies as well 
as between central agencies and implementing agencies. In addition, in initiating and 
implementing SETIA, officers in the Prime Minister's Department drew upon the 
same set of values and norms regarding the central direction and management of 
development projects and accountability for the use of central funds that governed 
the institutionalisation of projects before SETIA (The Red Book Plan of 1960-1970). 
The ideological bases as rooted in the New Economic Policy emphasising poverty 
eradication and economic restructuring continued to constitute the frame of reference 
for the moral order of development management. 
In 1981 the development scene for Malaysia was generally changing, and this 
coincided with the election of a new Prime Minister (Mahathir Mohamad) who 
brought about various social, ideological and economic changes. Social changes were 
mainly related to his desire to change Malaysians' (especially the Malays') ways of 
thinking from one of backwardness and complacency to that of being conscious and 
ambitious. Economic changes were directed towards a business-oriented, outward 
looking and industrialised country. He reaffirmed this view of Malaysia's status in one 
of his speeches in 1984: 
"The push towards the development of heavy industries represents another new 
dimension to national development. I believe heavy industries will bring 
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substantial benefits to the economy in terms of technology, skills and the 
numerous spin-offs, and will lay the foundation for Malaysia to become an 
industrialised society. We will not give up being producers of various agricultural 
commodities but we should overcome the mental block which condemns us to 
being the producers of primary commodities to fuel the growth of the 
industrialised countries. We must raise our sights and have the conviction that we 
have the 'dynamic comparative advantage' to sustain the development of heavy 
industries" (Mohamad, June 1984). 
The spirit of development beginning in this period (1981 onward) was towards 
advancing Malaysia economically and to resisting development intervention based on 
a colonial discourse. In the early part of Mahathir's administration, apart from the 
New Economic Policy which was retained, several major policies were written to 
support the new ideology. One important policy was 'Malaysia Incorporated' which 
was directly connected to the 'Look East' campaign which was strongly influencing 
the region at the time. The policy contained a notion for workers to serve their office 
(companies) as i f they were serving the country; and with service to country and 
company compared to family. The interpretative scheme drew on a broader structure 
of signification accorded to the need for national unity: a shared sense of national 
purpose, particularly for socio-economic achievement. This interpretative scheme was 
communicated through formal channels and extensive publicity through all forms of 
media. By 1986 (after recovery from the 1984-1986 recession) Mahathir expanded 
his scheme for national development, and the concept of privatisation was included as 
a means to generate economic growth. Privatisation increased the number and nature 
of projects involving government agencies. It also expanded the scope of public 
projects into the international and arena there was a focus on large scale development 
with partnership with multinational corporations. These developments resulted in an 
expansion of the duties of the Budget Office (the Treasury), the policy office 
(Economic Planning Unit), and the expenditure office (the Accountant General's 
Department). Accordingly, changes also trickled down to State and Local offices. 
This produced an incremental revision to the broader structure of signification 
regarding project management and consequently weakened the structure of 
domination and legitimation between central agencies and implementing agencies at 
both State and Federal levels. 
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SETIA was intended to be fully computerised in order to effectively monitor the 
growing number of projects. Nonetheless, SETIA's core design which was essentially 
driven from the centre and served primarily the needs of ICU, was not changed 
accordingly and thus was not able to fit effectively with the ad hoc systems of the 
implementing agencies. The difficulty of supplying information to the centre was 
further compounded by the ad hoc and often manual systems of data processing at the 
local levels, especially in the Districts and sub-Districts. 
As a result, by 1990 SETIA was beginning to lose control over co-ordination 
between central and implementing agencies. This experience led the Implementation 
Co-ordination Unit officials to modify their interpretative scheme, specifying that co-
ordination should be decentralised at three levels, Federal, State (including District), 
and local authorities. But SETIA officers drew upon a dated computerised system 
and operational values of the 1970s, that is, central accountability over project 
development and ideological bases still rooted in the New Economic Policy. At 
project activity level, financing lay mostly with privatised schemes. In other words, 
although central government had a role in project schemes, government control has 
no longer 'primary'. Rather government was merely the secretariat, and project 
budgets were not controlled by central funds. 
At the national level, a structure of signification was further developed. In February 
1991 the Prime Minister announced a new national objective, enforcing activities 
which were intended to make Malaysia a 'developed' country by the year 2020. 
Mahathir claimed that: 
"By the year 2020, Malaysia is to be a united nation, with a confident Malaysian 
Society, infused by strong and ethical values, living in a society that is 
democratic, liberal and tolerant, caring, economically just and equitable, 
progressive and prosperous, and in full possession of an economy that is 
competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient" (NST, 28 February 1991). 
Vision 2020 added a new sense of urgency to the tasks that lay ahead requiring a 
reappraisal of the current situation and a prospective assessment of the needs of the 
future. It demanded a new approach to planning, aligning socio-political objectives to 
growth targets and bringing into play all major factors of production. Science and 
technology were considered the driving forces to target the Vision's economic 
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growth. As such, following the Vision 2020 announcement, a 'Science and 
Technology' policy was introduced, envisioning four perspectives: 
1 "Technologies for satisfying basic needs such as food and shelter; 
2 Technologies for the quality of life such as health care, communication and 
transport, protection of the environment and stabilisation of population size; 
3 Technologies for wealth creation and maintenance of industrial 
competitiveness; and 
4 Technologies for governance appropriate for the needs of government in the 
high-technology age" (MOSTE, 1993). 
The ideological base of the Science and Technology policy was placed in the belief 
that substantial economic growth is the key to attainment of the objectives of Vision 
2020. It was argued that a sustainable economy could be attained by maintaining an 
average economic growth of 7% per year for the next thirty years. The growth target 
was to be met largely from manufacturing industries and services. 
In its determination to meet these target, government involved itself with Foreign 
Direct Investment. By 1990, Malaysia became the third most important recipient of 
Foreign Direct Investment (about US$4.3 billion) in the developing world after China 
and Singapore (World Bank and UNDP, 1995) and industrial growth continued. An 
enlarged meaning for development began to emerge that suggested a shift from the 
industrial sector to services and multimedia. 
In the late 1990s SETIA, as a facility for development monitoring, is looked upon by 
implementing agencies as obsolete and 'traditional' compared to new ideas that now 
dominate development. Consequently, senior administrators that manage SETIA have 
undergone several changes. SETIA's new leadership has no immediate plans to 
expand the programme in line with current development schemes such as joining with 
existing IT programmes such as NALIS and MSC. The results of this study shows 
SETIA will continue monitoring development projects based on a combination of 
manual and computerised systems. A metaphor used by Kling and Iacono (1984) 
'drifting along a development trajectory' perhaps is one way to describe SETIA 
current situation: 
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"a CBISs [computerised based information systems] may drift when developers 
react to somewhat conflicting demands made by users or from a rapidly changing 
environment over a period of years.. CBIS is the by-product of many loosely co-
ordinated implementation actions...loosely co-ordination developments (e.g., 
high staff turnover, rapid technological change, dynamic markets)" (Kling and 
Iacono, 1984, p. 1219). 
7.4 An Information System of the 1990s - National Land Information System 
(NALIS) 
NALIS was developed at a time when computerisation among agencies has reached a 
level of maturity. Many agencies in Malaysia have surpassed the barriers of basic 
computer use and are proceeding towards developing individualised information 
systems (Chapter 6, Part III) . Similarly, at the policy-making level there are several IT 
committees that have developed comprehensive development guidelines for IT-
related programmes. Members of IT committees, unlike in the early days of SETIA, 
are experts in the field, and each committee has a designated role towards an IT 
development programme. To illustrate the importance of the government's view on 
IT, a body, the National Information Technology Council (chaired by the Prime 
Minister) was established specifically to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of IT 
programmes. The Automatic Data Processing Committee was reformed, employing 
committee members who are mostly bureaucrats with IT skills. At the land agency 
level, major land custodians (the Department of Survey and Mapping and Registry 
Offices) have started to implement procedures which move towards building an 
integrated system. Subsequently, Telecommunications Malaysia Berhad has been 
aggressively promoting the use of Local and Wide Area Networks for intra - and 
inter- agency communication. 
The above factors, combined with the rapid pace of development in Malaysia, and an 
urgent need to have a better information system to help resolve land use conflicts, all 
encouraged the establishment of NALIS. The Ministry of Land and Co-operative 
Development was institutionalised to carry out co-ordinating duties. While NALIS 
was in its preparation stage, the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) was introduced 
and at the same time government announced a shift in its national development 
strategy towards services and multimedia or Information Technology. A focus on 
manufacturing industries was found no longer to help Malaysia's development 
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towards advanced country status. At the activity level, the Prime Minister himself has 
used his position to reinforce power relationships over individuals and agencies 
(private and public) across the country and world-wide, thereby reproducing the 
resources necessary for implementation of MSC. In order to administer MSC's 
development, rather than using the regular agencies, that is, agencies in the Prime 
Minister's Department, a separate agency (the Multimedia Development Corporation) 
was institutionalised and incorporated under the Companies Act. This agency is 
legally independent of civil service rules and regulations, yet since it has been 
established by the government it has the same power as a government body. 
Introduction of the MSC saw government outwardly change the existing 
'bureaucratic paradigm'. A new 'version' of government was created; government 
're-invented' itself, working around the notion of empowering rather than serving; 
replacing bureaucratic processes with market processes; meeting the needs of 
customers, not the bureaucracy; earning rather than spending; preventing rather 
cutting and moving from hierarchy to participation and teamwork (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992). 
The co-ordinator of NALIS (Information System Division - ISD - of the Ministry of 
Land and Co-operative Development), wholly engineered NALIS based on the 
government's new wave of ideology. NALIS reinforced the use of advanced high 
technology in its system design and approach with the view that the major part of the 
duties would be carried out by the private sector. The preliminary cost estimate for 
implementing NALIS, based on minimum requirements for organisation, communi-
cations, hardware, software and data conversion (with some provision for 
contingencies ) was estimated to be US$353 million (1996 exchange rate of US$1 to 
RM3.00). This expenditure was expected to be supported through a combination of 
financial support: government, franchising and privatisation. The proposal was as 
such: central government should supply infrastructure and communication facilities to 
link participating agencies to the system. Individual States wishing to participate in 
NALIS should then provide their own funding for the purpose of data acquisition and 
conversion, purchase of hardware and software, arrangements for staff training and 
for the necessary communication linkages. 
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The results of this study show that in order to minimise the overall cost to the 
government, the NALIS working committee recommended that the private sector 
should carry out as much of the work of acquiring, and converting and processing 
data as possible through franchising. Individual States and agencies are encouraged to 
franchise data acquisition, conversion and processing to private sector. In addition, 
clearinghouse operations, management and administration2 could be privatised as 
could the bulk of converting topographic, cadastral data and associated attribute data. 
The NALIS working committee also identified sources of revenue which could be 
generated by NALIS itself. Among these sources are services, including data 
exchange services, research and development (R&D) and product enhancement. Data 
exchange services refer to commission earned by clearinghouses through the 
management of data exchange. Consequently, data providers can earn their returns 
from the price charged per transaction based on the cost spent in producing the 
required data. With regard to research and development, the team assumed that new 
products developed through R&D could be a source of potential revenue. 
However, unlike MSC, NALIS clients are government agencies. Consequently, the 
NALIS co-ordinator is not mandated with similar resources as the co-ordinator of 
MSC. In addition, unlike the MSC co-ordinator, the co-ordinator for NALIS has no 
direct access to the Prime Minister for enforcement. Rather, NALIS faces similar 
problems to those of SETIA's co-ordinator. These co-ordinators oversee develop-
ment in a variety of ministries, departments and agencies that have differentiated 
objectives and differentiated interests and levels of capability in the use of IT. In 
addition, the co-ordinator has no administrative or budget control over these agencies 
who are thus able to develop their own systems without the co-ordinator's consent. 
Control over growth of individualised information systems was exaggerated when 
MSC announced both the possibility for upgrading of telecommunication and 
communication services for agencies nationwide and the availability a of large 
expenditure budget for IT purposes. Within a year of NALIS' announcement agencies 
at Federal levels started establishing organisational or State level GIS systems. At the 
time of the fieldwork for this study these agencies and States were at the planning 
2 This includes the necessity to establish procedures for maintenance and updating of the data 
directory of various information communities. 
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stage of establishing the following systems: at Federal level, Kuala Lumpur City Hall 
GIS (KULGIS) which covers Federal Territory and Kuala Lumpur; Geological 
Survey GIS, covering the whole country with respect to geological data and 
information; Indah-Water Consortium GIS (GIS-IWK) which covers the country's 
sewerage system. At State level,3 major GIS systems included: Kedah GIS; Melaka 
Land Information Infrastructure; Perlis GIS; Terengganu GIS; and Pahang State 
Executive Information System (similar to SETIA). 
The Information System Division (ISD), as the facilitator of NALIS, was unable to 
establish co-ordinated working efforts among the individualised systems. This can be 
attributed to two major factors. Firstly, the committee which was assigned to 
standards development (common referencing, data exchange and other related 
standards) was not functioning. Participating agencies were left to develop their 
systems without any guidelines. The agencies only choice, therefore, was to continue 
their existing practice of data collection and management, and thereby the problems 
of data and information duplication have remained. Secondly, NALIS' design and 
approach were not effectively translated to participants. Many were not familiar with 
the terms and concepts used in the design and were therefore unable to provide the 
necessary support to NALIS with respect to data models and standards. Thirdly, the 
ISD officer lacks the necessary advanced IT knowledge which is desired to manage 
and co-ordinate the sharing and exchange of land information. The ISD has depended 
on local experts (officers from major land custodian agencies) and consultants 
although the ISD was weakened when some of the experts they relied were recalled 
back by their respective heads of department or agencies. This withdrawal of skilled 
staff paralysed the ISD which in turn directly affected the implementation schedule for 
NALIS. The NALIS operational plan was further weakened when the idea of 
nationwide communication promised by the MSC programme was disrupted due to a 
lack of resources (financial and skills). The ISD continued with their ideas for 
NALIS, but the scale of operation was readjusted. NALIS' new operation centred on 
major producers of land information, covering agencies in the Ministry of Land and 
Co-operative Development (MLCD), the Department of Survey and Mapping, and 
Land Offices. NALIS' design was therefore significantly simplified, meeting the needs 
of several participating agencies. Agencies interested in access to NALIS were 
3 Within a State there were numerous departmental level systems being planned. 
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required to individually facilitate and finance themselves with the necessary support 
systems. 
The foregoing discussion has attempted to use the themes of structuration theory to 
highlight how initiation and implementation of information systems in Malaysia have 
been linked to government policies and organisational behaviour. The discussion has 
also tried to illuminate how aspects of meanings, power relations and norms were 
related to the transition to change made on implementation. The initiation and 
implementation of information systems can be defined as highly vulnerable to the 
environment in which the information system is implemented. Change in national 
development strategy helped to change organisational strategy. The interpretation 
brought to light the idea of duality of structure - change is produced both by action 
and non-action of participants. As Giddens (1976) argued: 
"The production or constitution of society is a skilled accomplishment of its 
members, but one that does not take place under conditions that are either wholly 
intended or wholly comprehended by them. The key to understanding social 
order...in the most general sense of that term...is not the 'internalisation of 
values', but the shifting relations between the production and reproduction of 
social life by its constituent actors" (p. 102). 
Social structures built to help development are the same social structures that act as 
constraints on development activities. Malaysia's information system development is 
constructed on beliefs which are visualised by policy-makers and organisational 
leaders. From a structuration theory point of view one could argue that policy-makers 
carry out actions based on resources and rules they believe conform to the reality of 
their social constructs. The Prime Minister, for example, believes that Malaysia is 
capable of undertaking advanced development programmes because: 
"we have an administrative machinery which we can be proud of. It is not only 
efficient, disciplined and productive, but also provides quality service and is 
comparable to the administrative machinery found in more developed nations 
. . .Malaysia does not face the kind of problems encountered by many developing 
nations because its administrative system is well organised and forward-looking. 
It has succeeded where many countries, which achieved their independence after 
the Second World War, had failed because the government had a capable and 
dedicated administrative workforce" (Mohamad, 30 April 1993). 
The Prime Minister has been quoted as believing, in 1997 at least, that Malaysia is 
financially strong and has the political will and power to carry out desired 
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development programmes (NST, 29 May 1997). Other policy makers generally hold 
similar views. One example comes from the chairman of MEMOS who supported the 
notion that Malaysia had been making a successful transition from one phase of 
development to another (from agriculture to manufacturing industry). He believed 
based on these past records that the prospect of shifting to high technology 
programmes "appears very good" (NST, 29 May 1997). 
At the level of the organisation ministries, departments and agencies constructed 
different sets of beliefs to fit their own requirements. Many organisational leaders 
have shifted to advanced IT believing that skills (indigenous) and infrastructure will 
be forthcoming. The delivery of skills was believed possible because the country had 
the financial capability to continue training (of local staff) and the ability to employ 
foreign experts to overcome short-term skills needs. In terms of infrastructural 
support, activities carried out by MSC were believed to cover every aspect of 
physical IT infrastructural needs. With regard to management and administration 
existing IT-related committees (National Information Technology Council; National 
Land Council; National Council for Local Government; National Remote Sensing 
Committee; National Committee on Data Processing; National Mapping Committee) 
believed that 'somebody' was developing appropriate IT standards and guidelines. In 
reality some of these assumptions and beliefs were naive since many aspects (e.g. IT 
training schemes and land-use standards) were still at the early planning stage. 
Similar representations could also be observed at the national planning level. The 
discussion in Part I I explores these relationships looking in particular at how policy-
makers motivate organisational leaders and subsequently the general level civil 
servants. It then goes on to explore how actions of government leaders and 
organisation actors produce and reproduce Malaysia's development pattern. At the 
same time, the discussion illuminates further the behaviour of key actors (at the policy 
level and organisational level) who consciously or unconsciously help to generate 
problems within programme implementation. 
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PART II: Consequences for Malaysia Development 
7.5 Policy and Development 
Since the early 1970s computerisation initiatives have been characterised by 
centralised control and a strong play for power by agencies from the Prime Minister's 
Department and Federal Ministries in general. However, the Prime Minister's 
Department and associated committees through the years, had only limited success in 
gaining co-operation from many Malaysian agencies. Central administrators lacked 
the relevant computing knowledge to make appropriate decisions although in a sense 
this was irrelevant since these key actors role were always supported by rulings from 
the Cabinet. Decisions distributed made by the Cabinet (in the form of circulars) were 
clear and exclusive in terms of designating power of control but were broad with 
regard to effective working strategies. Provision of control has continuously 
disregarded knowledge or understanding of a particular project and has been based 
instead on seniority. The resulting procedures and guidelines which purported to be a 
working strategy were, in fact, simply a reiteration of what an agency could and could 
not do. As a result agencies began to develop their own documentation which in turn 
produced different styles of guidelines for computer installation and use. 
Post-1980 policies for development, which, in a sense differed little from those of the 
1970s, were guided by two objectives, both being based on the Prime Minister's 
world view. The first objective focused on competitive ability and measures to survive 
competition; the second emphasised the importance of social and economic harmony 
among all Malaysians. The two objectives are interrelated, in the sense that 
achievement of the first would demonstrate that despite the complexity of Malaysia's 
society, a viable economy is achievable. 
The Prime Minister's development policies were, however, dynamic and many in 
Malaysia have opposed the approach of development, arguing that Malaysia is 
growing too fast and that the shift in economic policy (particularly in the industrial 
sector) is not supported by a skills base in the majority of the population (see, for 
example, Jomo, 1989; 1994; The Economist, 1995; Bullis, 1997). The present 
research supports the assertion that Malaysia's ambitious development programme 
has improved the country 's 'image' in terms of growth and economic achievements, 
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but has not realistically translated economic achievement into improving the real level 
of 'development' for many people. 
Decisions made by political leaders for national development to be pursued by means 
of promoting aggressive industrial initiatives increased economic growth from an 
average of 6.0 % in 1970, to 7.5% in 1980 and to 8.7% in 1990 (GOM, 1991b). 
Undeniably, all communities and regions have benefited directly or indirectly from the 
growth of the economy through substantial improvements in income and living 
standards. For example, the national incidence of poverty4 at 52.4% in 1970 was 
reduced to 17.1% in 1990 (GOM, 1991a) and was projected to be 7.2% in 1997 
(GOM, 1996). This substantial reduction in poverty was partly due to improvements 
in productivity and income levels among the target groups such as rubber 
smallholders, estate workers, paid farmers and fishermen. The main source of 
progress in reducing poverty, especially during the 1980s, came from the growth of 
the economy which created expanding employment opportunities in the non-
traditional sectors and which enabled the poor to diversify their sources of income, 
thereby reducing their dependence on traditional low income and low productivity 
activities. As rural households gained more access to these opportunities and with 
the tightening labour market, conditions resulting in lower unemployment and higher 
wage incomes have expanded. The shift towards waged employment among rural 
households constituted the most important factor accounting for the reduction of 
poverty in the country. 
Some have argued, however, that initiatives taken by Malaysia have failed to 
encourage independent development (World Bank and UNDP, 1995). This line of 
argument points, for instance, to the lack of local participation in enhancing 
Malaysia's development. Rather the development shift from agriculture to 
manufacturing industry was made possible through assistance from Foreign Direct 
Investment. Malaysia taps the advanced skills, especially from multinational 
4 Poverty in Malaysia is measured on the basis of poverty line income (PL1). The PLI takes into 
account the minimum requirements for food, clothing, shelter, and other regular expenditures that 
are necessary to maintain a household in decent standards of living. The incidence of poverty is 
directly estimated by observing the number of households whose incomes are below the PLI. For 
1990, the poverty line was RM370 per month for a household size of 5.1 in Peninsular Malaysia, 
RM544 for a household size of 5.4 in Sabah and RM452 for a household size of 5.2 in Sarawak 
(GOM, 1991a). 
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corporations, while providing in return, benefits in terms of competitive wages and 
overheads. Multinational corporations offer capital, technology, managerial skills and 
access to markets. It has been argued then that Malaysia's impressive transformation 
has left the country's industrial structure dependent on foreign experts for design, 
development and other advanced skills (World Bank and UNDP, 1995; Wolf, 1997). 
In 1996 a more drastic development shift was introduced to services and to the 
information technology industry, though preparation in terms of a skilled workforce 
and a Research and Development (R&D) base related to these industries only took 
place simultaneously with the construction of facilities for the Multimedia Super 
Corridor. An educational policy specifically focusing on support for the multimedia 
service industry came several months after the Prime Minister's announcement for 
industrial shift. It could be argued that a general development shift by way of the 
MSC came as quite a surprise even among Malaysia's 'intellectuals' and learned 
society. During the course of this research typical views expressed by professionals 
and graduate students included the following: 
" I have heard a lot about the MSC on TV. I don't really know much about it but 
I think it has got something to do with multimedia. Perhaps there should be more 
effort to promote the MSC among students in the universities and colleges since 
it will ultimately affect the whole population. It can also help us to better 
understand what it really means and the objective" (Graduate student, University 
of Malaya, fieldwork, interviewed January 1997). 
"The MSC sounds frightfully impressive and I am sure i t ' l l push Malaysia to the 
forefront of global attention. I guess it's also good for the economy and 
expansion of new technologies. However, the concerned authorities need to 
educate and inform the general public on what the MSC actually is and what 
good i t ' l l do them. The bits of information we get here and there somehow do 
not suffice. I have yet to meet someone who can give me a coherent explanation 
of what it actually is all about and how it ' l l operate" (Lawyer, Dexcell Sdn. 
Berhad, Kuala Lumpur, fieldwork, interviewed January 1997). 
However, there are some in the IT business who are conversant with the Multimedia 
5 Managers from various computer companies were approached when the author attended the 
Multimedia Asia 1996 seminar held in Kuala Lumpur. Among these were the General Manager of 
Digital, and Managers from Acer Sales Sdn. Berhad, Accurate Information System, Delta 
Computers, Sun Microsystems, Oracle, Intergraph, Mesiniaga and IBM. Of these companies, 
Intergraph and IBM were subsequently approached again for an interview. 
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Super Corridor approach, and who were sceptical of its success when viewing it from 
Malaysia's weak R&D and skills base. One executive from I B M at Kuala Lumpur 
argued that: 
"Transfer of technology is an acceptable start but it must be followed through. 
We can't expect foreign companies to continuously transfer their technology 
over now, can we?. .. One can buy a technology to have access to it but 
competency in that technology can only be acquired through learning and living 
i t . . . I t is fortunate this country can afford to offer what it is offering to get 
foreign companies to participate in the MSC. But what will happen i f some other 
country could offer the same. .Providing multimedia services and content, I 
believe, should not be too difficult for locals... But the crucial factor here will 
still revolve around technology that allows composition and delivery of the 
content. Malaysians must own that technology. As such the long term solution 
will still be R&D" (Research and Development Division, I B M Kuala Lumpur, 
field work, interviewed January 1997). 
Abrupt policy decisions and rapid policy shifts have resulted in continued ad hoc 
planning; this has benefited some quarters but has come as a disappointment to 
others. 
7.6 Policy and Geography 
Internal population migration escalated after independence in 1957 and has 
particularly grown in pace since 1980, with motivations to migrate driven by 
economic opportunities (Fong, 1989; Chan, 1994). With heavy industrialisation in the 
west coast6 of Peninsular Malaysia, Selangor (including the Klang Valley) for 
example, where many of these industries are located, has experienced a population 
growth rate of 4.3% per annum continuously from 1980 to 1991. The Multimedia 
Super Corridor initiative is another incentives for migration towards the west coast, in 
particular the already highly congested area of the Klang Valley. There have been 
several government policies introduced in an attempt to alter this pattern. Between 
the 1970 and 1980 the government introduced regional development schemes, 
building industrial zones in the east coast and in the economically backward States of 
the west coast notably the Malay populated State of Kedah. Many of these industries 
(especially in the Malay populated States of Kelantan and Terengganu on the east 
coast) could not survive market competition from the highly developed west coast, 
6 Other States in the west coast which have also experienced high growth rates are Pulau Pinang 
and Johor with, respectively, 3.4 % and 4.6 % per annum from 1980 to 1991 (GOM, 1981; 1991a). 
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however, and also disagreed with Federal policy7. As a result many factories were 
forced to close. Hence, since 1980 States that are not within the economically viable 
areas have continued to grow only incrementally or have remained stagnant. These 
'marginalised States' are poorly provided with basic services and are given least 
preference in term of allocation for SETIA and NALIS programme budgets. For 
example, in 1997 while about 82% of the 'poor' households8 in Peninsular Malaysia 
had access to electricity, for Sabah and Sarawak about 47% and 50% of poor 
households, respectively, had such access. With regard to piped water, the coverage 
is relatively low, benefiting only about 57% of the poor in Peninsular Malaysia, about 
20% in Sabah and 15% in Sarawak (GOM, 1996). Accessibility to educational 
facilities was similarly unequal; in Peninsular Malaysia 94% of poor households have 
access to education compared to 85% in Sabah and 64% in Sarawak (GOM, 1996). 
Selangor, Klang Valley and Johor continue as the most populous areas with the 
highest population growth rates. This imbalance of development is expected to 
continue, since new development strategies seem to be changing little in terms of 
regional inequalities. 
7.7 Policy and Public Organisation 
Development programmes in Malaysia have been largely driven by a centralised force, 
with strongly political motives. In Vision 2020 the Prime Minister stated that "no 
nation can achieve full progress with only half of its human resources harnessed. " 
Mahathir emphasised that the Malays should continue their part in the achievement of 
development goals and he reasserted the imperatives of "ow accelerated 
industrialisation drive, economic liberalisation and deregulation" which he believes 
to be a "winning formula that had rescued the nation from recession and would 
safeguard the economic defence strategy". Privatisation is placed as the "primary 
engine of economic growth". In addition the vision includes the forging of 
partnerships with international companies "because a country without strong 
economic capabilities and the ability to marshal influence and create coalitions in 
the international economic arena is an economically defenceless nation and 
1 For example Kelantan and Kedah States require factories to adopt a Muslim law that restricts 
women employees (Malays) to working at night and that requires women to adopt a Muslim code of 
dress. 
8 In 1990 the total number of poor households was estimated by the government to be 620,000 
(uiban poor = 89,100 and rural poor = 530,900 (GOM, 1991); in 1997 the estimated number of poor 
households was 372,900 (urban poor = 80,300 and rural poor = 292,600) (GOM, 1996). 
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economically powerless State [which] Malaysia cannot afford to be" (Mohamad, 
November 1991). 
The findings of this research have demonstrated the adoption of Mahathir's ideology 
into the practice of organisational leaders on different programmes. But for many 
organisations this adopted ideology was not translated into a working strategy. 
Rather the motivation was for the organisational leaders to improve themselves and 
to increase their individual financial status. In the case of SETIA, many organisational 
leaders, especially those from the Prime Minister's Department and other major 
ministries such as the Ministry of Industry and International Trade and the Ministry of 
Public Enterprises, were transformed through privatisation ventures, from civil 
servant to corporate executive. Here the boundary between government and private 
becomes increasingly unrecognisable. With the acceptance of commercial culture in 
government a more complex bureaucracy was formed; jealousy and competition 
became widespread not only among controller agencies such as the Economic 
Planning Unit, the Implementation Co-ordination Unit, the Treasury and Accountant 
General's Department, but also among other ministries and implementing agencies at 
State level. 
It could be argued that Malaysian organisations in the 1990s are consistent with the 
postmodernist description of postbureaucratic organisations, involving a sense of 
paradox, indeterminacy, heterogeneity and disorganisation: a "general impression of 
disorientation and chaos' (Bauman, 1988, p. 793). As Gephart (1996) explains: 
"There is no overriding 'rationality' guiding the postmodern system, only the 
logic of commodification reproduced in situational forms that themselves are 
often contradictory. There can be no appeal to powers beyond the organisation 
because even 'government' control is vanishing. Increasingly, managers and 
employees may ask 'What's in it for me?' and within the situational controls of 
their life space, this may be the driving rationality for action" (p. 38). 
Differentiated levels of development added to these 'images of commodification' in 
organisations have made for complex and competitive programme's operating among 
government agencies themselves. With NALIS, it is evident from this present 
research that the leadership were more concerned with establishing itself and in 
spending the allocated budget on high-technology procurements. As expressed by 
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Cartwright (1991) 'Wow in a curious way, the major obstacle is often too much 
enthusiasm rather than not enough...they want to run before they can walk"1 (p. 15) 
For NALIS, such enthusiasm drives the organisational leaders towards the adoption 
of sophisticated and extravagant designs: a design (the Canadian open windows 
concept) which is so obviously different from the Malaysian context, socially, 
culturally, administratively, economically and politically. 
7.8 'Malaysian' Development Character 
Organisational behaviour in SETIA and NALIS is not atypical of public programmes 
in Malaysia. Some of the decision-making issues identified by the present study have 
also been highlighted for other programmes (World Bank and UNDP, 1995; Jomo 
1990, 1994; Chee, 1989; Bullis, 1997; Newsweek, 29 September, 1997; The 
Economist, March, 1997, 29 March 1997). However, generally views that question 
government performances are interpreted as criticising the credibility of 
administrative' leaders and public servants in general. For example, though many 
outsiders think the MSC project is a bad investment, this view is not shared by most 
Malaysians, in particular those in government organisations. Similar conceptions 
apply to other public projects. 
These issues can be understood only by exploring the social discourse of 'Malaysian' 
society in general and public servants (who are mostly Malays) in particular. Malaysia 
is made up of several communities. Within these communities Malays are the 
dominant group and are also the principal policy-makers. This dominance of Malays 
over other communities has not been received favourably by the other communities 
and arguments against Malay control have prevailed, both before and after 
independence. Development policy preferences towards the Malays are clearly 
apparent. For example, Malaysia's economic policy emphasised first the eradication 
of poverty and second, the restructuring of society. The first refers to providing the 
Malays (among the poorest group in Malaysia) with economic and educational 
opportunities and the second aimed to make the Malays 'equal' to other communities 
in particular the Chinese in terms of social, economic and geographical factors, such 
as basic living needs; income and moving the Malays to urban environments. 
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Malays are typified in "The Malay Dilemma" (Mohamad, 1970) as 'laissez /aire and 
tolerant,' prefer 'politeness and abhorrence of unpleasantness,' and having a 'fear of 
anarchy'. Mahathir argued that these were the cultivated marks of good manners and 
good breeding, but that in politics, these attitudes were exploited by others and led to 
the Malays giving up "apparently, politely, almost every vestige of power and 
authority in their own land' (p. 118). In business and commerce, the Malays were 
felt to be severely handicapped by their "code of ethics and value concepts" (p. 116). 
In other words, they adopted fatalism' (p. 158) an "inability to accept the 
inevitable" (p. 114), and a "failure to appreciate the real value of money and 
property" (p. 169). In contrast, Mahathir sees the Chinese as inherently good 
businessmen, and hard working. He believes that sympathy and understanding are not 
strong Chinese traits, and therefore the Malays need to be assisted because when the 
Chinese conduct business, "not even the crumbs are left to others" (p. 56). 
The Malays view government policy-makers in a way which is notably different to 
that of other communities in Malaysia. Malays place more trust in government to 
provide them with the channels to upgrade themselves and criticisms of government 
action, particularly on unequal distribution of resources, are often not supported by 
Malays. A highly criticised programme such as SETIA is one example. SETIA is 
known as a programme designed to monitor the achievements of Malays. Despite its 
many problems, decision-makers believe that through its monitoring devices, SETIA 
has been able to generate and identify more projects for Malays. At the same time 
though, SETIA has indirectly initiated awareness among public offices towards 
computerisation. In fact, SETIA is the first programme in Malaysia that has worked 
continuously towards introducing computerisation at grassroots levels, and towards 
employing Malay staff in District and even Sub-District areas. Similarly the 
introduction of NALIS has increased awareness in the use of advanced IT in certain 
quarters and has reinforced the need for non-IT staff to explore the capability of new 
technology, such as GIS. 
There are numerous examples of projects and programmes that have directly provided 
for the Malays. In the 1970s and 1980s, there were public enterprise programmes, 
urban development programmes, regional land schemes and regional development 
programmes. The post-1980 period saw further increases in projects for Malays not 
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only in number but also in scale. From this perspective, i f anything, the government 
has succeeded in engineering a Malay class based on the parity of Malay with non-
Malay in a capitalist economy. 
7.9 Conclusion 
Government development programmes in Malaysia have to be considered not only in 
terms of what may have been intended at the outset, but also subsequently in terms of 
the objectives, hopes and aspirations hidden within these programmes. At another 
level, the implementation of a programme, and how this has been perceived, must be 
taken into account from a similar perspective. Hence, the programme may well mean 
different things to different people. This is not surprising since different people are 
differently affected by changing policies which guided the programme. But one trend 
has been quite clear, that is, of primary, i f not exclusive, emphasis on development for 
Malaysia. The continued commitment to industry and high technology will hardly be 
de-emphasised, especially by the present government. The same can be said about the 
intensive privatisation policy currently being pursued, and which include transfer of 
public monopolies into private hands. This focus on privatisation has the unintended 
consequence of postponing the urgent need for public sector change. The 
privatisation of some activities, such as the NALIS programme, has done little to 
address serious problems such as the duplication of data collection and the pressing 
need for a co-ordinated management system allowing data access and sharing. Rather 
it has precipitated animosity within and across organisations. Consequently the direct 
involvement of government with private ventures has undermined efficiency and 
dynamism, and has created opportunities for corruption. 
To bring about a change from the existing agenda will be difficult. Policy-makers and 
decision-makers seem to be trapped in a system, partly of their own making, which 
may well prevent them from initiating and implementing change. The pressure for 
change will have to come from outside the government system. Unfortunately, 
however, the limited public discourse on such matters of national importance has 
meant that relatively few people have been able to seriously consider those issues, let 
alone develop solutions for them. Rather, the national agenda has largely been defined 
by the existing limits of social discourse acceptable to the 'coalition in power'. To 
make necessary headway, it will be crucial that the nation transcends the constraints 
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in which it is caught. Chapter 8 explores some of the possible turns which Malaysia 
may take and suggests areas which need further research towards understanding 
Malaysia's development ideology. 
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Chapter 8 Discussion: where do we go from here? 
"The state's behaviour, and the consequences of that behaviour, are being 
scrutinised like never before. The scrutiny might lead to better government. But 
i f states are unable to respond constructively to the challenges they face, the 
result could simply be farther erosion of the state's credibility, as the gap 
between what the state can do, and what people ask it to do, widens even 
further" (World Bank, p. 19, 1997b). 
8.1 Introduction 
Despite efforts to improve social living standards Malaysia's national IT strategy is 
moving further away from basic societal issues. This thesis has explored the history of 
two information system development programmes from their early beginnings, and 
has shown the types of changes which government has produced, how they are 
produced and why they are produced. The message is clear that government can meet 
development demands, but only by matching what it tries to do to with what it can 
do, and by working to increase the number of things that it can do capably. 
This thesis has evaluated two information system programmes, SETIA and NALIS, in 
the context of IT for 'development' in Malaysia. Under this central theme the thesis 
had five objectives (see Section 1.4). 
1. to evaluate the process of information technology adoption in the 
organisational context and to explore the strategy (if any) of making 
information technology choices. 
2. to identify in detail where significant IT adoption has taken place. 
3. to assess adaptation issues, that is, how much the adopted IT has been 
adapted by the organisations. 
4. to explore the broader contextual factors, external and internal to agencies, 
that may have affected IT programme development. 
5. to assess how IT has improved communications within and between 
organisations; and within areas in Peninsular Malaysia and between the regions 
of Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia. 
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This final chapter draws together the key conclusions of the research within the 
context of the above objectives. The first section (Section 8.2) briefly explains the 
pattern of information strategy as understood through the execution of this research. 
In Sections 8.3 to 8.6 government's role in the development of information systems is 
discussed. The chapter ends by evaluating the lessons learned from the 
implementation of large scale information systems in the context of a developing 
country. The behaviour of actors, in particular government servants and political 
leaders, is considered to be a key influencing factor in achieving programme success 
or failure. Recommendations for future research directions are made in Section 8.8. 
8.2 Information Strategy and Development 
Malaysia lacks a clearly identified and consistent information strategy. What Malaysia 
really has are objectives in terms of the intention of policy-makers regarding which 
programmes should be introduced and why. Definitions of how a specific programme 
should be implemented or consideration of the real value of an information system to 
the potential users (Bawden and Blakeman, 1990; Campbell and Masser, 1995) tend 
to be missing. Factors relating to the function which information technology should 
play in the overall life of an organisation and users; whether the users are capable of 
understanding the technology; how integral IT is to the users' objectives; and whether 
IT is seen as a strategic tool have not been given proper consideration. As Bawden 
and Blakeman (1990) argue: "One of the most important roles for IT planners is to 
see that these factors are decided upon, and clearly stated; otherwise a degree of 
chaos...is the most likely result' (p. 157). Campbell and Masser (1995) also find that 
without clear strategy guidelines "[the] chances of systems becoming redundant 
would seem to be high without a widely accepted sense of the information needs of 
both the organisation as a whole and individual members of staff" (p. 46). 
Difficulties in devising appropriate strategies are compounded when the organisers of 
a programme themselves seem to be unsure of the prerequisites required in setting up 
a large scale information system, in particular in terms of the appropriate technology 
and skills. Generally such decisions in Malaysia are based on a 'belief of what is 
needed by the users. This belief is not based on the decision-maker's own 
understanding of Malaysia's IT needs; rather through knowledge being passed on to 
decision-maker by consultants. 
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One key reason for the inability of local decision-makers to make informed 
judgements for their targeted programme(s) occurs when the operational structure of 
the programme is imported from another society, usually an advanced country. This 
approach has led to a continuous process in Malaysia of dependency of the organisers 
(and, indirectly the users) on consultants - from the inception of an idea through to 
the design, planning and implementation phases. Typically, although consultants can 
have expert knowledge of information technology, they are less likely to understand 
the organisation's (client's) objectives, and its political and economic environment. 
Indeed this finding is in accordance with the view of many researchers who have 
argued that lack of attention to political, organisational and psychological issues, is 
the cause of deficiencies in many information system developments (Bostrom and 
Heinen, 1977; Mumford, 1981; Zmud, 1983; Freidman et al., 1984; Kumar and 
Welke, 1984; Campbell, 1991; Masser and Campbell, 1991; Nedovic-Budic and 
Godchalk, 1996). 
Such shortcomings may not be recognised by the consultants nor are these issues 
often addressed by the clients. Usually in Malaysia a number of committees are 
established in an attempt to overcome these inconsistencies in knowledge. Typically 
two levels of committee are formed - steering and technical. The steering committee 
is made up of policy-makers, usually represented by the most senior members of the 
programme office. The steering committee, for NALIS, for example, is headed by the 
Secretary General of the Ministry of Land and Co-operative Development. The 
committee's role is to monitor the progress of the consultant and to provide the 
consultant with appropriate assistance. The technical committee is made up of officers 
with expertise in information technology and their main duty is to assist the consultant 
in terms of information relevant to their offices and related development factors. This 
approach in fact relies almost totally on the consultant's professional values; local 
staff (the technical committee) are merely feeders of information to the consultant. 
The necessary detail unique to Malaysia's organisations and which could be identified 
only by local staff, can be overlooked in this process. 
As the SETIA and NALIS programmes illustrated, this type of approach may look 
impressive as a presentation paper to the Cabinet but it is not viable in a long-term, 
practical context. Consultant input works well at the advisory level, but the broader 
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planning and implementation arrangements are best understood and decided by local 
organisers. The consequences of failing to acknowledge the need for appropriate 
supporting resources were revealed before the pilot study phase in the case of SETIA 
and during the pilot study for NALIS. With SETIA, programme planning had to be 
re-adjusted for there were simply not enough facilities to cover all of SETIA's 
participants and there was insufficient staff to handle data collection, processing and 
transfer. With NALIS the situation was even worse, with no data for the system to 
operate on, GIS skills were inadequate and, except for few agencies in major centres, 
a communication systems for data transfer were lacking. 
8.2.1 Policy and Development 
Policy guidelines for planning for new information systems are rarely lacking in 
Malaysian organisations; rather there can be too many. Often the guidelines are vague 
and changeable and add confusion to a situation. The World Bank outlines the 
consequences of drawing up uncertain and unclear guidelines: 
" I f the state changes the rules often, or does not clarify the rules by which the 
state itself will behave, businesses and individuals cannot be sure today what will 
be profitable or unprofitable, legal or illegal tomorrow. They will then adopt 
costly strategies to insure against an uncertain future..."(World Bank 1997b, p. 
32). 
A case in point is the Multimedia Super Corridor experience. Financial crises that hit 
the East Asia region in mid-1997 have affected international interest in the Malaysian 
market. This has forced the Multimedia Development Corporation to turn to local 
investors to promote the Multimedia Super Corridor; an initiative which was treated 
as secondary before the financial crises happened. This approach caught local 
agencies by surprise, and government suddenly changed its focus of investment 
towards locals who are not able to support the Multimedia Corridor undertaking and 
do not fully understand the rationale behind it. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that many 
projects, whatever the country establishing them, could plan for such cataclysmic 
events as the mid-1997 economic crises in Asia. 
SETIA, since its initiation in 1984, has undergone several transformations to adapt to 
rapid changes in policy. But modifications to the programme have failed to result in 
improvements in programme performance which, i f anything, has worsened. After a 
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certain period of time, policy changes became taken-for-granted by the co-ordinators 
and participants, and policies with slogans such as 'Look East', 'corporatisation' and 
'privatisation' gradually lost their appeal. As Cole (1991) argued: 
"A common problem management faces at all levels is information overload... 
'More than two objectives is no objective', may be exaggerated, but it makes the 
point well. Too much information [guidelines] leads to a lack of clarity in 
priorities. Furthermore, too much information in the form of guidelines for action 
leads to reduced employee discretion and therefore a loss of employee initiative" 
(P- 34). 
8.2.2 Policy Changes and Organisational Strategy 
Notwithstanding the issue of changing policies, government has had a major influence 
on structural change in the demand for technology. For example, the rapidly growing 
demand for a wide range of technologies used in information technology production 
stems directly from major government initiatives to develop that industry (notably the 
Multimedia Super Corridor). However, although technology objectives are clearly 
associated with such initiatives, these forms of government policy are primarily 
concerned with broad issues of information technology development strategy, and 
they are implemented primarily through aspects of trade policy and the range of 
mechanisms for information technology promotion. A more specific information 
technology development strategy should now follow from this general policy. 
An organisation should have its own strategy related to its true objectives. In order to 
avoid unnecessary purchase of technology which does not fit organisational needs and 
capability, this strategy should then be translated into the requirements of those who 
will use the systems. This is to overcome unnecessary purchase of technology which 
does not fit organisational needs and capability. As exemplified in NALIS, in the 
excitement of establishing a sophisticated system, organisers have allowed themselves 
to be driven by technology which led to the introduction of a system for the wrong 
reasons. This study argues that one of the most important duties to those who have to 
plan for the introduction of an information system is to decide when a computerised 
information system should not be introduced. In some circumstances computerisation 
can be inappropriate to an agency for many reasons, for example, i f the agency is too 
small to maintain a computerised system, or i f staff are unwilling to install it because 
most information is classified. As exemplified in NALIS, some agencies simply 
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resisted the installation of Local Area Networks (LANs), not because of maintenance 
or installation costs, but because they were not ready to share their information with 
others. 
Willingness to develop a clear organisational strategy depends on the behaviour of an 
organisation's leaders, in particular the programme co-ordinator; how they perceive 
participation of its members and their task to introduce IT where it is appropriate and 
not wherever it can be forced in. Successful implementation of IT is a process that 
works gradually; there must be specific recognition of the potential for interaction and 
integration between the technology and the people who are to use it. These findings, 
in the context of the present study, are in line with the approach taken by successful 
programmes such as the Land Information System for Hong Kong (Yeh, 1990) and 
the Singapore Land Data Hub project (Tang-Kwong, 1994). The incremental 
approach has the advantage of taking on smaller staged investments that both bring in 
a series of new technologies; and allow time for the organisers and users to adapt to 
the new technology. This process, then, establishes a pattern of continuous 
technology upgrade, an approach suggested by many researchers as the most 
appropriate for countries with weak infrastructural support (capital and human 
resources). Thus, although the process of implementation will be slow it will almost 
certainly lead to a more measured pace of investment and deployment. 
8.2.3 Participation and Expectation 
In the cases of SETIA and NALIS, a large majority of the officials interviewed felt 
that their influence on the choice of technology was minimal. From a typical desk 
officer's viewpoint, an agency enters the programme cycle, that is, the process of 
identifying, preparing, appraising, modifying, approving and implementing a 
programme, when it receives a programme proposal. Most agencies take the view 
that by then the basic questions of programme design have already been settled, and 
they can hardly propose substantive modifications, partly because of a lack of 
information, but more so because of in-built organisational (political) constraints 
inherent in an 'arm's length' relationship. 
In Malaysia, as in a number of other developing countries, provision of true grass-
roots participation in project planning is rare. As argued by Thomas-Slayter (1987) 
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some programme organisers assume that people at grass-roots level know very little 
and therefore not allowed to have a 'voice'. In the case of SETIA and NALIS, 
participation was undertaken by a co-ordinating agency but was conducted half-
heartedly. For example, from over 356 agencies (and thousands of participants) about 
14 major agencies (represented by, at most, one or two officers) were selected to 
participate in discussion. These agencies are generally categorised as a technical 
group; their duty is to 'feed' consultants or organisers with their agency's 
information. The organisers are usually made up of appointed high-ranking civil 
servants who serve to hold control in discussions and decisions. Discussions are 
carried out quite regularly but technical representatives usually only listen and follow, 
in what civil servants refer to as 'monologue meetings'. 
Information technology programmes cannot easily be planned based on selective 
representation. Introduction of new technology depends crucially on the nature of the 
organisation and agency in which it operates. In most cases representation left to an 
individual may seem unfair, for the person selected may not necessarily be devoted 
full-time to this work or may not have the mix of skills required to: understand 
planning the implementation and use of a large-scale information system; have a 
thorough knowledge of their agency and its aims; and have a sensitivity to the needs 
of its users. In an agency it is not possible for one person to have this mix of skills and 
knowledge (though one can be assumed to have it). It is safer therefore for every 
agency to form a team with a mix of technical skills and knowledge of the 
technologies, knowledge of the organisation and its staff, and awareness of the 
information and communication flows and the management operation. 
A programme should be able to maintain its effectiveness i f its establishment is 
supported or needed by the people. A programme which evolves through people's 
needs will usually need minimal effort to sustain support. On the other hand, a 
programme that is imposed on people (without first taking into consideration their 
particular circumstances) may generate scepticism. Essentially the programme 
organiser or management would benefit from adopting a learning attitude at the 
outset and from establishing a culture of learning with respect to all aspects of the 
specific development programme so that participants are included in the whole 
programme development process. Participation provides a valuable source of 
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knowledge and insight which can serve as a basis for innovation, and adjustments 
formulated on this basis will be far more easily implemented. Participation reduces the 
risk of inappropriate methods being imposed on users, ensures that the agency's 
resources are a foundation for development and checks that its capacities are 
expanded to include new options. 
In principle, participation involves putting decision-making where the information is. 
This is in order to reflect the fact that the staff have a lot more information in their 
heads than management usually recognises. While it is true that staff often have 
information they do not share with management, the converse also applies. Indeed, a 
critical objective should be to supply feedback information throughout the 
organisation, as it relates to the achievement of specific organisational goals. Moving 
information down through the organisation by a strategy of information sharing is one 
approach. Clearly, it is also important to move information up. 
8.2.4 Participation and Realisation 
The process of moving information upward through an organisation could be set-up 
but how far could it be realised? In other words, how much is information from the 
grass-roots level taken seriously by decision-makers? This issue was illustrated with 
the SETIA programme when information gathered from the grass-roots level was 
translated and manipulated in order to address only those issues which organisers 
found it fitting to implement1. The value of information depends on users' attitudes 
and behaviour vis-a-vis the information. Its availability alone does not change 
behaviour. The willingness of decision-makers to change, their ability to interpret 
information and the credibility of the information are key factors in this respect. 
Conversely, having information but without the power (voice) to make corrective 
suggestions is also futile. Realistically, when one closely examines the process of 
decision-making one finds that the person(s) who makes the decisions may not need 
the information at all. Rather their decisions are made on the basis of other factors, 
which are unrelated and foreign to that of Malaysia's context. The design of NALIS, 
for example, was brought to Malaysia based on decisions made by a few individuals 
1 Products from SETIA are found in the Malaysia Five Year Plan. The plan is used as a base to 
describe and predict government goals. Generally these goals are remotely approximated and have 
no or little effect on day-to-day decisions. 
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prior to a formal decision-making process. Such choices made through informal 
means are not uncommon practice in the Malaysian government. 
8.3 Information and Choice of Information System 
Choice of technology and design of information system should involve a clear 
understanding of organisational structure, information flows and communication 
pathways, and user behaviour (Bawden, 1989). In order to avoid misjudging potential 
problem areas recommendations must be tailored to the scale and significance of the 
technology change proposed. As Goodman (1993) suggests, the goal of such 
planning "is for diagnostic purposes. That is, it is the mechanism for identifying 
impediments to successful implementations" (p. 50). 
The present study discovered that government research for development programmes 
is often viewed merely as a formality to demonstrate to the general public that the 
government is 'concerned' about public views. The products of such studies often are 
vague, and impediments are often not identified. During the development of NALIS, 
for example, a feasibility study was conducted to identify potential problem areas and 
to collect information on existing levels of computerisation. But the feasibility study 
was carried out with pre-set ideas for the design of NALIS. The idea for NALIS had 
been in the mind of the technical committee's chairman since 1989 when organising 
the Computerised Land Information System for registry and land officers with the 
Central Board of Real Estate Data from Sweden. The idea was further developed in 
1994 through views provided by various international GIS and LIS experts at a 
seminar on land management held in Kuala Lumpur. The seminar was followed by 
field visits by senior members from major land and policy planning agencies to 
Sweden, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Canada to 
strengthen ideas for NALIS. This was followed by a feasibility study led by Malaysian 
consultants in collaboration with several international consultants, in particular those 
from Canada and Sweden. 
As argued in Section 8.2.3, agencies cannot be treated as objects; they have their own 
views and objectives. Programme co-ordinators (through the advice of consultants) 
may be well informed in terms of the latest land-related information technology, but in 
many instances unless an appropriate feasibility study is made, a co-ordinator may 
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have little understanding of users' interests and capabilities in a selected information 
system. Ignoring this issue will result in disinterest and a reluctance to learn and adapt 
to the new technology. It is in fact, very difficult to make realistic suggestions for 
major improvements, unless there is shared knowledge among every group about the 
state of the technology and its practicality. Getting users involved in planning for new 
information technology systems and in achieving smooth implementation requires 
very specific skills, which could only be learnt incrementally. Essentially, this involves 
a sensitivity to the true complexities of users' work patterns, and an ability to match 
their requirements to the new technologies, rather than to force the users into the pre-
conceived idea of a new system. 
It could be argued that the approach taken by Hong Kong and Singapore is a good 
model to be followed by other developing countries especially those of similar social, 
economic and cultural characteristics, for example, Malaysia. Yet this has not 
happened. In fact Malaysian programme organisers seem not to have learnt from the 
mistakes of previous programmes. NALIS, for example, is repeating the very same 
problems experienced by SETIA, and, to a lesser extent, problems that have been 
made by previous land-related projects. The reasons for this were explored in Chapter 
7; each programme organiser has their own beliefs and generally decision-makers are 
too involved with national policy and ideology, that is, their desire to proceed as fast 
as possible towards their goal of reaching advanced country status. As such, many of 
Malaysia's development strategies and models for information technology uptake are 
associated with programmes from developed countries, despite the fact that many IT 
initiatives in developing countries provide valuable examples of successfully 
implemented programmes (for example, India's GISNIC - GIS National Informatics 
Centre, the China Agriculture Information System, Singapore's Land Data Hub, the 
Philippines' Metro Manila Physical Survey Project and Thailand's Bangkok Land 
Information System Project). 
Thus, although there is a clear objective for Malaysia to be an advanced country by 
year 2020, a balance can be achieved only by understanding the problems within itself 
and through examples of those most closely related to it, economically, politically and 
socially. Even though it could be argued that it is fast reaching a developed stage, 
Malaysia is still susceptible to various factors that are found hampering development 
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progress, such as a volatile environment including corruption and political instability. 
The voice of a government may, however, differ. According to the World Bank 
(1997b) Thailand's government, for example, considered their business environment 
as generally stable (1995 to early 1996) despite various coups d'etat and changes in 
government. Attitudes in the Malaysian government appear to be not dissimilar. Thus, 
despite the views of economists and academicians on the weaknesses of Malaysian 
investment and development strategies, the Prime Minister believes these views to be 
purely academic and theoretically-based. Rather, the Prime Minister argues that 
Malaysia is quite capable of reaching its development target because: 
"We have the political will and power to rapidly change any existing laws or 
policies that impede the ability of companies to capitalise on the benefits afforded 
by the information age. We will not be bogged down by excessive politicking in 
Malaysia" (NST, 29 May 1997). 
This statement seems to contain an implied understanding that 'the executive body' 
has the power to change and make laws. The judiciary exists to support sustainable 
development by holding the executive and legislative branches accountable for their 
decisions and underpinning the credibility of the overall business and political 
environment. However, the judiciary can play this role only when it is given 
independence. A weak judiciary gives the state the power to intervene arbitrarily. 
This power, coupled with access to information and resources not available to the 
general public, creates opportunities for government to promote interests based on 
their own understanding. 
8.4 Development, Government and Geography 
Since information is power, nations that establish their information infrastructure will 
have tremendous competitive advantage over those that lag behind (Bangemann, 
1994; World Bank, 1997a). Many developed and developing countries are working 
toward this end. Early beneficiaries are the economically viable areas since these are 
the group that are able to support development and maintain its services. In the case 
of NALIS, for example, the organisers were frightened by large up-front fixed costs 
for facilities deployment and have drastically reduced coverage of the programme. 
The programme covers major areas such as Kuala Lumpur and Georgetown; agencies 
that are with support facilities, or areas and agencies which are capable of developing 
203 
themselves in the first place. The argument that "high technology can put unequal 
human beings on an equal footing, and that makes it the most potent democratising 
tool ever devised" (Pitroda, 1993, p. 2) is difficult to justify in the case of Malaysia 
when distribution of high-technology is concentrated in highly urbanised areas and 
diffusion of IT to the poorest groups has been slow. This is in line with Harris, et al., 
(1995) argument relating to issues of access to GIS: 
"The establishment of a GIS database and the acquisition of hardware, software, 
and trained personnel is an expensive process. These costs usually limit GIS 
technology to state agencies or large private corporations. The conditions, or 
preconditions, that regulate access to that information also usually reside with the 
same agencies. . . Without equitable access to GIS data and the technology, small 
users, local governments, nonprofit community agencies, and nonmainstream 
groups are significantly disadvantaged in their capacity to engage in the decision-
making process" (pp. 202-203). 
The results of this study show that there is a clear imbalance between the 
government's IT development vision (that is, equal access to IT services for all 
areas), and IT support capability. Malaysia's vision for information technology is 
based on an anticipated supply of IT skills from the foreseeable future (expected to be 
achieved by the year 2020) and development of infrastructural support from foreign 
investors. The importation of high-tech design and technology is seen as a way of 
reaching the desired vision as quickly as possible. This has parallels with the argument 
put forward by some for India's GIS programme, that is, to demonstrate the use of a 
certain technology like GIS for its own sake rather than to use the technology to 
solve real development problems (Taylor, 1991b; Hutchinson and Toledano, 1993; 
Sahay and Walsham, 1996). 
For Malaysia, the government has undoubtedly made substantial efforts to improve 
access to IT, but for both political and technical reasons, ranging from differences in 
political ideology to a lack of computer trainers, distribution of even basic computers 
has largely remained concentrated in urban areas and selected rural areas. 
In an economy that still maintains an unequal development pattern (unequal income 
distribution, and a large gap between rural and urban development) and limited 
resources, the vision to promote IT use for all areas requires conscious development 
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objectives, that is, objectives that answer the needs of the majority of the population 
rather than the selected few. 
8.5 Human Resources and Development 
When Malaysia made a shift from agriculture to industrialisation in the 1960s 
accompanying initiatives were arranged for education and training. The failure of 
these sectors to keep pace with industrial progress was not addressed because a skills 
base was maintained through foreign expertise. By the 1990s Malaysia began to feel 
threatened when other developing countries, such as Bangladesh, Thailand and the 
Philippines were able to produce similar incentives to foreign multinationals. A higher 
priority was therefore given to IT training and education, including the giving of 
incentives to the private sector to set up training centres. Nonetheless such schemes 
take time to mature and there remains a skills shortage in Malaysia. 
A focused and coherent R&D programme is clearly imperative for Malaysia, although 
interviews with officers from Malaysia Science And Technology Information Centre 
(MASTIC) indicate that there is no definite estimate for Malaysia's R&D level (based 
on the office's most recent industrial and innovation survey, in 1996). These officers 
stressed that they found Malaysia's level of R&D to be well below the set target of 
1.5% of GDP. The National Council for Scientific Research and Development, as 
well other public research institutions such as SIRIM and MIMOS, however, has set 
up working groups to develop specific measures to promote and facilitate the 
development of indigenous R&D, although their effort's have been fragmented and ad 
hoc. The MSC programme is one of the ways in which government was trying to 
encourage foreign R&D staff to co-ordinate with local researchers. But the initiative 
came too late; the 1997 weakening financial situation has discouraged foreign R&D 
staff to explore research opportunities in Malaysia. 
8.6 Information and Government Institutions 
Notwithstanding the many weaknesses of government as a model of resource 
distribution, government's role is becoming increasing indispensable. When 
information is treated as a resource, most consider government to be an appropriate 
choice of manager. This is because information (on individuals and organisations) 
could create benefits for society but could also introduce new risks should 
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information be uncontrolled. Quality and technical standards, such as privacy 
standards and copyright, are examples of areas where government could initiate steps 
to ensure the protection of society and the markets. However, these standards or laws 
are not easily drawn, because information as a resource is a relatively new area of 
concern for many governments; information technology development is growing fast, 
and governments are losing pace in drawing up and amending the necessary rules and 
regulations (Archer and Croswell, 1989). 
Malaysia as yet, does not have any laws which specifically address the issue of 
information technology standards and there is also no specific legislative provision 
which deals with computer-related crimes. The only standard available is the 
Malaysian Penal Code which is not designed to meet requirements of new tools such 
as GIS. As illustrated by Archer and Croswell (1989) for the case of GIS products, 
establishment of good policy as a basis for getting the most access to most people 
may not be straightforward, since there are generally several different players 
involved in the production of GIS information. Since the information is a combination 
of input (data) from various agencies, these agencies are part-owners and therefore 
have a say in who can and cannot access their information. As Harris, et al., (1995) 
note: 
"A GIS reflects the mandate of the agency that operates it. Agencies have 
internal rules and value systems, as well as a stake in self-preservation. The 
extent to which GIS represents objectivity in terms of what data is used, or how 
it is classified, or how it is analysed, or the interpretations drawn from it, is 
clearly highly questionable. Value-neutral GIS simply do not exist" (p. 201) 
In the context of NALIS the programme co-ordinator and relevant consultants had 
proposed the utilisation of the Official Secrets Act, 1972 (OSA) while waiting for 
appropriate information standards to be established. However, the OSA is generally 
recognised as a government means of controlling information for specific purposes. 
The meaning of 'information' under the Official Secrets Act is defined by an 
appropriate Minister and in the case of NALIS this is the Chief Minister of a State, 
since land is a State matter. The Chief Minister has the power to add, delete, or 
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amend any of the provisions of the Schedule of the Act 2. It is too early to observe the 
effects of applying the Official Secrets Act to NALIS, but from previous experience, 
in particular that relating to publication of 'sensitive' government issues, the Official 
Secrets Act has unbounded authority to limit or deny publication or distribution of 
information the Minister feels unfit for public viewing. This authority is difficult to 
challenge because the Act has no 'standard' definition of information and as such, is 
open to interpretation by the Minister. As Archer and Croswell (1989) suggest in the 
case where there is no such law "policy must be designed and implemented...before 
the wrong precedents are established, either by court or overly conservative 
managers^ (p. 1578). 
A further area in which progress has been slow is that of (geographic) information 
exchange standards. Two working groups (working group 12 and working group 13) 
have been set up to develop IT and GIS standards but progress has been slow 
because information exchange is still a new concern for Malaysian agencies. Indeed, 
the working groups have been forced to clone3 standards from advanced countries (in 
particular the United States4). For NALIS, however, cloning has proved to be 
ineffective due to differences in institutional factors including copyright, security and 
operating procedures. 
8.7 Closing Remarks 
Since the introduction of the first computer to the government sector thirty-two years 
ago, computerisation in Malaysia has continued to grow significantly. In the 1980s 
computers became commonplace in public agencies and took over traditional 
application areas such as revenue collection and information management. By the 
1990s computer applications had expanded from transaction processing (management 
information systems) towards helping to improve organisational performance and 
productivity. Systems Library operated by the departments of Environment, 
2 The information schedule currently covers: Cabinet documents (records of decisions and 
deliberations including those of Cabinet committees); State Executive Council documents (records of 
decisions and deliberations including those of State Executive Council Committees); and documents 
concerning national security, defence and international relations. 
3 Cloning of standards, in this way, which is also common for industrial technology, means that 
standards from another country are duplicated in their entirety. 
4 Spatial Data Transfer Standards - the American Society for testing and materials is suggested as a 
basis for the creation of NALIS data exchange standards while numeric and alpha-numeric coding 
was suggested to be used for all textual and attribute data relevant to NALIS. 
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Immigration, Road Transport and Inland Revenue, as well as the Royal and National 
Malaysian Police, for example, have all been successful. However, thusfar, success 
stories have been limited to individualised information systems operating at the 
departmental or ministerial level. Those systems applying an information sharing 
approach between departments and ministries have not, as yet, achieved similar 
success, largely because of difficulties caused by having several different organi-
sational leaders, and because of the needs of multi-level staff and differential end-
users. Such problems are not unique to Malaysia; rather problems in integrating 
isolated systems and in gaining a consensus for sharing information are common to 
developing and developed countries alike, although, clearly, such difficulties may be 
enhanced in poorer countries as a result of inadequate infrastructure or less well-
developed management systems (Fox, 1991; Masser and Campbell, 1991; Yeh, 1991; 
Hutchinson and Toledano, 1993; Campbell, 1994; Masser, 1996; Sahay and 
Walsham, 1996). For Malaysia, such problems are recognised by government and 
efforts to address system weaknesses began in earnest in the early 1980s. These 
efforts have been less than successful, however, since the programme co-ordinators 
themselves (notably the Economic Planning Unit, the Implementation Co-ordination 
Unit and the Ministry of Land and Co-operative Development) have been unclear of 
how a programme's objective were to be accomplished. The findings of this study 
show that such difficulties are less attributable to gaps in knowledge and more 
explicable in terms of lack of time to carry out realistic planning. 
In addition, some programme co-ordinators attempted to fit programmes to political 
leaders' agendas by adopting policies such as the New Economic Policy and Vision 
2020 as programme strategies. Such policies though vibrant in approach, are broad 
and philosophical and carry no operational practicalities. Many organisational leaders 
have been unable to separate their professional and politically oriented duties and, 
indeed, many have similar ambitions to politicians. A speech by the Prime Minister 
indicates the respect that is afforded to Malaysia's organisational leaders: 
"Malaysia does not face the kind of problems encountered by many developing 
nations because its administrative system is well-organised and forward 
looking...It has succeeded where many countries, which achieved independence 
after the Second World War had failed.. .Malaysia should be proud of its success 
and its efficient administrative system. Because of our success in the 
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administrative system, we have earned the respect of others and are able to stand 
tall even among the developed countries" (Mohamad, 30 April 1993). 
Whether such respect is justifiably extended to IT programme administrators is, 
perhaps, open to debate. Through the course of this study, but especially from the end 
of 1997 with the worsening financial situation in the East Asia region, unexpected 
changes to the national economy have directly affected information systems 
programme development in Malaysia. With the economic growth rate dropping to 
1.8% as of January 1998 from 8% during early 1996 organisational issues have 
started to become secondary in importance to economic forces and organisational 
actors have become more minor players. By 1998 the focus clearly turned to political 
leaders and their development decisions, not only in terms of organisational 
programmes such as SETIA and NALIS, but also for the destiny of Malaysian 
development in general. Issues such as plans for a new high-tech capital city, the shift 
of industrial focus to advanced technology, and continued reliance on foreign aid and 
experts dominate Malaysia's development debate. Spending on projects through 
unlimited foreign borrowing was labelled as one of the factors that created Malaysia's 
economic deterioration. 
At the outset of this study the author firmly believed that Malaysia differed clearly 
from other developing countries, especially in the context of its financial stability. 
Indeed, many Malaysians (in particular the new generation officers of the 1980s) have 
had no other reality of Malaysian life because their working life has been conditioned 
with the development ideology of one Prime Minister and his administration. 
Malaysians are trained to believe that they are different from neighbouring developing 
countries because they have the economic strength and political will to be a 
'successful' country. This seemed highly acceptable to government servants who, in 
general, were provided with a comfortable life. Malaysians have, therefore, chosen to 
leave development strategy to political leaders. For many government servants, the 
Asian financial crisis has been the first real understanding of Malaysia's development 
political vulnerability. The crisis clearly revealed that, like other developing countries, 
Malaysia is highly susceptible to external factors. 
This research, however, finds that the Asian financial crisis is but one of Malaysia's 
development problems. The theoretical context applied in this research has helped 
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to identify other critical issues, that is, organisational and political issues that have 
been dampening Malaysian development progress. One of the most important 
characteristics that this research adopted from Giddens' structuration theory is that 
there is no universal causation in a certain action. The conditions in which certain 
circumstances happen are mediated in one way or another by knowledgeable actors. 
Government actors (political and organisational leaders) generally motivate others to 
follow their actions. In addition, political and organisational actors, and their actions, 
have independent influencing power over one another. Although sometimes these 
actions seemed to overlap with one another, they are analytically distinguishable and 
have divergent consequences. These concepts helped to illuminate the actions of these 
actors and showed how they were mediated by aspects of meanings, power relations 
and norms. The initiation and implementation of IT development programmes in 
Malaysia can be identified as a continuous process whereby effective development 
management was progressively enlarged as a result of influence from broader 
environmental factors, including experience of previous programmes. Organisational 
leaders in particular and programme participants in general interpret their experiences 
differently. Each actor uses the horizontal inter-link of rules and resources, and the 
vertical inter-link of norms and power relations to increase their chances of 
influencing the outcomes they desire for themselves and their organisations. Similar 
explanations could be provided for the action and re-action of political leaders in 
suggesting development strategies for Malaysia. Political and economic criticisms 
from within and outside the country were taken by government leaders as challenges 
to their 'competency' to manage the country. The rapid industrial shift form heavy to 
light industry and services, and then to multimedia industries; dependence on 
multinationals and foreign aid to assist industrial development; and excessive 
spending on luxury projects to support multinational infrastructural demands are few 
examples of development motivated by such challenges. 
The Asian financial crisis, however, disrupted the continuation of the leaders' 
development ambition. In their failure to accept any responsibility for the situation 
Malaysian leaders argued that the crisis was created by manipulation of the US dollars 
by advanced countries, a debate which remained open throughout 1998. However, 
with worsening economic opportunities, the argument put forward by government 
eventually became unacceptable. To re-establish public confidence the Prime Minister 
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established a National Economic Action Council, chaired by the former Minister of 
Finance, specifically to deal with the recession issues. The Prime Minister's strategy 
was not fully supported by key policy-makers, including the (former) Deputy Prime 
Minister and many members of the ruling party - the National Front. The 
disagreement between these leading political figures brought out previously hidden 
(sensitive) issues such as misallocation of project budgets to selected companies and 
individuals. The conflict, coupled with the weakening economic situation experienced 
by major businesses (who are also key political members of the ruling party) resulted 
in rifts and divisions of trust within the ruling party. The potential effects on 
sustainability of the Malaysian economy and government remain uncertain5. 
This research began when development in Malaysia was at a peak and ended when 
national development is at stage of uncertainty. In this way the findings of this study 
draw attention to the need for follow-up research on the progress of information 
systems programme development, in particular NALIS since it is a new undertaking. 
Should the economy recover, will NALIS maintain its conservative approach or 
begin to start yet another grand undertaking? And will government leaders continue 
with their currently cautious approach or turn back to old approaches such as 
pursuing ambitious projects? In the meantime, how competently could organisational 
and political leaders share the knowledge and hence the capability to keep Malaysia's 
development programmes going; how could political leaders overcome personal 
differences for the state of national development objectives; and how far could this 
attitude be maintained? 
8.8 Recommendations for Further Research 
The findings of this research highlight points that may help practitioners in 
developing countries move towards more effective mobilisation of scarce resources in 
an environment that is fraught with uncertainties. Some of these important issues, 
however, could not be fully explored in detail because of the time limit afforded for 
this study. These are in four main areas: 
5 The political environment in Malaysia is currently changing on a daily basis. For example on 
September 2, 1998 the Deputy Prime Minister was dismissed from office. 
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First, the relationship of Malaysia IT programmes to that of other developing 
countries, notably its closest neighbours, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. 
The current research only afforded the opportunity to study the process of change 
brought about by one situation. Although literature provided some comparable 
information from countries in the ASEAN region it is, however, insufficient in 
providing 'stories' of the dynamics of IT change. Further research will serve as an 
interesting comparison of cross-cultural influences in IT adaptation and adoption, 
and help to unify the findings of previous empirical studies. 
Second, in the context of programme management, different administrative 
cultures may affect development differently. The current research has explored this 
in the context of Malaysian's administration which is strongly linked to the 
traditions and culture of the Malay community. This research believes that with the 
increasing use of IT for development purposes the normal patterns of dominance 
and status within the current administration may change. For Malaysia there are 
significance differences in professional occupations among the communities and in 
particular in the IT sector. This issue emerged during the conduct of this study 
where a great deal of IT schools are controlled by the non-dominant community, 
notably Chinese. Further research is needed to discover how, over time, there 
could be a change in Malaysia's pattern of administrative control. 
Third, research into management behaviour would be valuable area for further 
research. The exposition of traditional values in the research findings highlighted 
issues that are critical for organisational building and for evolving appropriate 
information systems. Research could be directed towards identifying changes that 
are needed in the administrative structure in order to harness the broad cultural 
imperatives of the Malaysian society. 
Fourth, is research relating to the methodology and approach. The findings in this 
study are not conclusions that can be absolutely verified for it involves subjective 
interpretation and sometimes since the context is to close to researcher it is 
difficult to maintain objectivity. Although effort was made to avoid mixing of 
personal judgement, it is inevitable that to some extent researcher's values will be 
reflected in the kind of data sought and the sense made of it. This suggests that 
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further research is needed to formalise some of the main points that this research 
has highlighted, in particular on the subjects of social, cultural and political 
influences on development. 
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Appendix: A l 
Form SI -Project Creation and Registration 
1. Project No: 2. Ministry: 3. Department: 
4. Implementation Agency: 5. Vote Head 6. Head 
7. Sub Head: 8. Project Name: 9. Project Objective/Scope 
10. Project Location 11. Project Area 12. Security Project 
13. Year Project Statement/ 14. Year Project 15. New or Continuing Project 
Expected to Start Expected to 
Complete 
16. Total Cost Breakdown by Type of Development Expenditure: 
Total Project Costs: Supplementary Project Cost Requested 
a. Land acquisition 
b. Construction 
c. Equipment 
d. Consultant Service 
e. Development Operating Cost 
f. Others (explain) 
17. Total Project Cost: 
18. Total Cost Breakdown by Foreign and Local Cost: 
19. Total Allocation Applied: 
20. Estimated Yearly Breakdown for Five Year Plan Allocation: 
21. Source of Finance: 
a. Federal b. State c. Statutory Body d. Others 
i . Grant ii . Loan 
22. Name of Reporting 23. Address 24. Telephone 
Officer 
25. Date 26. Address of Reporting Officer Filling the Form S3 
FOR SETIA SECRETARIAT USE 
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Appendix: A2 
Form S2 - Project Budget Allocation 
1.1 Ministry: 1.2 Department 13 Vote Head 1.4 Head 1.5 Sub-Head 
2. 0 Information on Project Allocation: 
2.1 No. 2.2 Project No. 2.3 Total 2.4 Malaysia Plan 
Project Name Approved Project Allocation 
Project Scope Cost Estimates Estimates 
Project Objective 
Progress Project 
2.5 Total Expenditure 2.6 Current Year Allocation 2.7 Forecast Allocation 
3 .0 Verified by Reporting Officer 
3.1 Name 3.2 Date: 3.3 Telephone 3.4 Signature 
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Appendix: A3 
Form S3 - Monitoring the Progress of Project Implementation 
Part A 
1.1 Project No 
2.0 Project Development Name 
1.2 Component No. 
3.0 Project/Component Objective/Scope 3.1 Revised Project/ Component 
Objective/Scope 
4.0 Component Location 
5.0 Project/Component Cost 5.1 Project Component Revised Cost 
6.0 Foreign Loan 
(a) Source of loan 
7.0 Project Consultants 
8 .0 Overall Status of Project/Component 
(b) Loan Number 
7.1 Reason for Change of Consultant 
(a) Physical (b) Users have received 
implementation of project benefits of projects 
(d) Project/component 
postponed 
Reason Postponed 
(c) Last payment of 
project has been settled 
Year project implemented 
again 
(e) Project Abandoned Reason Abandoned 
8.1 Percentage of Project Completion 
9.0 Problems of Project Implementation 
PartB 
(1) Activity 
Code 
PartC 
(2) Sub- (3) Date 
Activity Code Activity 
Started 
(4) Planned (5) Revised 
Activity Activity 
Complete Complete 
Project Expenditure 
1.1 Vote Head 1.2 Head 
2.0 Last Term Expenditure: 
3.0 Current Term Expenditure: 
Reporting Officer: Office Address: Telephone: 
1.3 Sub-Head 
Date: 
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Appendix: A4 
Output Produced from Listings in Forms SI, S2, and S3 for Economic Planning 
Unit 
• List of development projects under a certain plan according to the State, Ministry, 
Department, Development Objectives, District and Project Identification Number. 
• List of development projects with information on expenditure and physical 
progress by sector 
• List of projects after yearly allocations 
• List of projects financed by the Federal Government according to State, Ministry, 
Development Objectives, District and Project Identification Number 
• List of projects financed by the State Government according to State, Ministry, 
Development Objectives, District and Project Identification Number 
• Summary of allocations according to State 
• Summary of allocations according to the development objectives 
• Summary of allocations according to development objectives and urban/rural areas 
• Summary of allocations according to sector codes 
• Summary of total projects according to development objectives and rural and 
urban areas 
